

# JOURNAL of CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

## THE NEW LEGAL SYSTEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by Václav Beneš

### I.

#### *The Impact of Stalinism*

THE SOVIETIZATION of the states of central-eastern Europe was not the result of convulsive revolutionary outbursts and of a desperate struggle for power which characterized the establishment of Communism in Russia, but of a gradual process, following a unitary pattern, prepared well in advance by Moscow and by the leaders of international Communism. Thus the satellite Communist Parties have been able to avoid, in the realm of ideology, all those mistakes and pitfalls which Lenin termed the "child diseases of Communism."<sup>1</sup> In fact, there was little need of a search for new forms, or for the adaptation of theory to practice. Both were supplied, ready made, by the Soviet Union.

Officially, the people's democracies have been described as an expression of the transitory stage from bourgeois democracy to the "higher" type of democracy, represented by the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> The term *transition* itself would imply that there are still important differences between the Soviet Union and its satellites. Today, however, these differences appear to be more in degree and in form than in substance. The rapid advance toward complete identification with the Soviets indicates clearly that—far from representing a specific path to socialism—the concept of a people's democracy was a political expediency to be abandoned after the Communist seizure of power. This change is perhaps most evident in Czechoslovakia where the people's democracy was regarded as a new type of social system unique in its aims and methods. Before the Communist *coup d' état* of February 1948, Prime Minister Gottwald repeatedly stressed the neces-

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin's "Left-Wing Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" in *Selected Works*, English Edition Vol. VII, p. 351-378.

<sup>2</sup> L. P. Trainin, "Demokratia Osvobogo Tipa," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, 1947, Nos. 1 and 3.

sity of Czechoslovakia following "its own" way towards the establishment of socialism.<sup>3</sup> After the seizure of power, the conception of people's democracy, though officially still valid, was given a new interpretation, rendering it identical with the dictatorship of the proletariat.<sup>4</sup> This "evolution" of ideas in Czechoslovakia was only the culmination of a development which earlier had taken place in the other satellite states of central and south-eastern Europe. Although they have been saved by the friendly sharing of experience from the "child diseases" of early Communist society, the people's democracies have succumbed completely to that brand of Communism which is generally described as Stalinism.

In no field is the trend towards complete identification with the present Soviet system more evident than in law and in the organization of state power. Far from being an expression of social reality—there is ample evidence that sovietization is being strongly resisted by the majority of the people—law has become the main instrument by which the Communist reality is to be put into effect. It is the purpose of this article to examine the development of the new legal system of Czechoslovakia. As a matter of fact, analogous trends prevail in the new legislation of the other satellites so that conclusions which may be arrived at here also apply, in the last analysis, to them.

In accordance with one of its definitions, the people's democracy represents a social system valid in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. It can no longer be considered as capitalistic; neither is it yet socialistic. The people's democracy may be considered as that stage of social development in which only the foundations of socialism are being laid. In its essential characteristics, this period is equivalent to the initial stage of the Soviet Union, from the October Revolution to the establishment of socialism by the acceptance of the Stalin Constitution in 1936. Both—the initial Soviet legal and social order until the Stalin Constitution, and the present legal order of the states of people's democracy—fulfil essentially

<sup>3</sup> "As a result of social changes and of national and democratic revolution, which broke the power of the strongest and most reactionary capitalists and estate holders and which gave the power into the hands of the people, conditions have been created for the emergence of a social system of a new, hitherto unknown, type which we call people's democracy. Conditions have arisen for a pacific development towards socialism without further revolutions and the dictatorship of the proletariat." Klement Gottwald in an interview given to Russell Hill and William Attwood of the *New York Herald Tribune* in September 1947, quoted from *O československé zahraniční politice* (on Czechoslovak Foreign Policy), p. 39.

<sup>4</sup> See H. Gordon Skilling, "People's Democracy, the Proletarian Dictatorship and Czechoslovak Path to Socialism," in *The American Slavic and East European Review*, X (1951), pp. 100-116.

the same function and are identical by their class nature, their aims and tasks.<sup>5</sup>

However, this statement can hardly stand the test of historical facts. The initial period of the Soviet Union was characterized by the frantic efforts of the new régime seeking the forms appropriate to its substance. In the field of law this meant a constant search for an ideological and philosophical foundation for the legal system of a changing society. The fate of Pashukanis, Stuchka and other representatives of the nascent Soviet jurisprudence who had been rejected as deviationists from true Leninism and wreckers of the Soviet State is an eloquent proof of the cataclysmic nature of this process. The Soviet jurists moved from the absolute negation of law in socialist society, based on the abstract interpretation of Marxism and expressed by the so-called Commodity Exchange Conception of Law, towards the theory of the necessity of law in Communist society.<sup>6</sup>

It is significant that the jurisprudence of the people's democracies did not even attempt to formulate a special, entirely independent, legal theory, corresponding to the peculiar characteristics of their social development. This, after the transformation of the people's democracy into a dictatorship of the proletariat—the only orthodox path leading towards socialism—appeared, no doubt, to be unnecessary. Furthermore, any attempt to formulate a legal theory in the transition from capitalism to socialism might have easily led to the revival of conceptions which the Soviet Union rejected as subversive and dangerous. The mere possibility of an accusation of "deviationism", which might have followed, was a powerful enough deterrent even to those who, in the satellite Communist Parties, are regarded as representatives of the new jurisprudence. Thus, with regard to the theory of state and law, the people's democracies cannot be considered as going through a period which is either identical with, or similar to, the earlier stage of Soviet society. As in all other respects, so in the realm of law, the basic concepts of present day Soviet jurisprudence have been almost slavishly adopted.

## II.

### *The New Ideological Basis of Law*

The new conception of law is based on the present Soviet interpretation of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, the only ideology permitted

<sup>5</sup> Vladimír Procházka, "Ústava z 9. května a její první výročí" (The Constitution of May 9th and its First Anniversary), in *Právnik* (1949), p. 196.

<sup>6</sup> "Marxism teaches that law must be used as a means of struggle for socialism, one of the means of the reconstruction of society on a new basis . . .," Soviet Constitutional Law, quoted from "Soviet Civil Law" by Vladimir Gsowski, pp. 187f.

in the Soviet sphere. Law is derived from the new economic order as its by-product—a superstructure built over the material foundations of life. It seeks to express the relationships of men as they arise in the productive process of commodities. These factors alone can determine the form and content of law. The new approach has been expressed as follows:

In the construction of the new legal order, corresponding to the social conditions of life in a people's democracy, we must start from a scientific point of view which for many of our jurists is entirely new and which differs substantially from the traditional conception of legal science. We do not consider law and legal thinking to be a sphere separated from social life—a part of the social consciousness which develops in accordance with its own rules, the changes of which can be explained in the terms of these changes alone. We realize that law and legal thinking, as well as the manner in which the individual legal questions derived from the needs of society are solved, are dependent on the method of production, the social, and especially the economic conditions which represent the social basis of life.<sup>7</sup>

The aim of law is to be the bearer of the changed power-relationships within the state and the expression of the new conception of the economic life. It is to provide stability to the social system, protect the rules of socialist life and the new institutions of society, in particular, socialist collective property. It is to serve as a weapon to crush the enemies of the state and all elements hostile to socialism. The State Procurator, Dr. Juraj Vieska, defined the aim of law in a people's democracy by the following words:

The law is not a grammatical formulation. The law of the bourgeoisie is a lash for the working class. The law of the working class is an iron fist of the people against those who obstruct the path towards socialism.<sup>8</sup>

The first program of the government of Antonín Zápotocký of June 17, 1948 called for the change of the old and the creation of a new legal order in keeping with the "spirit of the new reality." The aim of the old capitalist legal order which the Republic had partly inherited from Austria-Hungary, was the securing of the power-political position of the exploiting classes. The legal order of the people's democracy must be definitely separated from all remnants of capitalism. Having adopted the method of gradual transformation, the Communist régime in Czechoslovakia avoided the anarchy which followed the destruction of the Czarist state in Russia. After the Communist seizure of power, however, the existing laws and

<sup>7</sup> Alfred Dressler, "K ideovým zásadám nového občanského práva" (On the Ideological Foundations of the New Civil Law), in *Právnik*, Vol. 88 (1949), p. 8f.

<sup>8</sup> Juraj Vieska, "Komentované zákony; Ochrana lidově demokratické Republiky v novém trestním zákoně" (The Law Commentary; The Defense of the People's Democratic Republic in the New Criminal Code) p. 10.

regulations were interpreted in the light of the people's democracy and the interests of the working class. This principle found its expression in the new Communist Constitution of 1948, which stipulated that the judges should abide by the laws and orders of the Republic and interpret them in the light of the Constitution and of the principles of the people's democratic order.<sup>9</sup> Here a comparison can be made with the Soviet doctrine of "Socialist Legality." Again, the most recent, i.e. the Stalinist, interpretation of "Socialist Legality" was adopted.<sup>10</sup> Although the government is not bound by the legal order, the judge and administrator are not given the right of arbitrary interpretation of law. In the application of the new legal order, they must start from the actual economic and social organization of life, and avoid, at all costs, the erection of a wall of *metanormativity* between law and society, which was a characteristic feature of the bourgeois period. For it is imperative to realize the close relation of both. What this means can be seen from the following quotation:

In the interpretation of the new legal order, the intellectual and scientific method, acquired through the analysis of old law, is insufficient. No greater mistake could be committed than to try to approach and to interpret the new legal system in the terms of old conceptions and systematics which have arisen a long time ago, and were fashioned to serve the needs of bourgeois society.<sup>11</sup>

What is to be the basis of this new approach to, and interpretation of, the new law has been expressed quite unequivocally by A. Čepička, the former Minister of Justice:

The application of law in any of the sectors of our national life would be impossible if legal conclusions should not be based on the reasoning of men whose world outlook is that of dialectical and historical materialism—men who in their thinking use the dialectical method, which represents a more advanced stage than mere logic. It is therefore necessary that the jurist should be fully acquainted with Marxism, and should accept the Soviet jurisprudence as the source of his knowledge.<sup>12</sup>

### III

#### *The Legal Two-Year Plan*

The transition, in the legal field, from "mere" democracy to a people's

<sup>9</sup> Sec. 143.

<sup>10</sup> It is directed towards the protection of the limited sphere of private rights which, it is held, coincide with the interests of socialist society. Socialist Legality protects them against arbitrary measures of the local inferior authorities. From interference by the government, however, they are not safe; Soviet Civil Law, *op. cit.*, pp. 191f.

<sup>11</sup> *Pravnik*, Vol. 88, 1949, p. 1f.; the editorial introducing the new legal review; replacing the previous *Pravnik* and *Právní prakse*.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52, A. Čepička, "Postavení a poslání právníků" (The Position and Mission of Jurists).

democracy has been accomplished at a record pace. After little more than three years of Communist rule, Czechoslovakia was given a legal system based in its substance on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the experiences of the Soviet Union. Ironically enough, the new régime realized some of the old aspirations of Czechoslovak jurisprudence, strictly in accordance, however, with the concepts of Communist doctrine. For ever since 1919 the Czechoslovak jurists had been working on the unification<sup>13</sup> and revision of the civil and criminal law. The relatively slow progress<sup>14</sup> of their efforts could be only partly explained by the enormous scope of their task and their profound sense of responsibility.<sup>14</sup> Under Communism, this vast and highly technical work was accomplished at a literally "Stakhanovite" tempo. In the autumn of 1948, the Minister of Justice was entrusted with the task of carrying out of the so-called "Legal Two-Year Plan," which had as its aim the change of existing laws and the drafting of new ones so that the legal structure of the Republic would correspond to the requirements of the new political order. Old codes and statutes—some valid for more than a century and gradually adapted to the changed circumstances of time by the most prominent lawyers both of Austria and Czechoslovakia—were replaced within the short period of two years. In this hasty work legal conceptions based on the efforts of whole generations of jurists were rejected as "outmoded" derivatives of the bourgeois way of life.

In the development of the new legal order, an ever increasing tendency towards identification with the Soviet legal system can be traced. Thus the new Constitution, adopted little more than two months after the Communist *coup d'état*, still contains a number of principles and provisions to be found in the democratic constitutional instruments of the West. Nevertheless, the more recent legislation—in particular the new Criminal Codes—in its conception and emphasis has greatly leaned on the Soviet model and followed closely the Soviet legal ideology. Hence, complete identification is a matter of time, not of principle. This fact has been clearly demonstrated by the declaration made by the Minister of Justice, Štefan Rais, on the occasion of the adoption of the new Civil Code, protecting, with very important limitations, private ownership of land. He stated in the National Assembly:

In view of the present policy of the government, in particular with regard to agriculture, the Civil Code also recognizes as private ownership what has

<sup>13</sup> After 1918, there were two legal systems in Czechoslovakia—the Austrian in the West, and in the East the Hungarian; hence the need for unification.

<sup>14</sup> The adoption of some of the draft codifications was delayed for political reasons; In particular, this was true of the draft Civil Code, which was finished already in the thirties.

not been acquired by work of the owner, so long as it serves his personal needs. It is a further question of state policy, in the period of the establishment of socialism, to decide when this category of property should disappear.<sup>15</sup>

The first five months of the Communist régime can be described as the revolutionary period. Though the government endeavoured to give legal sanction to at least some of its actions,<sup>16</sup> the majority of measures of the Action Committees, which represented the organs of the Communist revolution, were taken *extra legem*. Only later were these measures validated by retroactive legislation. The Law of July 21, 1948,<sup>17</sup> declared all measures taken by the Action Committees, in the period between February 20, 1948, and the date of the promulgation of the Law, to be legal, provided that their aim was the protection, or the securing, of the people's democratic order, or the purge of the public life of the Republic.

#### IV.

##### *The New Constitution and Public Law.*

The adoption of the new Constitution of May 9th, 1948, was a prelude to the end of the revolutionary phase. It also represented the close of the constitutional provisorium which started after the liberation of 1945, when the Communists and the majority of Socialists claimed that the old Constitution of 1921 was no longer applicable. Though the new document was the creation of a Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly, established already in 1946, the Communist *coup d'état* of February 1948 had a decisive influence on its final drafting. The present Czechoslovak Constitution—unlike those of the other People's Democracies which slavishly follow the Soviet model<sup>18</sup>—contains a number of orthodox liberal provisions. The Parliamentary Report on the Constitution admitted that it "was linked with the democratic principles of its predecessor," being composed of two parts: the older part taken over from the previous Constitution, and

15 Quoted from the *Hospodář* (Economist) of October 12, 1950, as stated in the "Report on Czechoslovakia," Vol. I., No. 20, p. 10; published by the National Committee for a Free Europe.

16 See for instance: The Laws of March 25, 1948, Nos. 38, 34 of the Collection of Acts, re-introducing the validity of the post-war retribution legislation concerning the punishment of war criminals and collaborators; A number of regulations issued in the month of February by the Ministry of the Interior, relating to the reorganization of the National Committees, made necessary by the mass dismissal of their members; Sec. 11 of the Law of April 28, 1948, No. 138 of the Collection of Acts, Relating to the Control of Apartments, permitting the eviction of politically unreliable persons.

17 The Law Concerning the Regulation of Certain Public Relationships for the Defense of Public Interests, No. 213 of the Collection of Acts.

18 See "Constitutions of the Soviet Satellites" by George C. Guins, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, September 1950, Vol. 271, p. 74.

the new one expressing the needs of the new social order. The Report, however, added that the main emphasis was to be laid on the more recent parts of the constitutional document, which, indeed, have also given a new meaning and significance to the provisions originating in the liberal period.<sup>19</sup>

From the political point of view—which under Communism is also legally decisive—the most important provisions of the Constitution are to be sought in its introductory "Declaration" which forms an integral part of the whole instrument.<sup>20</sup> It expresses the spirit of the Constitution and the main principles on which it is based, which, it is declared, are the main consideration in the interpretation of its detailed provisions.<sup>21</sup> The Declaration rejects emphatically the pre-war past of the Republic, extolls the Soviet Union as its only friend and savior, and accepts as a goal of the Czechoslovak people's democracy the establishment of a new social order—socialism. By "socialism" the authors of the Constitution understood that phase of social development which the Soviet Union claimed to have achieved through the adoption of the Stalin Constitution.

All the other parts of the Czechoslovak Constitution must be read and interpreted in the light of the Declaration. This applies, in the first place, to the organization of the economic system. A privileged position is guaranteed to the so-called socialist ownership, *i.e.*, to the national (state and communal) property, and to the people's cooperative property. All personal property, such as household utensils and articles of personal use, as well as family dwelling houses, and savings derived from personal labor, is declared inviolable.<sup>22</sup> Finally, private property, namely small and medium enterprises up to 50 employees,<sup>23</sup> and private ownership of land up to the limit of 50 hectares, tilled by the farmers personally,<sup>24</sup> are guaranteed. However, this latter sector of national economy, which has been described as capitalistic, may be subjected to nationalization in accordance with special laws passed under the Constitution.<sup>25</sup> This method left the door wide open

19 See "Ústava 9. května" (The Constitution of May 9th), p. 101, published by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Information.

20 Sec. 171 of the Constitution.

21 The Parliamentary Report described the importance of the Declaration as follows: The introductory Declaration, however, is not a legal norm in the usual sense of the word. It is a political proclamation which represents the main interpretative aid for the new Constitution . . . Its introduction and the closing part, and, in particular, the clear statement that the peoples of both our nations want to follow the path of people's democracy towards socialism, can be used for such interpretation; See Ústava 9. května (The Constitution of May 9th), *op. cit.*, p. 115.

22 Sec. 158 (2).

23 Sec. 158 (1).

24 Sec. 159.

25 Sec. 153 of the Constitution stipulates (i) Which sectors of the economy and which economic and other assets are or shall be nationalized and to what extent shall be

to the development which, in the Declaration, has been described as the "road to socialism." As the later practice of the government proved, it meant a road to sovietization on the Russian model.

Very interesting and indicative of future developments was the interpretation given to the economic provisions of the Constitution by one of its main authors, Vladimír Procházka.<sup>26</sup> In an article written one year after the adoption of the Constitution,<sup>27</sup> he distinguished five categories of ownership: (i) National property; (ii) The property of the people's cooperatives; (iii) The ownership of land by farmers who till it personally—the so-called "work property" of the peasants; (iv) Private property of physical persons and of corporate bodies, limited with regard to industrial enterprises to 50 employees, and by the general prohibition of misuse to the detriment of the community; (v) Personal property, as a special privileged category within the scope of private property. To this classification V. Procházka added that, under the circumstances which have developed in our economy, the difference between the individual categories of ownership is not particularly great, and that "a tendency is to be observed towards the amalgamation of the conception of private property with that of personal property." V. Procházka did not mention what is to happen with private enterprises permitted under Sec. 158 (1) of the Constitution. This apparently was unnecessary in view of the provision of Sec. 153, relating to nationalization, and of "the circumstances which have developed in our economy."

Of the other provisions of the Constitution the most important is the recognition of the national identity of the Slovak nation, within the limits, however, of state unity. The Constitution provides for Slovak national organs, both legislative and executive. But the division of legislative powers between the central parliament and the Slovak National Council is not clear. The Prague government has retained, in many respects, a dominant position. In particular, the control of the police is entirely in the hands of the central government, the members of which are also entitled to exercise their authority in Slovakia directly.

The most important legislative measure in the field of public law was the reorganization of the system of local government through the establishment of regional administrative units (Regional National Committees) which replaced the former division on the basis of the individual

prescribed by Act. (ii) The extent of nationalization carried out under nationalization Acts cannot be restricted. (iii) By nationalization the ownership of the affected enterprises and other economic units and property rights shall pass to the state."

<sup>26</sup> Dr. Vladimír Procházka, recent Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States was parliamentary "General Rapporteur" of the New Constitution.

<sup>27</sup> "The Constitution of May 9th and its First Anniversary," cited in note 5 supra, p. 109.

Provinces.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, a number of measures were enacted regulating the function, jurisdiction, and organization of the Regional, District, and Communal National Committees, which, already after 1945, have become the sole representatives of local autonomy, responsible for the public administration in all its aspects. The characteristic feature of this legislation is the strict subordination of the local representative and administrative organs to the Minister of the Interior, and to the Action Committees—organs of a purely political nature, standing outside the law, and entirely dominated by the Communist Party.

Of interest, in particular from the point of view of a radical departure from former traditions, in the new law regarding the acquisition and loss of citizenship.<sup>29</sup> The Ministry of the Interior may deprive of Czechoslovak citizenship a person who is resident abroad and who (i) was or is, engaged in activities hostile to the Republic; (ii) illegally escaped from Czechoslovak territory; (iii) did not return from abroad within a period of time fixed by the authorities.

By and large, it may be said that the legislative activity of the Parliament, in keeping with the program of the government, was to serve a dual purpose. In the first place, its general task was to express the changed circumstances of economic and social life, to serve as a means for the realization of the idea of socialist planning, to decrease the scope of the capitalist, i.e. private, sector of the national economy, and to create conditions favorable for a planned state economic activity.

Within the framework of this program a great number of laws were enacted, such as the second series of the nationalization laws,<sup>30</sup> new tax laws, measures regulating the organization and control of national enterprises and their mutual relations in a society in which the state had become the most powerful, and in most areas, the sole economic factor. All these measures are characterized by the ever increasing extent of strict control over the entire economic activity within the framework of the Uniform Economic Plan, and the dwindling measure of the economic independence of the individual. Of fundamental importance in this respect is the Five-Year Plan, adopted on October 28th, 1948 and put into operation on January 1st, 1949. Its far-reaching implications in the legal and political sphere

<sup>28</sup> The Law of December 21, 1948, No. 231 of the Collection of Acts, on the Organization of Regions.

<sup>29</sup> The Law of June 30, 1948, No. 174 of the Collection of Acts.

<sup>30</sup> The first series of nationalization laws came soon after the liberation, being promulgated on the 28th of October, 1948, the second immediately after the Communist seizure of power.

lie particularly in the strengthening of the nationalized industry and of the socialist sector of economy.<sup>31</sup>

In the field of social legislation by far the most important measure was the enactment of the National Insurance Law,<sup>32</sup> extolled by the government and controlled press as providing for a complete system of social security, unsurpassed by any country except the Soviet Union. Under careful scrutiny, however, it appears that the law, far from introducing new categories of social protection, is a mere codification of the existing social legislation, the bulk of which was already enacted in the pre-war period.

The second task of the legislative activity of the new régime was to protect and to secure the people's democratic order against any possible attacks, or attempts at resistance, even of a passive nature, and to provide for the full protection of the socialist economic order. Such measures led, even to a greater extent than the new economic and social legislation, to the gradual erasing of the hitherto existing legal system. They also reflected more clearly the Communist conception of law, as well as the changed approach to its function in the life of society. Indicative of these new tendencies and of the trend which the future legislation would follow is the statement of the former Minister of Justice, Alexej Čepička, made in the Prague Parliament on December 22nd, 1948. Dealing with the mission of law and its importance for the building up of Czechoslovak socialism, he emphasized especially the ruthless struggle against all disruptive and reactionary activities, the energetic suppression of all kinds of economic sabotage and attempts to disrupt the socialist elements of national economy or damage state or national property. In addition, he mentioned explicitly the incessant struggle against whispering propaganda, and the efforts to fulfil the economic plan, both industrial and agricultural.<sup>33</sup>

The realization of this program required, in the first place, the change of the judicial organization so that the judiciary would become a willing and efficient instrument of the governmental policy. This was achieved by the Law on the People's Judicial System,<sup>34</sup> the main characteristic of which is the introduction, in addition to professional judges, of the so-called "people's judges." This provision which can be found in all sovietized legal systems, is an implementation of the new Constitution.<sup>35</sup> It

<sup>31</sup> See John Cardew, "The Czechoslovak Five-Year Plan," *New Central European Observer* (London), February 19, 1949, p. 44.

<sup>32</sup> Law of April 15, 1948, No. 99 of the Collection of Acts.

<sup>33</sup> See "Právní prakse" (Legal Practice), Vol. XII, p. 283f.

<sup>34</sup> "Zákon o zlidovění soudnictví" (The Law on the People's Judicial System) of December 22, 1948, No. 319 of the Collected Acts.

<sup>35</sup> Art. XI (2) and Sec. 140, stipulating that the courts shall discharge their power through benches, consisting, as a rule, of professional judges and lay judges: each of whom is equal in any decision.

provides for the participation of people's judges in courts of all instances (including the Supreme Court) where a collegiate decision is required. Political reliability, and especially loyalty to the idea of the people's democracy, has become the main qualification for the appointment of all judges. With people's judges, this is the only qualification required.<sup>36</sup> In all cases the people's judges constitute the majority on the bench, and their supremacy is further strengthened by the provision that they are to cast their votes first.<sup>37</sup>

All the people's judges, including those appointed to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, are appointed by administrative authorities.<sup>38</sup> Their status is very similar to that of other administrative officials since at any time they may be recalled by the appointing authority. They do not enjoy the privileged status guaranteed by the Constitution to professional judges. As the people's judges have a majority on all benches, the Constitution fails to provide adequately for the independence of the judiciary, taken as a whole.

The Law on the People's Judicial System granted to the lay element a decisive function also in the organization of public prosecution. The "people's prosecutor" is a counterpart of the people's judge. He is entitled to intervene in all cases where the interest of the state and of the working class are involved. His professional status and method of appointment are regulated in the same manner as those of the people's judges, and his sole qualifications are his faithfulness to the people's democratic order and knowledge of the official Communist ideology.<sup>39</sup>

People's judges and people's prosecutors participate also in the proceedings before the State Tribunal, established for the purpose of trying all major offenses against the security of the Republic, in particular those of a political character.<sup>40</sup> Special provisions on procedure are to facilitate a speedy punishment of offenders tried before this court.

Of equal importance, from the point of view of the organization of the judicial system, is the regulation of the professional status of attorneys

<sup>36</sup> Sec. 11.

<sup>37</sup> Sec. 26.

<sup>38</sup> Sec. 10, providing for the appointment of people's judges in lower courts by the District and Regional National Committees, and in superior courts by the government.

<sup>39</sup> At the conference of people's prosecutors in Prague, on September 25, 1950, Stefan Rais, the Minister of Justice, commenting on the new penal law, declared: "The new penal law represents a very important support for the people's justice in dealing with its responsible tasks; a good knowledge of it is basic so that the people's prosecutors and the entire people's prosecutors must become profoundly familiar with Communist methods and practices." *Rudé Právo*, September 26, 1950.

<sup>40</sup> The Law Relating to the State Tribunal, of October 6th, 1948, No. 232 of the Collection of Acts.

at law—the advocates.<sup>41</sup> The practice of law has ceased to be a liberal profession, being subject to the strict control of the Ministry of Justice and assimilated to an administrative branch of the government.

A long series of penal laws was inaugurated by the enactment of the new Law for the Defense of the Republic,<sup>42</sup> which sought to provide an efficient weapon against all those whose activities would be directed against the state and its people. Largely based on the former Law for the Defense of the Republic of 1923, it has greatly increased the number of criminal offenses and the severity of punishment, extending criminal protection also to the state of an ally. Indicative of the conditions in Czechoslovakia after the Communist seizure of power is the introduction of a new criminal offense, consisting in unauthorized departure from the territory of the Republic, or refusal to obey an order to return from abroad.<sup>43</sup> Later, the Law for the Defense of the Republic was incorporated, with very little changes, into the new Criminal Code. Likewise the Law Relating to the Establishment of Forced Labour Camps,<sup>44</sup> introducing administrative punishment mainly for political offenders, was abolished by the new Criminal Code. The punishment by detention in a Forced Labour Camp was retained, however, both in the Criminal Code and in the Code of Administrative Criminal Law.

## V.

### *The New Civil Law.*

A radical change in the legal system came in the course of 1950, when new civil and criminal codes, both substantive and adjective, were adopted. This was the culmination of the legislative activity of the Communist régime, and can be considered as a further stage in the creation of the socialist legal order. It is also the expression of the increasing identification of the Czechoslovak legal order with that of the Soviet Union.

During the preparatory work on the new Civil Code, one of the leading Communist lawyers declared:

It is necessary to give more modern diction to the Civil Code which was based on the principles of the capitalistic social order. Hence, however, much more is at stake—we are concerned with a fundamental change in our civil law which, in the future, must not serve the interests of the bourgeoisie and

<sup>41</sup> The Law Relating to Advocates of December 20, 1951, No. 114 of the Collection of Acts.

<sup>42</sup> The Law of October 6, 1948, No. 231 of the Collection of Acts.

<sup>43</sup> Sec. 40.

<sup>44</sup> The Law on the Establishment of Forced Labour Camps of October 25, 1948, No. 247 of the Collection of Acts.

represent an instrument of exploitation. In our future development, the Civil Code must assume the function of a lever for the rebuilding of society on socialistic foundations.<sup>45</sup>

This point of view permeates the whole Code,<sup>46</sup> which entered into force on January 1, 1950. Being based on the principle that civil law is essentially a regulation of proprietary relations between citizens, it excludes from its scope family and marriage law. This is to emphasize that "family and marriage relations are to be freed from all proprietary interest and that, in a people's democracy, the family is to serve, above all, as a solid foundation for permanent reproduction of the nation and its future development, and not—as it is used under capitalism—as a predominantly economic unit."<sup>47</sup>

Thus marriage and family law was regulated by a special act.<sup>48</sup> The guiding principle of this new regulation is the conception that the family is no longer a private affair, but that it is primarily an important social institution with a special function and mission. Both spouses enjoy the same rights and duties, and the interests of the child are considered as paramount. Children born out of wedlock enjoy the same legal status as legitimate children. Parental authority is exercised in keeping with the interests of the child and for the benefit of society. With regard to divorce, the law follows closely the Soviet model. There is no enumeration of valid grounds for the dissolution of marriage, and the court has full discretion to consider, in each case, whether divorce should be granted.

While the Constitution guarantees full protection to all sectors of national economy, the Civil Code greatly favours the state and cooperative sectors, and limits radically the scope of the private one. The following quotation from an article written before the enactment of the Code, may serve as an explanation of this flagrant discrimination:

It is impossible to conceive of the people's democracy as of a static economic-political system . . . The future civil law must be a part of the development towards socialism. It must take into account the needs of economic planning which is important not only in the general field of production, but also in the fields related to civil law.<sup>49</sup>

From this conception of the civil law relationships it was only a step to the adoption of a Civil Code, stipulating in its first Section that "the foundation of the civil law rights is the constitutionally guaranteed social

<sup>45</sup> Alfred Dressler, "On the Ideological Foundations of the New Civil Code," *op. cit.* p. 9

<sup>46</sup> The Law of October 25, 1950, No. 141. of the Collection of Acts.

<sup>47</sup> Alfred Dressler, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>48</sup> The Law Relating to Family Rights of December 7, 1949, No. 265 of the Collection of Acts.

<sup>49</sup> Alfred Dressler, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

order of the people's democratic republic, and its socialist development."

The Civil Code distinguishes between three kinds of ownership: socialistic, personal and agricultural. Socialistic ownership is vested either in the state, or on the people's cooperatives.<sup>50</sup> These are the so-called socialistic corporate bodies to which the Civil Code grants special protection and certain privileges. Their property is inviolable and can be transferred only within the scope of the usual measures of administration, unless special regulations provide for conditions of transfer of such property.<sup>51</sup>

Special protection is granted also to the operation of the Uniform Economic Plan,<sup>52</sup> through which the state directs all economic activity. If a juristic act is important from the point of view of the fulfilment of the Plan, the "expression of will" must be interpreted in keeping with the aims and purposes of the Plan.<sup>53</sup> Its operation is secured by contracts specially suited to the needs of economic planning (the so-called economic contracts). If economic planning so requires, competent organs may impose definite obligations on the citizens. The legal relationships thus created are determined by the Civil Code unless otherwise provided.<sup>54</sup> Finally, in order to meet the requirements of economic planning, competent organs may change, or altogether abolish, the obligations flowing from legal relationships important for the fulfilment of the Uniform Economic Plan.

The tendency to remove all remnants of capitalism from the national economy is further expressed by the fact that the Civil Code—unlike the Constitution—does not include special provisions relating to private ownership. Only personal ownership is recognized, and the Code follows very closely the definition embodied in Section 158 (2) of the Constitution.<sup>55</sup> However, a number of provisions clearly discriminate in favour of socialistic ownership. Notably, wherever there is a conflict between personal and socialistic ownership, it is the latter that prevails.

The only exception to this clear-cut division is the express recognition of ownership of land. Section 110 of the Civil Code stipulates that "Proprietary relationships to land, being based on the principle that the soil belongs to those who till it, are regulated by the Civil Code unless special regulations provide otherwise." As was observed above,<sup>56</sup> this provision is

50 Secs. 100 and 101.

51 Sec. 104.

52 This special protection is granted to the Five Year Plan.

53 Secs. 251, 258.

54 Sec. 212.

55 Sec. 105, entitled "Personal Ownership," reads as follows: "Personal ownership relates, in particular, to household utensils and articles of personal use, family dwelling houses and savings derived from labor (personal property). Personal property is inviolable."

56 See note 15, *supra*.

being regarded by the government as a temporary solution which, in the development towards socialism, will be replaced by the principle of socialist ownership of land.

Unlike its predecessor, the new Civil Code does not regulate—apart from family and marriage law—the master and servant relationship. The provisions relating to commercial law have been greatly restricted, replacing entirely the former Commercial Code, which was abolished.

Along with the enactment of the Civil Code, a new Civil Procedure<sup>57</sup> was put into operation. It replaced all previous codes relating to procedure in civil matters, and provided for a radical simplification of the judicial process. In particular, the difference between contentious and non-contentious procedure, and the regulations concerning litigation *in forma pauperis* were abolished and the general competence of the Court of the first instance (District Court) was established. In keeping with the principle of "Socialist Legality," and in order to secure its full application, the organs of public prosecution were given the right to intervene in the procedure whenever the interests of the state, or of the working class, so required.

## VI.

### *The Sovietization of Criminal Law*

Criminal law occupies a central position in the whole new Czechoslovak legal system. It extends to areas which hitherto have not been covered by a special set of legal sanctions, and its main aim is to provide for the protection of the established political order, and to guarantee the smooth operation of the new economic system. As in the Soviet Union, the criminal law has become the main weapon to achieve the ends of state policy. Its ideological conception, its system, as well as its individual provisions, have been strongly influenced by Soviet legal theory and practice, and, in many cases, almost slavishly follows the Soviet model.

Perhaps most striking is the provision of Section 1 of the new Criminal Code,<sup>58</sup> stipulating that "the aim of criminal law is the protection of the People's Democratic Republic, of its socialist development, of the working class, and of the individual, as well as education in keeping with the rules of socialist cooperation." The ideological function of criminal law is stressed also in other parts of the Code. Thus, any criminal act ceases to be a delict, if committed in order to avert an impending danger to the People's Republic, to its socialist development, or to the interests of the working class.<sup>59</sup> The aim of punishment is defined as follows: (i) to destroy

<sup>57</sup> The Civil Procedure Code of October 25, 1950, No. 142 of the Collection of Acts.

<sup>58</sup> The Criminal Code of July 12, 1950, No. 86 of the Collection of Acts.

<sup>59</sup> Sec. 8.

the enemies of the working class; (ii) to prevent the offender from continuing in the commission of his offenses, and to educate him so that he would accept the rules of socialistic life; (iii) to exert an educational influence on other members of society.<sup>60</sup> The fact that the criminal act was an expression of enmity towards the people's democratic order is considered as an aggravating circumstance.<sup>61</sup>

The Code, distinguishing between three kinds of main punishments and thirteen different subsidiary ones, introduces new forms of punishment such as the loss of citizenship, the confiscation of all property, the prohibition of certain activities, and the prohibition of sojourn in certain parts of the state territory. In addition to the penalty of death and imprisonment, the Code introduced as the third main punishment, the so-called "corrective measures,"<sup>62</sup> consisting of temporary reduction of emoluments or salary and the deprivation of certain privileges derived from the work relationship.

A person convicted of enmity against the people's democratic order, even after the expiration of his punishment, may be assigned to a Forced Labour Camp for a period of up to two years if whilst serving his sentence he did not achieve a change of disposition justifying the assumption that he would lead an orderly life worthy of a toiler.<sup>63</sup>

Such and similar provisions characterize the General Part of the Criminal Code (Secs. 1-77), containing general rules and principles and the definition of all concepts. Likewise the Special Part (Secs. 78-312), which deals with the individual delicts, reflects strongly the new ideological basis of criminal law. The offenses enumerated therein can be divided broadly into three groups. The first category, which represents the most important and voluminous part of the whole Code, serves the purpose of the defense of the state and its economic order. It embodies practically all the provisions of the Law for the Defense of the Republic which it had abrogated,<sup>64</sup> crimes against the economic system,<sup>65</sup> and crimes threatening public order with regard to public affairs.<sup>66</sup> The second group contains conventional delicts

<sup>60</sup> Sec. 17.

<sup>61</sup> Sec. 20 (a).

<sup>62</sup> Secs. 37-41.

<sup>63</sup> Sec. 36.

<sup>64</sup> See page 19 *supra*.

<sup>65</sup> Crimes against the economic system, against the Uniform Economic Plan, against the currency, and against tax regulations and regulations relating to the exchange of goods with foreign countries.

<sup>66</sup> Offenses against the people's administration and judiciary, neglect of duty by public functionaries, offenses against public functionaries, bribery, offenses against public order.

as they are known in the non-Communist world. Finally, the Code includes delicts relating to military service and discipline.<sup>67</sup>

The Code lays the main emphasis on the first group of offenses, which generally can be termed political. The emergence of new crimes and of more severe punishments is determined by the new system of government and by the greatly enlarged scope of its functions. Indicative of the relationship between state and church is the establishment of a new crime consisting in the misuse of religious functions.<sup>68</sup> The crime of incitement to aggressive war reflects the recent political tendencies in the Communist world.<sup>69</sup> Some of the provisions are so broad that an entirely arbitrary application is possible.<sup>70</sup> Detailed provisions relating to the protection of the socialistic sector of national economy and of the Uniform Economic Plan correspond to the changed criteria of values to be protected by criminal sanctions in a society in which the interests of the individual are absolutely subordinated to those of the collective. This is most evident from the comparison of punishments imposed for the different types of offenses. For example, larceny, if committed against socialist or cooperative property, is punishable by imprisonment for a period of 1 to 20 years; if committed against the property of the individual, by imprisonment between 1 and 10 years.<sup>71</sup>

Similarly, the new Code of Criminal Procedure<sup>72</sup> provided for a far-reaching simplification of the hitherto valid criminal procedure. Of special interest are its provisions dealing with the position and prerogatives of the public prosecutors.

The introduction of administrative criminal law is perhaps the most eloquent evidence of the changed concepts of criminal justice. The Administrative Criminal Code<sup>73</sup> deals with all offenses which are not covered by the Criminal Code. Its main motive—the defense of the people's democratic order and of the new system of government against the non-conformist part of the population—has been explained very bluntly in the Parliamentary Report, adopted along with the actual text of the Code. The Report stated:

<sup>67</sup> Offenses against regulations relating to universal military service, military offenses.

<sup>68</sup> Sec. 123, referring expressly to the misuse of religious or spiritual functions with intent to influence matters of political life in a manner detrimental to the people's democratic order.

<sup>69</sup> Sec. 98, In December 1950 a special Law on the Protection of Peace (No. 165 of the Collection of Acts) was passed serving the same purpose.

<sup>70</sup> A state secret is defined as ". . . everything that should be kept a secret from unauthorized persons in an important interest of the Republic, particularly in political, military or economic interest." Sec. 75 (6).

<sup>71</sup> Secs. 245, 246, 247.

<sup>72</sup> Of July 12, 1950, No. 87 of the Collection of Acts.

<sup>73</sup> Of July 12, 1950, No. 88 of the Collection of Acts.

The reaction definitely defeated in February 1948, and forced into the underground, uses every opportunity to prevent, or, at least to obstruct, the building of socialism in our state. In the struggle against this class enemy, not only the criminal but also the administrative criminal justice, must become an efficient weapon of the people fighting against all enemies of the new social order, and against the wreckers of our progress towards socialism.<sup>74</sup>

The statement of the purpose of the Administrative Criminal Code which introduces its General Part (Secs. 1-32) is identical with that of the Criminal Code. It is to protect the People's Democratic Republic and its socialist development, to guarantee the interests of the working class and of the individual, and to educate people in the rules of socialist cooperation. The Code introduces a large range of penalties, dividing them in main and subsidiary ones. The main punishments are detention, public reprimand, or fine.<sup>75</sup> The penalty of detention is carried out either in a penitentiary, or in a Forced Labour Camp.<sup>76</sup> As a rule, the normal period of imprisonment is not to exceed 6 months; however, if the manner in which the offense was committed reveals a hostile attitude towards the people's democratic order of the Republic, or towards its socialist upbuilding, the sentence may be detention from three months to two years, to be served in a Forced Labour Camp. Subsidiary punishments, which may be imposed in addition to the main penalty, are the following: confiscation of property, interdiction of stay, confiscation of the object, and publication of the sentence.<sup>77</sup> Certain subsidiary penalties are imposed if the offender has intentionally shown manifest hostility towards the people's democratic order, or if the interests of the people so require.<sup>78</sup> On the other hand, if the interests of the people do not necessarily demand the punishment of an offender who leads an orderly life of a working person (toiler), the National Committee may stay the execution of the punishment.<sup>79</sup>

Only a few provisions of the Special Part of the Code (Secs. 33-152), containing an enumeration of the individual delicts, refer to acts which might be described as ordinary offenses. The Special Part deals almost entirely with the protection of the different aspects of the new economic and political system, introducing a great number of entirely new crimes. Its

<sup>74</sup> "Nové trestní právo" (The New Administrative Criminal Law) published by the Ministry of the Interior, Prague, 1950, pp. 67f.

<sup>75</sup> Secs. 18, 19, 20.

<sup>76</sup> Sec. 17.

<sup>77</sup> Secs. 21-26.

<sup>78</sup> Sec. 21, relating to the confiscation of property; The Parliamentary Report on the Code stated that "the subsidiary penalties are to serve, in the first place, as a means for the elimination of capitalistic elements," The New Administrative Criminal Law, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

<sup>79</sup> Sec. 16.

class motivation is clearly evident from the Parliamentary Report. Commenting on the provisions of Head I of the Special Part of the Code relating to the protection of the economic system, it states:

Its main aim is to protect the pillars of our economic system—national property and nationalization itself. Through the nationalization of natural resources, industry, wholesale trade, banking and of other material assets we have broken the capitalistic rule of the bourgeoisie, and economically secured the building of socialist society. National property has become one of the most efficient weapons in the struggle for the complete abolition of exploitation of man by man, and for the liquidation of the remnants of capitalism. As Marxism-Leninism and experience have taught us, this is the main reason why the efforts of the united bourgeoisie are directed against the economic foundation of the state.<sup>80</sup>

The purpose of the other parts of the Code is to provide for the protection of labour, the health of the people, and of the supply system (Head II); of order in public affairs (Head III); of universal military service (Head IV); of the cultural life of the working class (Head V); and of the community life of citizens (Head VI).

In keeping with Art. 135 (2)<sup>81</sup> of the Constitution, the Code of Administrative Criminal Procedure<sup>82</sup> placed the prosecution and punishment of administrative offenses in the hands of organs of state and local administration. Thus, not only a judge—even though a "people's judge"—but also a government or local administrative official, or any other person acting in a similar capacity, can deprive people of their personal freedom and impose grave penalties. Here the penal authority is exercised by the District National Committees, which, as a rule, act as organs of the first instance. Regional National Committees deal with appeals lodged against the decisions of the District National Committees. The Government, however, may by an ordinance entrust the Local National Committees with the power to deal in the first instance with certain specified offenses.<sup>83</sup> The criminal jurisdiction of the National Committees is exercised by special "People's Penal Commissions" which are entirely composed of laymen. They are appointed by the National Committees or by the Government.

The main characteristics of the Code of Administrative Criminal Procedure are speed and an informality which is necessary in view of the lack

<sup>80</sup> The New Administrative Law, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>81</sup> "The jurisdiction in matters of criminal law shall be discharged by criminal courts save where the general regulations prescribe that criminal cases shall be dealt with by administrative criminal proceedings."

<sup>82</sup> Of July 12, 1950, No. 89 of the Collection of Acts.

<sup>83</sup> A governmental ordinance determining the criminal jurisdiction of Local Nation Committee was passed in October 1951.

of training and experience of the members of the Penal Commissions. The Code empowers the Ministry of National Security to issue, in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior, detailed regulations relating to the establishment and conditions of detainment in the Forced Labour Camps.<sup>84</sup>

## VII.

### *Conclusion*

Being based on the traditional approach to legal systematics, this study endeavors merely to trace the new concepts of law and justice in the public, private, and, in particular, the criminal law of Communist Czechoslovakia. Therefore, no attempt has been made to provide for a complete guide to the new Czechoslovak legislation—a task by far surpassing the scope of this article.<sup>85</sup>

In the general evaluation of the new Czechoslovak legal order, it is necessary to bear in mind that the legal system of a society is much more than the sum of laws in force at a given time. Equally, if not more, important are human actions—the social behavior both of the individual and of the collective. This applies especially to Communist society, in which the relationships of man to man and of man to society are, in the last instance, determined by the Communist Party and its political and economic ideology. The Party frequently intervenes by extra-legal arbitrary measures, establishing a large gap between the law as written and the law as practiced. Possessing a monopoly over man's body and soul, it also determines the atmosphere in which law is applied, interpreted, and approached, moulding the legal and moral consciousness of people in keeping with its purpose. This fact—to no lesser degree than the actual character of the legislation—determines the legal system of Communist régimes, divorcing it entirely from the traditional conceptions as they are known in the West.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

---

84 Sec. 85 (2).

85 In particular, the treatment of the new legal relationships between the different state and collective organs of economic activity is omitted.

## THE FIRST SOVIET DOUBLE CROSS

*A chapter in the secret history of World War II*

by F. C. Nano

**A**LTHOUGH THE Roumano-Soviet negotiations conducted at Stockholm in 1943 and 1944 were only a minor incident in the great drama of those days, the mere fact that they were initiated by Moscow, as well as their timing—with due allowance for “post hoc non propter hoc”—should be of interest to students of history. Various conclusions can be drawn with regard to the soundness, from the point of view of the West, of a policy which could not only lead Stalin to believe he might safely run the risk of being caught in the act of double-crossing his allies, but actually did force them to condone his breach of faith, nay, even put Mr. Churchill in the unenviable position of having to bestow the blessing of the West on the deed.

\* \* \*

I had been appointed Roumanian envoy to Sweden in September 1943. My mission was to ascertain whether there existed any disposition on the part of the Allies to discuss terms on which Roumania could surrender “unconditionally.”

The drawbacks and difficulties caused by strict application of the principle of unconditional surrender should have been especially obvious in the case of the eastern “satellites,” for, without preliminary negotiations and detailed arrangements with the Western Powers, surrender on the part of the individual minor allies of Germany could only end with the outright occupation by the Wehrmacht, followed by Soviet conquest and of course, the concomitant devastation of their countries.

In the following pages I shall refrain from any attempt to pass judgment on the policies of the Antonescu régime or of its predecessors, for the simple reason that the subject cannot be separated from the policies of the Great Powers, epitomized by the name Munich, and it is far too complex to be treated briefly in this article. I shall simply proceed from the fact that the Roumanian dictator, Marshal Antonescu, joined in Hitler’s attack on his Russian ally in June 1941, and since Britain thereupon chose to ally herself with Russia, Roumania was in 1943 technically at war with all the Allies.

But, needless to say, the vast majority of Roumanians felt even less sympathy for their Nazi ally, who, together with Italy in 1940, had despoiled their country of half of Transylvania, than did Americans or Englishmen later for their Russian ally. As an Eastern saying has it, “A man has

three kinds of friends: his friends, the friends of his friends and the enemies of his enemies." Germany was Russia's enemy and for Roumania, Russia was enemy number one.

Roumania's war aim was very simple: to recover Bessarabia, brutally and humiliatingly annexed by Russia in June 1940. Antonescu went further: what good would it do to occupy the province under cover of the German advance, if Russia was not ultimately defeated and sufficiently weakened to be rendered militarily impotent in the foreseeable future? After the failure of the Blitz offensive of 1941, it had become obvious that to defeat Russia, the Wehrmacht would need every bit of assistance it could get. The Roumanian army might prove to be just the extra weight needed to tip the balance.

It was also fondly hoped in Roumania that Nazi Germany would bleed herself white in the process and that Roumania, together with the rest of the world, would be rid of both the Nazi and the Soviet evils at one stroke. The corollary was, of course, the deep-rooted conviction that the leaders of the Western Powers were equally alive to the danger of a Russian victory and would maneuver with sufficient skill to prevent it. After all, they owed the Russians nothing—especially after all that happened in 1939.

But by the summer of 1943, it had become clear that the Axis armies would be unable to defeat Russia, at any rate without the connivance of the Western Powers. Of this, however, there were no signs. Just the opposite. Everything pointed to a policy of appeasing Stalin by giving in to him on every point, apparently on the theory that he could be trusted to keep faith with his allies in everything—except in the matter of not concluding a separate peace with Hitler. It began even to look as if the Western Powers might make the mistake of allowing the Russians to occupy the countries of southeastern Europe unless these countries rapidly withdrew from the war and obtained the protection of the Western Powers.

The opposition parties in Roumania, led by Maniu and D. Bratianu, officially banned under the Antonescu dictatorship, but still very much alive, had opposed the advance across the Dniester by the Roumanian army after the reoccupation of Bessarabia, and had been advocating ever since Roumania's withdrawal from the war. For this purpose the Opposition had established contact with the Western Allies through underground channels.

In the summer of 1943, Mihai Antonescu, Minister for Foreign Affairs (no relation to Marshal Antonescu but his *homme de confiance*) also decided it was high time to ascertain what chances Roumania had to make peace. Marshal Antonescu was, of course, *au courant*, but for obvious reasons, pretended ignorance until a satisfactory conclusion was reached. Naturally too, Marshal Antonescu could be expected to be difficult to please.

For a soldier, it was hard to admit defeat and hard to forsake an ally at a critical time.

The only justification for Roumania's further participation in the war being the aim to contribute to the defeat of Russia, there was obviously no more reason for her to go on fighting if the Western Powers, whose victory appeared certain, refused to countenance this object.

The urgent task for Roumania seemed, therefore, to be to ascertain on what terms she could extricate herself from the war and to learn how the Western Powers proposed preventing Russia from obtaining control of the country. For this purpose, a change of personnel in key neutral capitals was deemed advisable and among the new appointments was mine as envoy to Sweden. Needless to say, no assignment could have been more welcome, especially after I had held for almost two years the unenviable position of Chief of Protocol at the Foreign Office in Bucharest.

Mihai Antonescu's parting instructions had been quite vague. I was to seize every favorable opportunity to find out how the Allies would react to eventual peace overtures. However, he recommended the greatest caution. He shared with the western statesmen the fear of a separate peace between Hitler and Stalin and was afraid that in that case the Germans would be able to hold central and western Europe indefinitely, but would have to pay the price in the East. Obviously, the first to be sacrificed would be those allies who had proved disloyal.

Marshal Antonescu made no direct allusion to my mission. However, that he was aware of it was revealed by the fact that he too enjoined upon me the utmost circumspection, explaining that German suspicions were bound to be awakened by the simultaneous appointment in neutral capitals of new ministers not distinguished by their pro-Germanism. "You may tell those who may be interested," he said, "that I have informed Hitler that not a single Roumanian shot will be fired at American or British troops, should they appear in Roumania."

He obviously still believed there was a chance that the plan, generally attributed to Churchill, to strike at the soft "under belly" of Europe would be adopted and he wanted it known how soft it would prove to be.

\* \* \*

Toward the end of November, shortly after my arrival in Stockholm, Mr. Sampaio, the Brazilian minister whom I had met while we were both serving in Washington some years earlier, asked me through a mutual friend, whether I would not like to speak to our American colleague, Mr. Herschel Johnson. Mr. Sampaio would arrange the meeting.

Nothing could have suited me better, so I replied that as I had known

Mr. Johnson well in the old days I would be delighted to see him again and talk things over, although I had no special communication to make.

We met at Mr. Johnson's private residence the next day and spent about an hour chatting about mutual friends in Washington, life in Sweden and so forth, but my attempts to lead the conversation toward Roumania being ignored by Mr. Johnson, I finally got up to leave. Mr. Sampaio jumped up and asked excitedly why I was leaving without making the communication he had understood I was going to deliver. I replied there must be some misunderstanding as I had sent him word that I had no special message but had been prepared to discuss the position of Roumania if Mr. Johnson showed any interest in the subject. He had shown none, so there was nothing more to say.

Mr. Johnson replied that he had nothing to add to the official point of view of his government which was well known and that, as Minister of the United States, he could not enter into any discussions with representatives of enemy powers. He could only forward messages.

Mr. Johnson was clearly alluding to the official policy of unconditional surrender which had been extended at the Moscow Conference to cover the "satellites" also, and which had to be addressed to the three principal Allies jointly. It was clear that any illusions entertained in Roumania that events in Italy had taught the Western Powers a lesson had been vain.

It should have been obvious to them that the situation was even more complicated in Roumania than in Italy. There was nobody to surrender to, for even the Russians were still at a considerable distance from the Roumanian frontier, while the main Roumanian forces were likewise far away, with their communications at the mercy of the Germans. It would have been easy for the latter to replace the capitulating Roumanian Government with members of the Iron Guard, as they were to do later in Hungary with their counterparts. The Western Powers then would have gained nothing, far from it! Moreover, while the overwhelming majority of Roumanians were perfectly willing to surrender to the Americans or British, they preferred to fight on in the hope of a change of mind rather than surrender without guarantees that they would not be merely hastening a Russian occupation.

Needless to say, my interview with the American representative had deeply discouraged me. At least, it confirmed my growing belief that Washington and London had in fact, if not in name, resigned themselves to the division of Europe into "spheres of interest," Roumania falling within the Russian sphere.<sup>1</sup> The only hope now seemed to be that some other way could be found to open Roosevelt's eyes before it was too late.

---

<sup>1</sup> This policy was formally adopted in June 1944, over Mr. Hull's protest.

But it is the unexpected which always happens.

In this case, the chosen instrument of the unexpected was Mr. Goranoff. Mr. Goranoff was a Bulgarian journalist and "business man"—the kind who can always get you the things which are hard to find.

For some weeks, he had been urging my press attaché, Mr. Seinescu, to get in touch with his Soviet colleagues, assuring him that, in spite of the war, the Russians were very well disposed toward Roumania, and that if we were willing to collaborate actively with them, we would have no cause to regret it.

I had not taken these talks seriously. For all I knew, Mr. Goranoff might have been a German agent, and for a variety of reasons, I had no intention of taking the first step to meet the Russians.

But on December 21 he asked to see me and instead of offering me some rare vintage wine or prewar English tweed, he told me he had come to inform me that the Russians wished to enter into negotiations with us. He warned me that the Russians would make heavy demands, but that the rewards would be commensurate with the sacrifices.

This was indeed sensational news. I replied that I needed time to think the matter over and told Mr. Goranoff to come back for my answer the same day at 7 P.M. I had made up my mind by that time to take that chance of finding out what the Russians had in mind, without the delay necessary to consult my chief, even if it meant losing my job. I told Mr. Goranoff, however, that inasmuch as at the first interview there would be certain minor details to settle, such as means of identification, where to meet, etc., which could be arranged by minor officials, Mr. Seinescu would depu-tize for me.

By the 24th, Mr. Goranoff was back with the answer: The Russians demanded that no member of my staff, not even my counsellor, Mr. Duca, should know of our conversations for fear of indiscretions. I must not inform any of Russia's Allies. The Russians themselves would see to that.

I assented readily as I was well aware that other threads were being spun through different channels, both by the Government and by the Opposition, although I was not kept informed of the details, and only in Bucharest could the various strands be woven together. Furthermore, I knew that all my reports to Mihai Antonescu would pass through the hands of the chief of the decoding office, Niculescu Buzeshti, who was entirely devoted to Mr. Maniu.

It was true the Russian action was in sharp contrast with that of the Western Powers. But that was their business, not ours.

Mr. Goranoff told me he would soon let me know which member of the Russian Embassy I was to deal with, as well as where and when we

should meet. He then volunteered the assurance that I would find the Russians extremely reasonable. Russia was now Communist only in name, in fact, she was practically a democracy and firmly resolved to apply the principles of the Atlantic Charter!

Having sold me the idea of dealing with the Russians, Mr. Goranoff apparently decided I was an easy mark and rather unexpectedly produced a collection of second-hand jewelry which, he assured me, I could have for a song. I told him I would have to resist the temptation until after the war was over when the Russians had proved by deeds that they had renounced the acquisitive habits of Communism and I could be sure of keeping my property in Roumania.

\* \* \*

I was, of course, fully alive to the fact that I was assuming considerable responsibility and running certain risks by agreeing to deal with the Russians without specific instructions, for such a possibility could never have entered Mihai Antonescu's mind. However, I believed that a good diplomat should not be a Mr. Milquetoast. Although it was obviously our duty to leave no stone unturned in Washington and London, I had reluctantly reached the conviction, chiefly as a result of Polish developments, that there was but slight chance of persuading the Western Powers to oppose Russia. They had lashed themselves too firmly to the mast of unconditional surrender and no amount of arguing could open their eyes to the danger of letting Russia establish herself in the "Borderlands" with their vast natural and human resources. So the only thing left to aim for, it seemed to me, since defeat seemed inevitable, was to avoid the transformation of Roumania into a battleground like Italy. Nothing prevented us from negotiating on two fronts and while other colleagues were persevering in their efforts to persuade the Americans and the British, I could try to obtain the best possible terms of surrender from the Russians. However little faith I had in Stalin's word, still I felt it was my duty to try to obtain such terms, and the best way was by direct negotiations.

I feared that the detours via Washington and London, although they had to be made, would prove futile and only make the Russians more suspicious of us, for already the latent antagonism between Russia and her Western Allies seemed evident to me, and I felt sure it was the latter which would give in, for fear of a Russian defection. Actually, although the fact was only revealed to me a year later by Mr. Duca, the proof was even then available: Beginning in September 1943, and until Roumania's surrender on August 23, 1944, Mr. Duca was secretly acting as agent for the Opposition. Originally, he had established contact only with the American and British Legations, but was soon informed that

the Russians would have to share in the conversations, with the result that but little progress was made. The Russians suffered from no inhibitions. Their offer to start bilateral conversations with me was made exactly two days after Mr. Maniu's acceptance of the Anglo-American demand for Russian participation.

\* \* \*

On the afternoon of Christmas Day I was sitting in my study trying to concentrate on the daily batch of newspapers—with only indifferent success, the noise of a children's party in the next room being somewhat disturbing—when the footman came to announce that Mr. Goranoff wanted to see me with an important message. This call, without telephoning for an appointment and on such a day, was certainly startling, the more so as the Russians are not particularly noted for expeditiousness in the conduct of negotiations. The only conclusion I could draw was that Moscow attached greater importance than I expected to an agreement with Roumania.

But the man who appeared in the doorway was not Mr. Goranoff. "My name is Spichinski," he said in German. "Press Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy." . . .

With that he handed me his diplomatic identification card. But it was hardly necessary. He looked every inch of what I knew him to be: A member of the OGPU. He stared at me with his small cruel eyes, then with a nod toward the door of the living room he snapped, "Having a good time!"

"Oh, just a children's party," I murmured apologetically.

He had come to ascertain, he said, whether it were true that, as Mr. Goranoff had reported, I had asked to see the Soviet envoy, Mme. Kollontai, whether I was empowered to negotiate Roumania's surrender, and whether I had definite proposals to make.

I replied that according to Mr. Goranoff it was the Soviets who had certain suggestions to make to Roumania. Also, since it had been officially announced at Moscow only a few months ago that only unconditional surrender would be accepted, and, so far at any rate, we had no such intention, I could hardly have any proposals to submit. If the Soviets had anything to offer as a basis for negotiations, I was prepared to take the responsibility of meeting the Soviet negotiator and transmitting his terms to Bucharest.

Mr. Spichinski retorted that the unconditional surrender formula must not be interpreted narrowly, but that if Mr. Goranoff had said the initiative of these conversations had come from the Russian side, he had misrepresented the facts.

I let it go at that, although it was rather obvious that if that had been

the case, it was my representative who would have been in Mme. Kollontai's study and not Mr. Spichinski in mine.

Mr. Spichinski's next question was with whom I intended to get in touch in Bucharest, Mr. Antonescu, my official chief, or with Mr. Maniu?

I replied that it seemed to me preferable to deal with Mr. Antonescu. If satisfactory terms were worked out with the Antonescu Government, the Opposition would be certain to subscribe to them, while the contrary was unlikely. An agreement with the Opposition without the concurrence of the Government could, therefore, only be translated into fact after internal upheavals, of which the Germans would be the chief beneficiaries.

Mr. Spichinski expressed approval, but added that I should not expect any offer of terms from the Russian side. My reply was that I would, of course, report our conversation to my chief, who would perhaps have something concrete to offer.

In that case, said Mr. Spichinski, I should call him on the telephone from a public booth, under the assumed name of Jacobsohn.

New Year's Day 1944 brought two new developments. Mr. Goranoff—who was apparently still in good standing with the Soviets in spite of his "misrepresentations"—brought me a cryptic message from Mr. Spichinski. He was to tell me, "It was still not too late."

The same day, a courier arrived from Bucharest in the person of one of Mr. Antonescu's private secretaries, Mr. Barbul. He brought verbal instructions to continue dilatory conversations with the Russians, as Antonescu put great hopes on recently initiated talks with the American Ambassador in Madrid, and, naturally, he too preferred to reach agreement with the Western Powers rather than with Russia. I asked him whether it had occurred to Mr. Antonescu or the Opposition to inform the Western Powers of the Russian overtures and to put the choice up to them: Either to back us against the Russians or to give their blessings to direct negotiations between the Russians and us. He told me that to his knowledge this had not been done, but promised to convey my suggestion to the responsible quarters.

To my further question concerning the relationship between the government and the Opposition, Mr. Barbul replied that they seemed to him to have taken a turn for the better. Only the night before his departure, Mihai Antonescu had secretly conferred with Mr. Maniu for over three hours and had seemed in excellent spirits when they separated.

Presumably as a result of this conversation, Niculescu Buzeshti personally informed Mr. Duca on January 1, 1944 that the Opposition "welcomed the conversion of the Antonescu régime to a policy of collaboration with the Allies," which the Opposition had no intention to obstruct,

especially as the Antonescu Government was to a certain extent trusted by the Germans and could take the steps necessary to collaborate in the military field without arousing suspicion.

My next task was to decide how to keep the matters moving with the Russians, for I remained skeptical as to the chances of western support. At any rate I wanted to have a talk with one of the Russian higher-ups and arranged the matter through Mr. Spichinski. The following day at six in the apartment of the Soviet assistant naval attaché I met Mr. Semenoff, alias Kaufman, who was in charge of the Soviet Embassy during Mme. Kollontai's illness.

I went by taxi to within a block of the indicated address on a quiet, dimly-lit street and after being sure that I had not been followed, took the elevator to the third floor. The door of the apartment, which was obviously uninhabited, was opened by a man who turned out to be Mr. Semenoff himself, according to the identity card which he immediately produced. After a glance at mine, he proceeded to turn on the radio and asked me curtly in rather poor German what I had to say. In reply, I read out a short statement to the effect that Antonescu had welcomed the indication that a direct understanding with the USSR was not ruled out. However, it had not been possible, for technical reasons, to postpone the departure of the courier and so the time had been too short to study such an important matter adequately and to formulate concrete proposals. Antonescu asked if, in order to save time, in the meantime he could not be given some idea what the Soviets expected from Roumania and what they offered in return?

"Is that all?" snapped Mr. Semenoff. "We expected definite proposals. You have had ample time to formulate them since Mr. Goranoff first spoke to your press counsellor over a month ago!"

He then read me a complete record of the dates of their meetings.

I replied that it was, of course, only since my interview with Mr. Spichinski on December 25 that I had had any certainty that Mr. Goranoff was not an impostor or a German agent and until then our government had no way of knowing that the Soviets took a broad view of unconditional surrender.

"The situation is now no longer the same as a month ago," he retorted. "Our troops have reached the Bug River, the Germans are running away, and now we have not much to tell you."

Realizing his slip, he added hastily, "But, of course, it remains well understood that it was you who took the initiative in these conversations."

"All right," I answered, "but in Roumania we have a lot of German troops who are not running away and a surrender would have to be care-

fully worked out. Even if we should concede that the final victory of the Allies is a certainty, it cannot be the same to them if the war is shortened even by a few weeks only as a result of our withdrawal from the war."

Finally, I asked him to raise the question of the best avenue for negotiations, if they were initiated. Communications between Sweden and Roumania, through Germany, were risky. Perhaps Turkey would be more suitable?

That, Mr. Semenoff answered, would be decided later. He would report to Moscow. However, he felt sure, Moscow would not offer any terms but wait for concrete proposals on our part.

\* \* \*

The interview had been even more unpleasant than I had feared. It was a far cry from Mr. Goranoff's lyrical descriptions of Russia's friendly disposition toward us, of the alleged improvement in Soviet mentality, etc. But probably, I reflected, Mr. Goranoff had been sincere. It was the military situation which had changed after the Russian victory at Jitomir, and Mr. Semenoff's bullying attitude had merely mirrored that change.

It was, therefore, a great relief to me when on January 19, I received a cable from Mr. Barbul, informing me that although Mihai Antonescu approved my manner of proceeding, I was to take no further action. He wanted to await the outcome of other negotiations now being carried on, and besides, future conversations would very likely be held by a group of private citizens instead of the present Board of Directors. These instructions were confirmed on February 8, favorable developments being expected soon.

I understood Mihai Antonescu to be referring on the one hand to the Madrid negotiations with the American Ambassador and on the other to the probability of letting the Opposition take over the negotiations, on the assumption that they had a better chance of obtaining favorable terms from the Allies. The news gave ground for hope that, after all, some progress was being made in Washington and London, although all the friends I had in Polish, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak diplomatic circles—who looked upon Roumania much more as a sister in trouble than as an enemy—insisted that, according to the information they were receiving from those capitals, there was no chance of a stiffening in their attitude toward Russia, and they urged direct conversations with the Russians.

On March 14, there was a *coup de théâtre*: Reuter's and the British Radio announced the arrival in Ankara of Prince Stirbey, sent by the Opposition with Antonescu's approval to negotiate Roumania's exit from the war. The news itself was, of course, not startling to me, but the fact that it was broadcast by the Western Powers was. The leaders of the Roumanian

Opposition were aghast. In a telegram to Mr. Duca, Niculescu Buzeshti described their dismay and their fear of an immediate German occupation of the country. The measures already taken by the Antonescu government toward complete mobilization of the armed forces in order to be able to resist the Germans would have to be stopped to calm German suspicions. Surely these disadvantages greatly outweighed the propaganda value of the news.

However, for reasons best known to themselves, the Germans refrained from any attempt to seize complete control of Roumania as they did in Hungary a few days later. Presumably they felt they had sufficient troops in the country to prevent any defection, for by the end of March, the front ran through northern Roumania.

For their part, the Russians found it expedient to broadcast on April 2 a solemn statement to the effect that although they had to pursue the Germans across Roumania, they promised to respect the territorial integrity of the country as well as her social and economic institutions.

\* \* \*

I had a feeling that it would be better to remain in town over the Easter holidays, as I had done at Christmas and New Year's. The feeling proved justified. On Easter Sunday, April 10, a visitor was announced and this time he turned out to be my old friend Mr. Goranoff, himself. He told me that he had lately had a conversation with my press attaché, Mr. Seinescu, who had mentioned current rumors that the Russians intended to establish a new government in northern Moldavia, headed by two Communists, Groza and Professor Constantinescu. Mr. Seinescu thought it would be a great mistake for the Russians to follow Hitler's example by imposing on weaker countries hated Quislings, a procedure which could only lead to hatred instead of the desired reconciliation between Russia and her smaller neighbors. In Roumania there were only two political leaders who were backed by 80% of the population: Maniu and Bratianu.

Mr. Goranoff had reported this conversation to his Russian employers, who assumed that Mr. Seinescu had been speaking for me and wished to give me the answer which had just arrived from Moscow. Could I come to see Mr. Semenoff the next morning?

As a matter of fact, I had no knowledge of Mr. Seinescu's conversation. In answer to my question, he explained to me he had had no idea that his casual remarks to Mr. Goranoff in the course of a friendly chat would be given—or pretended to be given—such importance in Moscow. I was by now familiar with the Russian foible, in their dealings with smaller states at any rate. They always had to make it appear as if the latter had made the first step and I saw no objection to humoring their childish vanity.

The next morning Mr. Semenoff greeted me—to the accompaniment of the radio, of course—with marked affability. I was pleasantly surprised, for I fully expected the Russian advance since our last meeting to reflect itself in a still more arrogant and uncivil attitude. But the Kremlin had apparently decided that for the time being the friendly approach to Roumania would suit their plans better.

Mr. Semenoff asked me to take down the French text of the communication he was instructed to read to me. It was obviously another Soviet practice—from which they never departed in their dealings with me—never to give anything in writing in such cases, so as to be able to deny everything if it appeared expedient to do so.

Translated, the message read as follows: "We would prefer to deal with the present government of Roumania and we are prepared to help it free its country from the Germans if it is capable of organizing resistance to the Germans. But as there is not much hope for that we are prepared to deal at the same time with the Roumanian Opposition in the persons of Maniu and Bratianu.

"It is not true that the USSR has any intention of forming a new Roumanian Government, headed by Constantinescu or Groza. The Soviet Government does not plan in general to organize a government for Roumania, believing that this is the business of the Roumanians themselves. As for the place where the new Roumanian Government, which would be headed by Maniu and Bratianu, could establish itself, it might be suitable in cities like Jassy or Galati, which will probably soon be occupied by the Soviet troops."

I promised to forward the message but I added that, if the Soviet Government had seen fit to give us such assurances sooner, after our conversation of January 4, a lot of time might have been gained and the German troops would not have been massed on Roumanian soil as they now were. It had also been a mistake to broadcast the declaration of April 2, for it could only make the Germans more suspicious. At least, I went on, Moscow should let us have immediately the armistice terms which they were willing to grant us, just as they had communicated them to the Finns.

Mr. Semenoff replied that he would notify Moscow without delay. What he could not understand was why we did not seek to establish direct contact with the Russians, at Ankara for instance.<sup>2</sup> Did our minister there

<sup>2</sup> Actually Prince Stirbey had moved to Cairo after a short stay in Turkey, and had established contact with the representatives of the Big Three. The original plan had been for him to proceed to London, but the British were afraid they might be suspected by the Russians of separate and secret dealings with him. For some mysterious reason, this would not be suspected in Cairo.

lack initiative? Nothing could change the fact that since it was Russia who was our neighbor, it was with her that we had to reach an understanding.

I answered that we had been in direct contact with the Soviets here in Stockholm since December 25, and it was not our fault if we had only now heard from them. As for the conversations now going on in Cairo, I was not acquainted with the details, but if, as he seemed to imply, the Soviet Government resented the fact that we had approached the Western Powers, the resentment was unjustified. We were really fighting the Russians, but had been only technically at war with the United States and Britain.<sup>3</sup> It was perfectly normal and usual in such cases to try to secure the good offices of a Power able to take a more objective view.

It was all very well for me to promise to forward the Russian message to Bucharest, but there remained the problem of finding the means without the risk of interception by the Germans. Speed was essential but any urgent request for a reservation for an extraordinary courier on a German plane would have attracted attention and certainly been refused on some pretext. The regular courier was not due for another week. On the other hand, I was not sure that our code had not been broken by the Germans. It occurred to me that the best way to estimate this likelihood was to find out whether the Russians themselves, masters in the art of breaking codes, had managed to do so. I reasoned that if they had not, they would assume the Germans had been equally unsuccessful. I therefore asked Mr. Semenoff, who could be expected to be just as anxious as I was that the Germans should not learn the contents of my dispatch, how he thought I had best forward it. When he answered, "By coded cable," I knew it would be fairly safe to do so.

Before I left, Mr. Semenoff transmitted an invitation from his chief, Mme. Kollontai, now sufficiently recovered from her paralytic stroke, to come to see her the following day.

Mme. Kollontai was convalescing at the Grand Hotel in Saltsjöbaden, about half an hour's drive from Stockholm. The hotel was practically empty at that time of the year and when I arrived at the appointed hour, there was no one at the desk, but I was met in the lobby, as arranged, by a man who led me to Mme. Kollontai's room on the second floor.

The Russian ambassadress was sitting in a wheel chair by the window. Her face was pale and drawn, but her eyes were full of life. It was hard to believe that this old lady with her delicate features and general air of refinement had played such an active part in the horrors of the October

<sup>3</sup> Except for the intensive bombings of Bucharest by American and British planes which had started only a few days previously.

revolution. More remarkable still, she was, beside Stalin himself, the only survivor of Lenin's inner circle.

Marame Kollontai told me—in perfect French—that she had not yet received the detailed armistice terms I had requested but she wished to see me in order to tell me that the Soviet Government took these conversations very seriously and not as simple soundings. She also wanted to impress upon me the necessity for absolute secrecy; the Soviets would keep their allies informed. Above all, Mme. Kollontai continued, she wished to convince us that we had no reason to fear the Russians. Stalin had realized that in order to achieve a lasting peace he had to win the friendship of the neighboring nations. He, therefore, intended to treat Roumania kindly and even to help her repair the damages of the war. It was pure slander, emphasized Mme. Kollontai, to represent the Russians as aiming to foster internal revolutions everywhere, for they knew by experience that revolutions broke out from internal causes and could not be artificially provoked; at most they could be channeled in a certain direction.

She had, she added, reported to Moscow my criticism of the Russian delay in getting in touch with us after our first conversation of January 4. It would have been better, she agreed, if Stalin's new policy of friendship toward Roumania had been communicated to us confidentially sooner.

The reason for this extraordinary change in Moscow's attitude toward us—the stick had vanished while the bunch of carrots had grown tremendously—can only be guessed at. It was in sharp contrast with the attitude of the allied representatives at Cairo where the slogan still seemed to be that Roumania had to earn her passage home. Presumably the change was intended to show how much better Roumania would fare if we settled with the Russians directly, instead of trying to enlist the support of Britain and the United States. The Russians were clearly in a hurry, being undoubtedly just as afraid of a change in the attitude of the Western Powers in the matter of allowing them a free hand in eastern Europe, as the Western Powers were afraid of a separate peace between Russia and Germany.

If Britain and the U.S. had known of the Stockholm conversations, it might perhaps have opened their eyes to the real situation. But it is an irony of fate that it was another Allied slogan—unity at any price—which, as I found out later, prevented Mr. Maniu from informing the Western Powers at the time:<sup>4</sup> He thought that any appearance of trying to exploit a possible divergence of interests among the Allies would create an unfavorable impression and must be avoided.

<sup>4</sup> Although space forbids going into details, it must be stated that the evidence on this rather important point is far from clear. Mr. Visoianu, for instance, has asserted that as instructed, he gave the American and British representatives at Cairo an account of

The day after my visit to Mme. Kollontai, on April 12, Mr. Semenoff sent word he wished to see me, having an important communication to make. The armistice terms I had requested had arrived. Briefly, the Russians demanded:

1. That the thirteen Roumanian divisions then in the field should either surrender to the Russians or attack the Germans in the rear. The Russians would undertake to supply them with additional armament and would put it immediately at the disposal of Marshal Antonescu and Mr. Maniu to "re-establish the independence and sovereignty of Roumania;"
2. The frontier of 1940 was to be reestablished. (This meant recognition of the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina);
3. Reparation for the damage done on Soviet soil;
4. Return of war prisoners.

However, the Russians added that they did not demand the right to occupy Roumania during the armistice, merely "a right of passage for the Allied troops if the military situation demanded it."

Furthermore, they declared the Vicinna Decision to be unjust and undertook to return Northern Transylvania to Roumania.

Mr. Semenoff added that the terms were also being communicated to Prince Stirbey in Cairo, but he hoped that negotiations would continue in Stockholm. As a measure of precaution, for telephone calls, my name was changed to Wassermann.

A long time elapsed before I had anything to communicate. The Russians were becoming impatient. On May 22, Mr. Goranoff called to tell me he had "happened" to meet Mr. Semenoff. That gentleman, it appeared, was on the verge of despair. "We Russians," he lamented, "have made every kind of concession! We have promised our neighbors, solemnly and publicly, to reestablish their independence with our blood. All we want in return is the assurance that we can trust them and that they will keep themselves free from foreign influences. But we wait and wait and nothing happens. We are not believed, we are not trusted, our word counts for nothing!"

Fortunately, a week later, the arrival of Camil Demetrescu, one of Niculescu Buzeshti's assistants, with a reply from Mihai Antonescu, enabled me to pour some balm on Mr. Semenoff's injured innocence.

The information brought by Mr. Demetrescu was unfortunately vague and confusing. It appeared that the negotiations in Cairo had made little

---

Stockholm negotiations as early as May 1944. As his veracity cannot be questioned, it follows that Mr. Maniu soon changed his mind and modified his original instructions—and that the Western Powers were therefore aware of Stalin's breach of faith at an early date, but decided to close their eyes to this inconvenient fact.

progress, but that another prominent member of the Opposition, Mr. Visoianu, had just left for Cairo; Marshal Antonescu seemed unable to make up his mind, but Mihai Antonescu had told him (Camil Demetrescu) that if necessary, he would act upon his own responsibility.

In the meantime, instead of clear instructions, Mihai Antonescu transmitted to me a number of objections and desiderata: A province would have to be set aside in which the Government would reside and no foreign troops would be allowed to penetrate; we could not pay reparations; finally, a plebiscite should be held in Bessarabia and Bucovina.

I found myself in the difficult position of having to reduce these ideas to writing, in a form which did not close the door to further negotiations with the Soviets, yet would also prove acceptable to Marshal Antonescu and other Roumanian military leaders.

In my written memorandum I therefore pointed out, that in order to benefit the Allies and Roumania, the change of front must be effected without civil war and be fully supported by public opinion and the army. Many officers would undoubtedly refuse to turn against their companions in arms unless they felt they were not besmirching their honor as soldiers and that their action would greatly benefit their country.

1. Roumania could, therefore, not agree simply to turn against the Germans. But if the Germans refused a legitimate demand to evacuate the country within a short time, say 15 days, the Roumanian army would join the Russians to drive them out.

2. In either case the Allied armies could circulate freely on Roumanian territory, but the civilian power must remain in Roumanian hands everywhere. A region in which no Allied troops would be allowed to penetrate would have to be reserved as the seat of the Government.

3. Since it was our aim not only to reestablish peace, but also to establish lasting friendship with Russia and since all the Allies, including Russia, had solemnly adhered to the principle of self-determination, the Roumanian Government believed the fate of Bessarabia and of Northern Bucovina should not be decided before the end of the war, when the methods of the application of that principle would have been decided for all disputed territories.

4. The problem of reparations would need detailed examination, but in no case could Roumania make important payments after three years of war, the heavy German exactions, and the devastating Allied bombardments from the air. In the final analysis the brunt of such payments would have to be shouldered by the workers and peasants and Roumania could not believe Communist Russia wished to reduce them to lasting misery.

Two days later, on May 31, Mr. Semenoff read me Moscow's answer

(in German): Points 1, 2, and 4 of their terms could not be altered. As for reparations, Russia was aware of Roumania's difficult financial situation and was prepared to agree to a certain reduction of the amounts due.

If the desire to reserve a district, meant to choose a Roumanian district not to be occupied by Russian troops, the Soviet Government had no objection in principle. Neither had they any objection to the proposal to allow the Germans two weeks to evacuate the country.

As for the maintenance of the Roumanian administration—on the pattern of the Russian treaty with Czechoslovakia—that was not possible, as the latter was an ally while Roumania was an enemy. However, the Soviet Government was prepared to agree to a compromise in favor of Roumania.

I pointed out to Mr. Semenoff that there were numerous contradictions in the Russian reply. If they maintained point 1, obliging us to attack the Germans immediately, that could not be reconciled with the period of grace of two weeks. We would, therefore, interpret the Russian answer as an abandonment of point 1.

Furthermore, I objected to the word "occupy." Concerning the civilian administration, we rejected any analogy with Czechoslovakia. Our native officials had not been replaced by Germans and there was no need to fill the places even temporarily with Russian officers.

I also asked Mr. Semenoff to inquire how his Government planned to conduct further negotiations on the technical level, if we agreed in principle, as communications between Stockholm and Bucharest could be interrupted at any moment by the Germans. Could delegates cross the front by plane?

To my great surprise, the Russians answer again arrived again within 48 hours:

1. If the impossible happened and the Germans did evacuate Roumania within 15 days, they had no objection to Roumania's remaining neutral.

2. Neither had they any objection to the sending of a Roumanian delegation to the USSR.

On June 6, Mr. Semenoff received an additional message, to the effect that the Roumanian delegation could cross the front either by land or by airplane. It would be sufficient if I let them know the watchword or the markings of the airplane and the approximate place and hour of their crossing.

There were, of course, still many obscure points to be cleared up, but Mr. Semenoff and I agreed this matter had better be left to the respective delegations when they met.

Before he left—for a change he had come to see me at our Legation, walking up six flights of the backstairs and through the kitchen—he startled me by asking for my opinion as to how the Roumanians would consider the eventual return to the throne of former King Carol, a possibility which was being weighed in Moscow. He had been instructed to request my views. I felt, of course, highly flattered, but told him that I could not answer such a question offhand.

The Russians apparently gave up the idea and did not press me for an answer, so I quietly let the matter drop.

\* \* \*

As far as the conversations with the Soviets were concerned, I felt that my audacity had been justified by the result, for the terms I had obtained were unexpectedly favorable under the circumstances—our military situation having become hopeless. Of course the value of the terms depended entirely on the good faith of the Russians, but inasmuch as we were not in a position to demand guarantees, nothing could be done about it. On the other hand, even if the Russians did not keep faith, our moral position would be considerably strengthened at no cost to us.

The next question was the reaction in Bucharest, which I learned through a cable from Mr. Demetrescu, telling me that my report had been read with great interest but had produced amazement at the way I had exceeded my instructions. The delay granted the Germans was considered too short. We could not give up Bessarabia and Bucovina. Furthermore, too much haste in Stockholm might destroy other possibilities.

In my reply to this strange message from a chief to his subordinate, I pointed out that the Government could always disavow my action on the ground that the verbal instructions I had received had been incorrectly conveyed. Besides, the conditions could have various interpretations. Concerning the "other possibilities," I had understood that they were exhausted, but if that were not the case, I thought it was high time to establish the fact. I received no reply to that cable and when Mr. Semenoff telephoned on June 22 to inquire whether I had any news, I had none. The next day the Russians began another violent offensive on the Moldavian front.

On July 2, a courier arrived from Bucharest with a long coded message from Mihai Antonescu. Unfortunately, it was in a code I did not possess and I never learned its contents.

On August 5, another courier brought a verbal message which was equally confused and naïve, even though the obvious intent was to gain time. Mihai Antonescu sent me word that he had positive information the Germans were negotiating with the Russians in Stockholm—Minister Schmidt having declared to our envoy in Berlin that the intransigence

of the Western Powers left them no other issue. However, he (Mihai Antonescu) did not believe the Germans were negotiating seriously.

I was requested to explain to the Russians that we could not take the risk of exposing ourselves to the vengeance of Germany only to see her reach an understanding with Russia. We dared not send a delegate for fear of a violent reaction on the part of the Germans.

The conduct of the Russians in occupied Moldavia had hardly been encouraging. It would be better to settle the fate of Bessarabia at the Peace Conference. We could not turn against the Germans, but the Russians should appreciate the great advantage of Roumania's withdrawal from the war. The position of the Government was very difficult. It could hardly admit it had made a costly and unnecessary war. Yet a change of government would provoke the Germans to seize complete control of the country and its resources. Could not the Russians send a delegate? He (Mihai Antonescu) expected to hear from the Western Allies soon.

It was obviously impossible to make any sense out of such a jumble of contradictions. Instead, I sat down and wrote Mihai Antonescu a private letter in which I argued that a separate peace between Hitler and Stalin was out of the question, although for obvious reasons each one was trying to scare the Western Powers with this bogey.

On the other hand, it was, I continued, quite useless to expect these Powers to protect us from the Russians, especially after Mr. Churchill's speech of August 2 in which he had himself at last made it perfectly clear that we were to be left to reach a direct agreement with the Russians. Further attempts to enlist the support of the Western Powers would merely annoy them and infuriate the Russians. In my opinion, immediate action was imperative. There was not a minute to spare.

My letter seemed to have produced some impression, for I was informed by cable that a reply would be sent by a courier due to arrive on August 24. But when I turned on the radio on the evening of the 23rd, I heard the announcement of the arrest of Marshal Antonescu by order of the King, and of the formation of a new government which had agreed to sign the armistice.

I was, therefore, not a little surprised when at noon the following day, the Courier, Mr. Djuvara, was ushered into my office and announced breathlessly: "Mr. Antonescu agrees with you. There were various reasons which held him back, which I will tell you later. But the military situation is now so critical that the Government has to disregard them and conclude an armistice immediately. I am, therefore, bringing you instructions to see Mme. Kollontai immediately to ask her if the Soviet Government still holds to the terms previously outlined; if so where and how negotia-

tions could be resumed, and whether they wished to deal with a representative of the Opposition or want the present Government also to be represented. Mr. Antonescu also told me Marshal Antonescu was prepared to step out of the picture as soon as it would be necessary and had given him a free hand to sign the armistice."

"I am afraid you are 24 hours late," I replied and proceeded to tell him what had happened the day before. He had arrived that night by plane in Berlin and left early in the morning without being molested, the news of the events in Bucharest having been withheld from the public and evidently even from the police officials.

\* \* \*

Although the negotiations conducted by the Opposition are beyond the scope of this account, the lesson of the episode can hardly be appreciated without briefly alluding to them.

It should be observed that on May 29, I refused, on behalf of the Antonescu Government, to accept the Russian armistice terms without substantial improvements and by June 2, I had obtained at least three important concessions: 1) The right to grant the German forces a period of grace of 15 days to evacuate the country, and our right to remain neutral in case of their compliance, if we wished to; 2) A reduction in the claims for reparations; 3) A region to which no foreign troops would have access.

Mr. Maniu, on the other hand, had as early as April 20, declared his acceptance of the Soviet armistice terms as a basis for negotiations, merely observing that some of the clauses belonged properly to a peace treaty. Mr. Visoianu had, on May 26, explained on his behalf that a plan of close military collaboration with the Allies would be necessary to forestall the danger of a German occupation.

Yet, in spite of all this, on June 1, Mr. Novikoff, the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo, informed Mr. Maniu's delegates that his government refused any discussion so long as he had not categorically declared his acceptance of the original terms. This condition was fulfilled on June 10.

On June 30, Mr. Maniu informed the Allies that the Opposition had decided to overthrow Marshal Antonescu, having reached the conviction that he was not to be relied upon to conclude the armistice, and they submitted a detailed plan of action, based on a synchronized Russian offensive and the dispatch of three allied airborne brigades, to neutralize German resistance in the interior.

At the same time, Mr. Duca was instructed to inform Mme. Kollontai that the Opposition could not accept terms less favorable than those granted Marshal Antonescu and to request the *Soviet Government to instruct its representative in Cairo to incorporate in the text of the armistice the three*

clauses I had obtained. But no reply was vouchsafed Mr. Maniu in spite of all insistences.

On August 8, Russia's consent to the dispatch of a general for the purpose of coordinating military measures was requested, but although repeated twice, the request was ignored. I, on the other hand, had received an affirmative reply to a similar request within 48 hours.

Finally, because a new Russian offensive was imminent, the coup d'état was executed on August 23, without waiting further for the answer, and the delegates in Cairo were instructed to sign the armistice, but to ask that the three additional clauses should be embodied in that instrument. It was not until August 27 that Mr. Novikoff signified the consent of the Soviet Government, although the first clause was by then pointless, for the Germans had, contrary to their initial undertaking, already attacked the Roumanian troops.

\* \* \*

The question which naturally arises is why the Russians showed such marked preference for negotiating with Marshal Antonescu rather than with the leaders of the democratic parties, and a much greater willingness to grant him concessions. The argument, that it mattered little as they did not intend to keep them, is no explanation, for in that case they might as well have granted them to Mr. Maniu, too. It has been said that they preferred to deal with men whose guilty past guaranteed their loyalty, or with dictators with whom they felt more affinity than with democrats.

Possibly. But there may be another explanation. In their first contacts with me they repeatedly expressed their willingness to deal with Mr. Maniu and Mr. Bratianu. Perhaps the key to the riddle is, therefore, to be found in Mr. Semenoff's reproach on April 10, that Maniu's delegate had not approached the Russian Ambassador in Ankara *directly*. The Russians had already discounted Germany's defeat and being realists, what mattered was the attitude of a government toward the United States and Britain—their future adversaries. Mr. Maniu's initial approach to the representatives of these Powers, his persistence later in dealing only with the Three Powers—which to the Russians could only mean that he hoped to enlist western support against them—and his democratic record, left no doubt as to his leanings.

As this story shows, it is true that neither had the Antonescus any real intention of reaching an agreement with the Russians alone. But the fact that they were willing to deal with the Soviets directly gave them hope.

Although the truth will probably never be known, as the time when "now it can be told" never arrives in the Soviet Union, it seems likely that

the explanation for the amazingly rapid and glaring breach of faith perpetrated by the Soviets three weeks later at Moscow, where the armistice was formally signed, should be sought in the fact that they found themselves forced to deal with a government which had steadfastly refused to side with Russia against the West. When the Soviets met no effective opposition from London or Washington,<sup>5</sup> it was not surprising that they promptly took the next step and elevated Mr. Groza to power, the same Mr. Groza they had denied any intention of imposing on the Roumanian people.

There remains one more enigma: Why did the Antonescu régime not conclude the armistice? Marshal Antonescu and Mihai Antonescu might still be alive today, like Marshal Mannerheim and Mr. Tanner, instead of falling before a red firing squad.

Here one must distinguish between the two men. I believe, as did Mr. Maniu up to June 1944, that Marshal Antonescu was willing in theory, so long as the act was a remote prospect. But he always recoiled from the immediate plunge, especially into the arms of the Russian bear.

Mihai Antonescu was convinced of the necessity to withdraw from the war, but was unable to persuade his chief to take the last step and clutched desperately at every excuse to gain time. In the meanwhile he let everybody else negotiate, the Opposition at Cairo with his three Allies and me at Stockholm with the Russians alone. In his last message to me, sent on August 23, he made a final and rather pathetic attempt to justify his dilatory tactics toward the Soviets. Although he now agreed with me, he repeated that he had had good reasons to believe in a separate peace between Hitler and Stalin. (He mentioned an agreement reached in July between Tito and the Wehrmacht, obviously with Moscow's consent.) He argued that he had been loath to give up the hope of an agreement with the Western Powers or at least one with the Three Powers but in which the West would have formed an effective counterweight to Russia.<sup>6</sup> Our delegates at Cairo had never been told clearly and urgently: Go to Moscow! Even Mr. Churchill, in his speech of August 2, 1944, had only spoken of the future, "It seems to me that Roumania must primarily make its terms with Russia . . . ."

In this he was undoubtedly right. Roumania had been caught in an extraordinary embroilment. Since June 1944, the Western Powers had been prepared to give the Russians a free hand in most of eastern Europe, but

<sup>5</sup> Mr. Byrnes soon after declared, upon his return from Moscow, that he fully agreed with the Soviet exigence to be surrounded with friendly governments—which, it should have been obvious, could only mean anti-American.

<sup>6</sup> At his trial in May 1946, he explained that considering Mr. Maniu had better chances of success he had deferred to his wish to conduct negotiations at Cairo.

were not prepared to admit it.<sup>7</sup> Most Roumanians suspected it, but failing a clear statement few could bring themselves to give up the hope that this policy might be reversed. The Soviets, on the other hand, were not prepared to claim that right openly. At any rate they acted as though they did not believe it themselves and must double-cross their allies—although this was perhaps simply done from force of habit.

\* \* \*

Two weeks after our acceptance of the armistice, acting upon a "hint" from Mme. Kollontai, I called on her, this time at the Embassy. I had not been in a hurry to do so, as long as the Russian communiques kept on announcing the capture of numerous Roumanian "prisoners"—who had orders to lay down their arms, and the capture of the entire navy—which had been forbidden to fire a shell!

This had now ceased and Mme. Kollontai was able to assure me repeatedly how glad she was the war between our countries was over and that our peoples could now resume their friendly relations. She was delighted to hear the harvest had been good and that the Roumanian people would have enough to eat, for well-fed people were contented people. (As it turned out, the abundance was to be short-lived, for most of the food was promptly requisitioned by the Russians.) In short, she was all kindness and amiability.

I have often wondered whether she was sincere at our meeting in May and really believed in Stalin's "change of heart," of which even the appearance was not to last beyond September 12, when the Roumanian armistice delegates had to sign on the dotted line in Moscow.

Mme. Kollontai tactfully spared me the embarrassment of another meeting. Shortly afterwards I was relieved of my post but was still in Stockholm when Mr. Duca, who was temporarily in charge, gave a dinner in her honor. My name did not appear on the list of guests she had wished to meet.

NEW YORK CITY

<sup>7</sup> It may be recalled that the Finns, with whom only the British were at war, were left in no such doubt.

# THE REVOLUTION OF 1904-1905 AND THE MARXIST MOVEMENT OF POLAND\*

by M. K. Dziewanowski

THE GROUND for the revolutionary events of 1904-1905 was prepared by the economic recession which the Russian Empire experienced in 1903. After July of that year a wave of economic strikes swept the whole state, paralyzing most of the larger industrial centers. The Congress Kingdom of Poland was not an exception.

## I

The SDKPiL and the party "Proletariat," as well as the Jewish "Bund,"

When, in February of 1904, the Russo-Japanese war broke out, the working classes of the country were already in a state of acute ferment. The war by disorganizing production in Poland and communication on the trans-Siberian line and by closing a part of the eastern markets profoundly affected the whole economy of Russian Poland, which was geared to those very markets. Unemployment spread rapidly. The initial Japanese successes helped to re-awaken the patriotic sentiments of the middle class, to galvanize its politically conscious section into a state of expectation, and to reactivate latent political discontent. The endemic social and political unrest was skillfully exploited by both main rivals for the leadership of the revolutionary movement: the Polish Socialist Party and the Social Democracy of Poland and Lithuania.

In one respect the attitudes of the PPS and the SDKPiL toward the war were similar. Like the rest of the revolutionary parties of Russian Poland both hoped for a Russian defeat and were convinced that it would give them a unique chance for action. They differed, however, over what kind of action should be taken, and with which social group they should ally themselves. Although strongly defeatist, the Social Democrats never publicized their pro-Japanese sentiments. They tended to emphasize strongly that in this conflict of rival imperialism they hoped primarily for a *Tsarist* and not a Russian defeat, objected to all pro-Japanese manifestations and preached unity with the Russian Socialist movement.<sup>1</sup> The bulk of the PPS, on the

\*This paper is part of a larger project entitled *Genealogy of a Party: Origins and Beginnings of the Communist Party of Poland*. The project is being financed by the Russian Research Center of Harvard. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance granted to him by this institution.

<sup>1</sup> "Nacjonalistyczne manifestacje" (The Nationalist Manifestations), *Czerwony Sztandar* (The Red Flag), No. 18, (July, 1904).

other hand, especially its right wing led by Józef Piłsudski, was boastfully, enthusiastically pro-Japanese. They believed that the Russian Empire was bound to be defeated and so weakened by internal dissent to a degree that an independent armed action in the Congress Kingdom conducted by the Party, concerted with diversionary moves by other subjected nationalities, and supported by Japan, would result in the eventual creation of an independent Polish Republic. Acting accordingly, soon after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, Piłsudski and his associate, Tytus Filipowicz, were dispatched by the PPS to Tokyo to enlist Japanese assistance for an uprising in Russian Poland. These attempts were frustrated by the representative of the conservative National Democratic Party, Roman Dmowski. Dmowski believed in a policy of winning the good will of St. Petersburg, even at the price of cooperating with the government against the native rebels. In this way he hoped to gain basic concessions for the Congress Kingdom, especially political autonomy. This autonomy, he hoped, would put an end to the process of systematic russification, and might possibly turn this part of the country into another Galicia if not another Piedmont. Consistently following this policy, Dmowski also went to Tokyo and managed to persuade the Japanese government that an improvised revolt was bound to be a failure, and therefore would scarcely be worth trying. This démarche proved successful.<sup>2</sup>

Although deprived of any hope of support from abroad, Piłsudski, on his return from Japan, returned to the execution of his original plan. With the approval of the PPS, he immediately started organizing the military organization of the Party (*Organizacja Bojowa*, O. B. for short, colloquially called *Bojówka*). Piłsudski considered the formation of fighting squads as the first step toward setting up the cadres of a future national army.<sup>3</sup> This problem became one of the key issues within the PPS and eventually was to precipitate a split within its ranks.

The SDKPiL and the party "Proletariat," as well and the Jewish "Bund," emphatically stressed the unity of the revolutionary movement of the whole Empire. Therefore, they insisted upon the necessity of supporting what they considered the strongest element of discontent, the Russian parties and their political and social demands. These parties were convinced that an internal upheaval would inevitably follow a military defeat and should be exploited in order to force on the autocracy some fundamental concessions

<sup>2</sup> For the wider implications of the National Democratic policy see the introductory part of R. Dmowski's *Polityka polska i odbudowa państwa* (The Polish Policy and the Reconstruction of the State), (Poznań, 1925); also his *Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska* (Germany, Russia and the Polish Question), (Lwów 1908), *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> J. Piłsudski, *Memoirs of a Polish Revolutionary and a Soldier*, (London, 1931) p. 139.

by means of general strikes and mass manifestations. They wanted a transformation of the Empire into a democratic state, with a constitution guaranteeing universal suffrage; a state that would have to grant some national liberties to its non-Russian provinces.<sup>4</sup>

Around the dilemma of insurrection and independence or mass strike action and autonomy, revolved the endless debates that were going on in revolutionary circles. To this was added another tactical problem: with whom should one form an alliance? From the beginning, the Social Democrats took singlehandedly an aggressive position on two fronts, directed against both the autocracy and the native bourgeoisie with its alleged ally the PPS. This attitude is illustrated by the first analysis of the situation as affected by the Russo-Japanese war. We find it in the *Czerwony Sztandar* of February 14, 1904, in the editorial entitled *Wojna* (The War).<sup>5</sup> It foresaw the inevitable defeat of Russia as stemming from two main factors: first, the strength of modern Japan and, second, the resistance of the Russian nation to the foolish enterprise. The war, concluded the article, is bound to become the cradle of Russia's liberty. The whole Empire is seething with unrest. Only Poland's bourgeoisie is apathetic, and refuses its support to the growing revolutionary movement. We find a similar accusation in the theoretical monthly, the *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny* (Social Democratic Review). No. 2, of February 1904, in an article, written by Adolf Warski (Warszawski), "Polska apote!" (Poland apote!). In vitriolic terms he accused the

<sup>4</sup> For the attitude of the revolutionary parties of Russian Poland toward the events of 1904-1905 see, O. B. Szmidt, *Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy. Materiały i dokumenty. 1893-1904* (Social Democracy of Poland and Lithuania. Materials and Documents, 1893-1904) (Moskwa, 1934), Vol. I, 443 ff. Also *Informator, Stronnictwa polityczne w Królestwie Polskim* (Political Parties in Russian Poland), (Kraków, 1904), pp. 94-102, 109-116; L. Kulczycki, *Współczesne prądy umysłowe i polityczne* (Contemporary Intellectual and Political Currents), (Lwów, 1904), pp. 285, 293-296; Martov & Dan, *Geschichte der Russischen Sozial Demokratie*, (Berlin, 1930), p. 105; Rafał; *Ocherki po istorii Bunda* (Sketches on the History of the Bund), (Moskwa, 1925), pp. 138-139; Pogodin, *Glavnaya techeniya polskoi politicheskoi mysli, 1863-1907* (The Main Currents of the Polish Political Thought, 1863-1907), (St. Petersburg, 1908), pp. 520 ff; J. Martov & others, *Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v Nachale XX-go wieka* (The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the XX Century), (St. Petersburg, 1909), Vol. IV, Part II, the essay of K. Zaleswski on the "National Movement," 151-176; also No. 11/12 of *Zpola Walki* (From the Battlefield), Moscow, 1931, passim.

<sup>5</sup> The shifting attitudes of the SDKPiL was also formulated in numerous other articles that were being published in the monthly *Red Flag*, which circulated all over the country, in some cases almost openly. Later on, some of this material was issued in the form of numerous pamphlets: J. Karski (Marchlewski), *Jak i o co walzyć?* (How and for what to fight?), (Kraków, 1905); and by R. Luxemburg, *Z doby rewolucyjnej. Co dalej?* (From the Revolutionary Period. What Next?), Nos. 1, 2, & 3, (Warsaw, 1906), supplements to the No. 26 of *Czerwony Sztandar* of May 1905. Also, *Czego chcemy? Komentarz do programu SDKPiL* (What do we want? A commentary to the Program of the SDKPiL), Warsaw, 1906.

Polish bourgeoisie and the PPS of turning their back on the Russian revolution and of wishing to fight only "the Tsar-invader" and not the Tsar as the social as well as political oppressor. "Poland," claimed the article, "is now the most reactionary helper of Russian absolutism."<sup>6</sup>

On February 21, anti-war demonstrations took place in Warsaw. The Government replied by arresting several hundred persons. Numerous strikes and demonstrations followed throughout the country.

## II

### *The Growth of the Revolutionary Ferment*

Meanwhile all over Russian Poland, but especially in Warsaw and Łódź, revolutionary ferment was gathering momentum. Many of the leaders of the SDKPiL who had previously been compelled to stay abroad began to take an active part in the struggle they had been planning for the last ten years. The first to reappear in Warsaw was the only true proletarian among them, Marcin Kasprzak. He organized in Warsaw a secret printing press that produced leaflets and newspapers. Soon, however, on April 27, 1904, he was surprised by the gendarmes when printing May-Day leaflets. During the fight that ensued he killed four gendarmes and wounded three more. Sentenced to death, he was hanged in Warsaw on September 8, 1905. His death dispelled all the accusations that had been directed against him since 1893.<sup>7</sup>

The May-Day proclamation of the SDKPiL, edited and printed by Kasprzak before his arrest, condemned the war for its imperialistic character and appealed to the toiling masses to sabotage the Tsarist war effort, and to fight in close collaboration with the Russian comrades for peace, the abolition of absolutism, and the establishment of a democratic republic.<sup>8</sup> The May-Day demonstration in Warsaw was jointly organized by the SDKPiL, the "Proletariat" and the "Bund."

<sup>6</sup> A similar note was struck in the *Czerwony Sztandar* No. 20, of September 1904, in the article "Burżuazja i duchowieństwo na usługach Cara" (The Bourgeoisie and the Clergy in the Service of the Tsar). As for the attitude towards the bourgeois parties see also the article "Przełom polityczny" (The Political Turning Point), *Czerwony Sztandar*, (December 22, 1904). If the bourgeoisie was victorious, wrote the paper, it would seek support from their class fellows, the reactionary, monarchist groups and not from the Social Democrats; if they lost, "they would be kicked in the pants anyway," so there is no reason to ally oneself with them. "The liberation of the workers must be achieved by the workers themselves," in this case by all workers of the *whole* state, acting hand in hand.

<sup>7</sup> His party used the opportunity to attack the PPS for having suspected him of spying; Szmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 477-487.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 460-463; a similar slogan was repeated in the appeals to the conscripts of October and December, 1904, *ibid.*, pp. 554-557, 559-561 and 580-583.

The importance of spreading revolutionary sentiments to the non-proletarian masses in order to increase the chances of gaining the support of the bourgeoisie was reflected in the Social Democratic press. In July the *Red Flag*, No. 17, published a statement entitled "Chleba i pracy" (Bread and Work), which struck a conciliatory and reformist note. Economic crises are an integral part of the capitalistic system, we read, but the crisis through which the working class of the state is passing now is a direct result of a senseless war provoked by Tsardom. Were the toiling masses endowed with trade unions and other associations, like the workers of Great Britain, their lot would be much better. Now, the main purpose of the whole nation should be to abolish absolutism and to introduce a political system based on liberty. The editorial of the August issue of the same paper addressed itself again not to the working classes alone but to the whole nation. At the same time it criticized the bourgeoisie for its passivity and the PPS for its pro-Japanese attitude. The statement finally appealed for a unification of the efforts of all classes in the common fight against absolutism. Its abolition and establishment of a free and democratic system of government would be in the interest of the whole nation.<sup>9</sup>

The PPS took a more revolutionary and defeatist stand. It instructed its members and sympathizers to sabotage the war effort by all possible means and appealed to the soldiers to desert and form guerilla bands, or, if sent to the front, to desert to the Japanese. At the same time the party was feverishly preparing for an armed insurrection. In accordance with its program of 1892, it tended to co-ordinate its tactics not only with the Russian groups but also with those of other nationalities of the Empire, irrespective of their social creed. They hoped to construct a broad, multi-national front from a variety of revolutionary, if not necessarily Socialist, parties aiming at the overthrow of the autocracy.

In the fall of 1904, on the initiative of the Finnish opposition, a group of revolutionary organizations active within the Russian Empire held a conference in Paris with the purpose of co-ordinating their efforts. The conference was attended by seven major groups: by two Russian parties, the "Constitutional Democrats" and the "Social Revolutionaries"; by two Polish parties, the "National League" (the parent organization of the "National Democrats" of Dmowski) and the PPS; by the Finnish "Party of Active Resistance," by the Lettish Social Democrats, by the Georgian "Social Revolutionary Federalist Party" (*Sakartvelo*) and by the "Armenian Revolutionary Federation" (*Dashnak*). Although the SDKPiL as well as the "Bund" were also invited they, following the example of the RSDWP,

<sup>9</sup> "Odezwa z powodu ostatnich wypadków w Warszawie," (Appeal because of the latest events in Warsaw), *Czerwony Sztandar*, No. 19.

refused on the ground that being class parties they should not co-operate with bourgeois groups.<sup>10</sup>

The meeting, usually referred to as the "Paris Conference," formulated, in terms general enough to satisfy all the participants, a common minimum program. It may be summed up in three main points: abolition of autocracy, the introduction of a free democratic system of government based on universal suffrage, and acceptance of the national rights of the people of the Empire, including the right of self-determination. While initiating a series of similar meetings during the years to follow, the Paris Conference failed to bring about any concrete results beyond a general rapprochement between the various revolutionary parties of the Tsarist Empire.

The SDKPiL was, of course, highly critical of the attitude taken by the PPS, which had decided to support the idea of a democratic constitution for all of Russia, in conjunction with the bourgeois parties; a position it had previously refused to take with the SDKPiL. The PPS was accused of fraternizing with the non-proletarian elements, and of being carried away with the tide of the bourgeois revolutionary stream.<sup>11</sup> The petty bourgeois party, stressed the SDKPiL, unmasked itself once more by siding with one led by the bourgeoisie. The PPS, argued the Social Democrats, erroneously concluded that, since the aim of the coming upheaval would be a Polish, democratic and bourgeois republic, the leadership of the struggle and the fruits of an eventful victory should be shared with the bourgeoisie. In reality, the revolution has a double character: it is a democratic and a bourgeois revolution so far as its avowed objective was concerned, but a proletarian one in respect to its *methods* and its *leadership*. Moreover, by neglecting economic strikes and emphasizing terroristic activities and bloody demonstrations, the PPS was actually denying the very principle of Socialist mass movement.<sup>12</sup> The movement should not rely upon a limited team of terrorists and irresponsible adventurers but must permeate the masses and finally penetrate the ranks of the opponent's armed forces and police. Terror, bad in itself and never effective, was declared to be suicidal under the circumstances, since it tended to alienate the element which the Social Democrats hoped to win to their side: the Russian armed forces. This appeal, issued in December, 1904, bitterly criticized the big manifestation staged by the PPS at Grzybowski Square in one of Warsaw's working class districts. Street fights with the army and police ensued. Ten people were killed. This criticism, however, proved purely academic. Soon,

<sup>10</sup> Szmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 568-575. See also P. Miliukov, *Natsionalny Vopros*, (Berlin, 1925) p. 163 ff. Miliukov was a participant in this conference.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

the SDKPiL was carried away by the mounting wave of terrorism that swept the country.

After the bloody repression of the May-Day manifestation of 1905 organized in Warsaw by the SDKPiL, the Government-encouraged anti-Jewish riots and the appearance of armed groups of rightists dragged the party into armed activities. These remained, however, restricted to individual acts and the large scale armed uprising preached by Lenin was never seriously contemplated. Thus the Social Democrats, who bitterly criticized the "Socialpatriots" for too much armed activity, were soon in their turn, to be condemned by the Bolsheviks for not doing enough.<sup>13</sup>

The SDKPiL also differed considerably from the Bolsheviks on the subject of the Leninist "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." Without denying theoretically the necessity of co-operating with the peasantry to bring about the revolution, the Social Democrats argued that the peasants, especially the more prosperous ones, as soon as they got some land from the bourgeois government, would join the camp of reaction. The lack of any positive agrarian program of the SDKPiL during the years of 1904-1905 is an amazing phenomenon. According to the Leninist-Stalinist criticism,<sup>14</sup> the SDKPiL neglected the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and thus caused a complete isolation of the proletariat.

12 "Odezwa Zarządu Głównego SDKPiL: Jak należy urządzać demonstracje" (The Appeal of the Central Committee of the SDKPiL: how one ought to organize demonstrations) *ibid.*, pp. 562-567.

13 In 1908 Lenin wrote for the *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, April 1908, an article which is an indirect, veiled condemnation of the tactic that had been followed both by the SDKPiL and the PPS. Lenin declared that even under modern conditions, working masses, if properly armed, stand a fair chance of defeating regular armies. This the SDKPiL had never tried. As for the PPS, it had failed in 1904-1905 because it chose wrong methods of waging guerilla warfare with a small group of elite fighters and was deprived of the support of broad masses. The SDKPiL had misjudged the social forces that may support a revolution just as they had chosen the wrong methods to bring it about. The whole article, without mentioning its name, was an accusation of the Party by the Bolshevik leader. The editor of the paper made an attempt to cushion the blow by adding an editorial note which tried to focus the attention of the reader on the criticism of the PPS. Lenin, *Sochinentia . . . (Works)*, (Moscow, 1947), the Fourth Russian edition, Vol. XV;43-46. Already in 1905 and 1906 Lenin had condemned the revolutionary tactics of the PPS as exaggerated and not in close enough contact with the sentiments of the broad masses. On the other hand, he expressed his warm approval in principle for armed action which was an accusation against the SDKPiL which had practiced sporadic terrorism but had never even contemplated preparing an armed uprising on a larger scale. *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, 141-143 and 167.

14 See the introduction to both volumes of O. B. Szmidt's collected documents on the history of the SDKPiL: *Socjaldemokracja Królestwa . . . 1893-1904*, and *Socjaldemokracja . . . 1914-1918* (Moskwa, 1936) *passim*.

## III

*The Revolution in Poland and in Russia*

Simultaneous with military defeats in the Far East revolutionary discontent was smouldering all over the Tsarist Empire. The St. Petersburg demonstration of January 22, 1905, led by the priest Gapon, resulted in a massacre of hundreds of innocent people. The news of the general strike of the Russian workers found a warm reception throughout Poland. The success of the strike surprised the country. It managed to shake the distrust of the PPS leadership of the potentialities of the Russian movement.

Under the impact of events in Russia all the revolutionary parties of the *Kongresówka*, while never formally burying the hatchet, decided (the SDKPiL and the "Bund" three days later) to support the struggle initiated by the Russian workers.<sup>15</sup> A general strike was also called in the Congress Kingdom by all the Socialist groups except the SDKPiL and the "Bund."<sup>15a</sup> The strike began on January 27, 1905, with the slogan of the fight with autocracy for a democratic republic and an eight-hour working day. Like the Russian strike, it too was successful. From Warsaw it spread to almost all the major industrial centers. Demonstrations led inevitably to violent clashes with the authorities. Numerous lives were lost on both sides. The civil administration almost broke down, and a state of siege was proclaimed. In spite of bloody repressions, the wave of strikes unleashed in January continued throughout most of the year. On May-Day of 1905 the SDKPiL organized a large demonstration in Warsaw which, when attacked by the police, turned into a bloody riot. There were about 100 victims. The Warsaw riot, as well as a series of Government-sponsored pogroms, brought about the abandonment of the anti-terrorist line, advocated thus far by the Social Democrats.<sup>16</sup>

The climax of the almost continuous series of clashes and manifestations was reached between the twenty-second and the twenty-third of June 1905, during the three-day street fight which broke out in Łódź. Barricades were erected and fierce skirmishes between the workers and the police ensued. Again several hundred were killed and wounded.<sup>17</sup> The Constitutional Manifesto, without satisfying even the moderate segment of the

<sup>15</sup> Szmidt, *Socjaldemokracja* . . . 1893-1904, pp. 505 and 508. Martov and Dan, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

<sup>15a</sup> These two parties joined the strike three days later.

<sup>16</sup> "Odezwa Zarządu Głównego z powodu rzezi 1-go maja," (The Proclamation of the Central Committee because of the Massacre of May 1st), *Czerwony Sztandar*, No. 26, (May, 1905).

<sup>17</sup> Lenin considered the Łódź fighting as the first armed action of the 1905 revolution. *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*. Short Course, (New York, 1939), p. 59.

nation, was regarded by the majority as a chance worth trying; but it had little effect on the radicals.

Toward the end of the year, both Luxemburg and Jogiches-Tyszko appeared in Warsaw, attracted by a possibility of an all-Russian revolution. Immediately they both plunged into the underground activity; the former as the leading theoretician, the latter as organizer and editor of the publications that began to appear and circulate openly in the streets.<sup>18</sup>

Throughout the years 1904-1905 a certain interdependence between the events of Russia and those of the *Kongresówka* could be observed.<sup>19</sup> The Gaponade exploited the latent social and political discontent and unleashed a period of prolonged struggle, almost a civil war. On the other hand, the intensity of this struggle in the Congress Kingdom acted as a stimulus to the revolutionary forces in Russia. On November 2, 1905, protesting against the death sentence passed upon the Kronstadt Sailors, and against the proclamation of a state of siege in Poland, the St. Petersburg Council of Workers' Delegates declared a second general strike. It proved to be effective since Witte immediately cancelled his order and normal administration was re-established. The interdependence proved to be much more limited during the second phase of the revolution. On December 26, 1905, the organ of the PPS, *Robotnik* (The Worker), already run by the left wing of the Party, published a dramatic proclamation. It appealed to the working masses of Poland to support the Moscow uprising by a general strike, to refuse to pay taxes, and to establish a revolutionary autonomous government. The appeal had little response: there was no general strike in Poland, in December 1905. Only Warsaw, Łódź, Sosnowiec, and Radom managed to organize some local demonstrations. The country was exhausted by months of revolutionary fever. The Military Organizations of the PPS, the only serious fighting organization in the country, was weakened by arrests and decimated by action. The SDKPiL had no comparable force ready to act. The working masses were tired and apathetic. The rest of the nation was frightened by the "red spectre."

The introduction of martial law did not fuse the nation into united opposition but, on the contrary, divided it even more deeply. Those who

<sup>18</sup> For a first hand impression of that struggle see L. Kautsky (ed.), *Rosa Luxemburg. Letters to Karl Kautsky and Louise Kautsky from 1896 to 1918*, (New York, 1925), pp. 98-108.

<sup>19</sup> This interdependence was reluctantly admitted by one of the original opponents of this opinion, the leader of the Galician Socialists and an energetic supporter of the Revolutionary Faction of the PPS, Ignacy Daszyński in his *Memoirs*, Vol. I, 223. See also, L. Wasilewski, "Walka o postulat niepodległości w polskim obzie socjalistycznym," III (The Fight for the Independence Slogan in the Polish Socialist Camp III), *Niepodległość (Independence)*, Vol. X, No. 3, (1934), 326-327.

cherished hopes for improvement of the country's position became anxious not to jeopardize the concessions promised by the October Manifesto that augured a breathing spell for the Congress Kingdom. Those few who wanted to continue to fight were overwhelmed and paralyzed by the growing conflict between the SDKPiL and the PPS on the one hand, and the growing cleavage within the PPS on the other. Thus, divided and confused, and faced by the augmenting strength of the National Democrats, the revolutionary movement of the *Kongresówka* was either unable or unwilling to lend its support to the all-Russian general strike.

## IV

*The Changing Mood of the Country*

Thus the turning point of the drama proved to be the Constitutional Manifesto. Up to October 1905, it had been a fight of the various Socialist parties against the Tsarist troops and administration. This struggle was, to a certain extent, supported by the non-Socialist groups of the nation and assumed the character of a national struggle against the main partitioning power.

The national character of the movement was perhaps best reflected in the school strike of 1905 in which all parties, including the National Democrats, participated to force St. Petersburg to liberalize the school system of the "Vistula Land." This was crowned with success. Then came the Constitutional Manifesto. Without completely satisfying even the more moderate segments of the Polish nation, it was regarded by an overwhelming majority of the nation as a chance worth trying, possibly a beginning of an evolution in the right direction, a ray of hope. So, the bulk of the nation withdrew its initial wholehearted support from the revolutionary groups. Consequently, the political trial of strength turned into an economic duel between the working class and the industrialists, centered around a demand for better wages and for the establishment of an eight-hour working day. This further frightened the middle classes who began to oppose it as leading toward complete anarchy. The leadership of the country was taken over by the strongest political group, which preached the necessity of *détente* and the need for arranging some kind of co-operation between the Poles and the Russians. This tactic was represented by the National Democracy, led by Dmowski.

The failure of the revolution, the mistakes committed by all the Socialist groups gave to the "Endeks"<sup>20</sup> their first chance to venture into the

<sup>20</sup> So called colloquially from the initials of their Polish name "Narodowa Demokracja," an essentially middle class, strongly nationalist and conservative party.

field of labor politics. Demanding a fair trial for the new constitutional régime, supporting the election to the State Duma, and insisting on autonomy for the Congress Kingdom, the new party opened the fight "against Socialism and anarchy."

Toward the middle of 1905 the National Workers' Association (*Narodowy Związek Robotniczy* or NZR) had already emerged as an instrument of the National Democratic Party in its life-and-death struggle against the Socialist groups.<sup>21</sup> Therefore it had become a factor to be reckoned with in the labor movement, and for several years to follow was its strongest labor organization.<sup>22</sup> The NZR organized fighting squads to oppose those of the PPS and SDKPiL. To the boycott of the first Duma election proclaimed by the Socialists the NZR responded with a counter-boycott.<sup>23</sup>

Fights between Poles and Poles as well as between Poles and Russians ensued. There were hundreds killed. Under cover of the general confusion numerous acts of banditry were perpetrated in the name of every party. The country was on the verge of a civil war. By June, 1906, even the Social Democrats, who urged boycotts and violence, had become frightened and began to advise their supporters to return to reason.<sup>24</sup>

Soon it became obvious that Socialism as a whole was rapidly losing whatever popularity it had managed to acquire among the workers and the more radical intelligentsia, and that the National Democrats remained the masters of the situation. Moreover, the Socialist parties had never had any serious influence on the bulk of the nation, the peasant masses. The Social Democrats, contemptuous of the peasants, never even tried seriously to win them over.<sup>25</sup> The attempts made by the PPS during the early period

<sup>21</sup> Soon afterwards the NZR was transformed into the NPR ("Narodowa Partia Robotnicza," National Workers' Party). It was by means of this party that the National Democrats managed, during the years preceding World War I, to gain considerable influence among the working masses, especially in Western Poland. In 1908, dissatisfied with the conciliatory policy pursued by Dmowski toward St. Petersburg, impatient with his moderate program of autonomy for the Congress Kingdom, the NPR broke its political ties with the ND and drew closer to the PPS (with which it shared its pro-Austrian and anti-Russian orientation).

<sup>22</sup> This fact was frankly admitted by Warski (Warszawski) in his article "Nieco o Demokracji Narodowej" (A Few Words on National Democracy), *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, (April, 1908), pp. 100-101.

<sup>23</sup> "Wybory pod osłoną bagnetów" (The Election under the Protection of Bayonets), *Czerwony Sztandar*, No. 43, (January 13, 1906); also the appeals to the workers in the No. 46, (January 16) and No. 57, (March 4, 1906).

<sup>24</sup> "Koło Polskie" (The Polish Club [in the Duma]), *Czerwony Sztandar*, No. 76, (June 1906); "Walka ideowa zamiast walki na pięści" (Ideological Fight instead of Fist Fight), *ibid.*, No. 77, (June 19, 1906); also "Walka rewolucyjna czy rewolucyjne awanturictwo?" (Revolutionary Struggle or Revolutionary Adventures?), *ibid.*, No. 100, (August 20, 1906).

<sup>25</sup> The first serious attempt to formulate a more substantial agrarian program adapted

of the revolution failed. The "Peasant Union" organized in autumn of 1904 played a less significant role than in Russia. There were some sporadic strikes of agricultural workers but the peasant masses as a whole remained quiet. The weakness of Socialist influence in the villages was revealed during the election to the first Duma. The boycott appeals had no effect whatsoever. The peasants who expected a great deal from the Duma followed the lead of the National Democrats, who, after getting a temporary grip on the working masses, proved temporarily the masters of the rural areas as well. Thus they scored a series of sweeping successes.

After 1905 the influence of the Socialist groups shrunk still more. The divisions became still deeper and the internal tensions within the groups increased further.

## V

*The Cleavage within the PPS*

Under these circumstances the gathering crisis within the PPS, which had borne the brunt of the struggle, came to the surface. The prolonged fight against the superior forces of the Tsarist police, army, and administration, as well as the unexpected dynamism shown by the revolutionary movement in Russia, weakened the position of the leadership of the Party. It had repeatedly denied the potentialities of that movement as well as the possibility of a constitutional evolution of the Empire and staked all its forces on a successful insurrection. When, momentarily, the Russian movement surprised the world by its elemental strength, the PPS had to suffer the consequences of its tactics.

First, impressed by the events in Russia, many left-wing members of the party had believed that a democratic republic was about to be established. This republic, they argued, would surely grant a wide autonomy to *Kongresówka* and thus, render it unnecessary to separate Poland from the rest of the state (a separation that had been plotted since 1892), in order to carry out the program of democracy first and socialism next. It was not very different from the platform advocated by the SDKPiL. The apparent,

---

to the native conditions was made by J. Karski (J. Marchlewski), in a series of articles written for the *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny* (April, May, June and July, 1908), entitled "W kwestii zadań naszych wobec robotników wiejskich i włościan" (On the Problem of our Duties toward the Agricultural Workers and Peasants). This program suggested expropriation of large estates and handing them over to the farmers' co-operatives which would be composed of agricultural labor and of poor peasants. The land would be the property of the nation and would be only worked by the co-operatives. In the first stage the more prosperous farmers would be left in possession of their property and, gradually, won over to the collective forms of production. Thus Marchlewski's program stood half-way between the Bolshevik and the Menshevik ones, between nationalization and municipalization.

momentary, triumph of the Social Democrats caused a considerable shift within the Socialist camp. When, however, both groups proved to be mistaken, and no democratic republic was established, a deep crisis developed in the Socialist camp. All the Socialist parties began to lose their following. But the PPS was more adventurous than the other groups. The workers, who had not abandoned Marxism altogether in favor of the rising force, the National Workers' Association or the NZR, followed either the lead of the SDKPiL or that of the left wing of the PPS. The old guard of the PPS became leaders without an army.

To fully understand the cause of this split within the PPS we have first to analyze the revolutionary effort of Russian Poland, and the effect which developments in Russia had on the situation in Poland. The general strike of January 1905 was organized largely by the PPS and had enhanced the prestige of the Party.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, the initial successes of the revolution in the other parts of the Empire, especially in St. Petersburg and in Moscow, strengthened the position of the left wing of the PPS, or the partisans of close co-operation with the Russian movement. Why risk an isolated uprising, asked the left wing or the "young," when almost as much could be gained by uniting our forces with the Russian comrades? Soon the reckless guerrilla warfare for a seemingly utopian aim, preached and practiced by the followers of Piłsudski alienated from him all but a few enthusiasts. For months they defied an armed force of nearly three hundred thousand men and suffered great hardships and sacrifices. They were decimated by the fighting and the inevitable reprisals that followed the failure of the revolution.

We have no exact figures concerning the application of martial law in Russian Poland during the period of November 1905. Then both the fury of the revolution and the counter-revolution abated somewhat. Nevertheless, the available data illustrated fairly conclusively both the intensity of the movement and the participation of various parties in it, since in most cases people were tried for the acts they had committed between 1905 and 1906.

During a period of over nine months, between November 1905 and September 1906, the military tribunals tried 309 cases of participation in revolutionary groups, with 913 defendants involved. Over three-quarters of them belonged to both wings of the PPS, less than one quarter to the SDKPiL, and an insignificant number to the "Proletariat" and the "Bund." From February 1905 till June 1907 as many as 40,000 persons went through the Warsaw prisons. Six hundred and eighty-six persons were found guilty

<sup>26</sup> This fact was frankly admitted by its opponents; see Martov & others, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, 176.

Two hundred and fifty-eight, i.e., 38% of the total, were sentenced to death. It was 26% of all death sentences pronounced for similar activities during the corresponding period, throughout the Empire, while the population of the Congress Kingdom formed less than 10% of the total population. Warsaw and Łódź had the largest share of trials and death sentences.<sup>27</sup> The brunt of the revolutionary activity and its consequences was borne by the PPS and its military organization. To these figures must be added hundreds of men killed and wounded in the fratricidal struggles between the warring factions of the Marxist camp, as well as between the Socialist and the members of the NZR, the victims of strikes, street demonstrations and countless street fights.

The country was exhausted and tired of the continual fighting and revolutionary ferment. Even the Socialist groups themselves were soon at the end of their resources, especially the right wing of the PPS. Loss of strength was rapidly followed by a decrease in influence and popularity. Thus the patriotic wing of the PPS, the backbone of the Military Organization, although supported by the Galician Socialists headed by Daszyński, was rapidly losing ground within the ranks of the party in Russian Poland. Already since the VIIth Party Congress of 1905 the left wing of the PPS or the "young" (Feliks Sachs, Max Horwitz, Marian Bielecki) had taken over the political leadership. Reluctantly they left the "Old Guard" in control of the Military Organization, accusing it, at the same time, of being a "fighting aristocracy" and a potential danger for the party. In their policy the "Young" were largely supported by Feliks Kon and Tadeusz Rechniewski, two founding members of the first "Proletariat," who returned from exile and again began to play a considerable role within the party.

Thus two distinct factions were taking shape within the Party. In the beginning the real differences between them were camouflaged by the common desire for a separate Constituent Assembly or *Sejm*, to meet in Warsaw. The right wing interpreted it as an instrument of separation from Russia, while the left wing saw in it a stepping stone toward a wider autonomy (*usamodzielnienie*), which in the future might, or might not, lead towards a complete separation. However, in accordance with the forebodings expressed by Piłsudski and Jodko-Narkiewicz, the development of events led the leftist faction to interpret separate parliamentary institutions in an ever narrower sense, and eventually they came to mean no more than some kind of local autonomy. This was, in practice, not very distant from the autonomy

27 For martial law in the Congress Kingdom see F. K. (Feliks Kon), *Sądy wojenne w Królestwie Polskim* (Martial Courts in the Congress Kingdom), (Kraków, 1909), pp. 65-114. For the atmosphere of the years 1904-1908 among the PPS fighters see the first part of J. Kwapiński, *Organizacja bojowa-Katorga . . . 1904-1919* (The Military Organization Servitude . . . 1904-1919), (London, 1943).

claimed by the SDKPiL. The Social Democrats, however, unlike the left wing of the PPS, were, more often than not, inclined to support the idea of a single Parliament for the whole Russian state, in accordance with the centralist ideas professed by Luxemburg. The right wing, on the other hand, stuck to its guns, and, for tactical reasons only, was ready to concede that whatever liberties might be granted by Russia should be accepted but regarded merely as a stepping stone toward eventual complete independence.<sup>28</sup>

To compel St. Petersburg to concede as much as possible Piłsudski advocated the continuance of the armed fight. This policy of "permanent insurrection" found less and less support among the rank and file. They were gradually drawn more and more toward the opportunist program of the left wing of seizing at once whatever is offered and of making the best of it. Autonomy and the eight-hour working day were the immediate objectives. Thus, the differences of opinion between the SDKPiL and the left wing of the PPS were narrowing while those between the two wings of the party were rapidly widening. Under the circumstances a Congress became a necessity.

## VI

### *The PPS Splits (1906)*

The VIIIth Congress of the PPS took place in February 1906 at Lwów. The left wing was in overwhelming majority and carried the day. The Congress passed the declaration that spelled a major revolution within the party. It condemned the idea of an uprising, in the sense of a war leading to separation from Russia and proclaimed a social revolution as the main objective of the party. The resolution of the Congress stated that revolutionary, proletarian tactics have nothing to do with the idea of a national rising. Thus it shelved, if it did not drop altogether, the independence plank of the party as it had been formulated in Paris in 1892. The Congress also declared that in case of a victory of the revolution in St. Petersburg, the Russian Empire should be turned into a federal and democratic republic with a wide autonomy for the *Kongresówka*. Terror was condemned once more and the general strike was accepted as the main, though not the only, means of achieving the objectives of the party.<sup>29</sup>

28 This problem has been widely discussed in the Socialist literature. L. Wasilewski, "Walka o postulat niepodległość . . ." (Fight for the Postulate of Independence . . .), Part III, *Niepodległość*, Vol. X, No. 3, (1934) 328-332. For the minutes of the debate of June 1905, see W. Pobóg-Malinowski (ed.), "Na przełomie ideowym" (On the Ideological Divide), *Niepodległość*, Vol. VI, Nos. 1 and 2, (1931); Vol. VII No. 1 (1932) and No. 2, (1933). Also L. Wasilewski, *Zarys dziejów Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej* (An outline of the History of the Polish Socialist Party . . .) (Warszawa, n.d.) pp. 152-174.

29 *Księga Pamiątkowa PPS* (The Memorial Book of the PPS), Warsaw, (1923),

The SDKPiL which meanwhile was entering into federation with the Russian Social Democracy, became the dominant force within the shattered Socialist camp of Poland. The party of Luxemburg took advantage of the half-heartedness of the resolutions that had been passed in Vienna and criticized their vagueness. If a loose federation was approved, asked the Social Democrats, why not complete independence? It was obvious that the Left was far from drawing all the conclusions from its change of heart. Nevertheless, the indirect success of the Social Democrats was considerable. Although the Party itself was losing strength to the NZR, its most dangerous and hated opponent within the Socialist camp was divided. Moreover, one of the groups accepted a program which, although still a far cry from "proletarian internationalism," preached by the Social Democrats, meant a definite break with the hated independence program.

The right wing of the PPS had from the beginning opposed the resolutions of the VIIIth Congress and continued to object to them after they had been passed. Despite the orders of the Central Committee Piłsudski and his "Military Organization" went on their own way without, however, formally leaving the party. They carried out a series of bold raids or "fighting actions" as they were then called. The most important "actions" were raids on a train carrying Governmental money at Rogów, in 1906, and, two years later at Bezdany.

Soon, it became obvious the VIIIth Congress had settled nothing, and had only put off the final issue. Another Congress was badly needed. It took place in November 1906, in Vienna. The IXth Congress condemned once more the fighting activities of the "Military Organization," and, this time, excluded it from the party altogether. The Congress, moreover, definitely reaffirmed that the platform of independence should be shelved and replaced by a demand for autonomy which was declared the immediate objective of the party's activity. Although the party never openly abandoned the idea of a separate Polish statehood, it declared it impractical and pushed the problem into the background, subordinating it to the issue of an all-Russian social revolution, as a pre-condition of both social and national liberation.<sup>39</sup> Thus, the program of the PPS came nearer to the SDKPiL which meanwhile entered into federation with the Russian Social Democracy. But such a stand provoked a deep internal crisis. Again the majority of the members followed the new line and only a minority sided with Piłsudski. This group

pp. 10-12; T. Jabłoński, *Krótki zarys historii PPS* (*A Short Outline of the History of the PPS*), (Warszawa, 1947), pp. 59-60; A. L. Pogodin, *op. cit.*, p. 603; Wasilewski, *op. cit.* 175-183.

<sup>39</sup> *Sprawozdanie z IX Zjazdu PPS* (*Report of the IX Congress of the PPS*), (Kraków, 1907), *passim*. Wasilewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-186. *Mysł Socjalistyczna* (*The Socialist Thought*), No. 1, (1907), 13-16.

took the name of "PPS-Revolutionary Faction," while the majority came to be known as "PPS-Left."

From that moment began Piłsudski's rather slow evolution which, during the next ten years or so carried him gradually away from Socialism. When the international crisis of 1908 came, he formed the "Union of Active Resistance" (*Związek Walki Czynnej*). This organization was to co-operate with the "Military Organization" and to prepare cadres for a future revolutionary government and armed forces of the Polish Republic. The PPS-Left, on the other hand, kept drifting toward the Social Democratic viewpoint. This evolution ended only in December, 1918, when both Parties merged and set up the "Communist Workers' Party of Poland."

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

## SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN POLAND

by Zygmunt Zaremba

### *Part Two\**

#### *The New Ruling Class*

THE FREE play of social forces withers away in a totalitarian system. In the new arrangement of relationships brought into effect by the communist régime, the propertied classes have been reduced to the level of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, still tolerated, yet extremely restricted in their activity. The property of the larger capitalistic units has passed over into the hands of the state. The property of the petty bourgeoisie and of the peasantry is in process of a liquidation which is taking place in a number of ways: by confiscatory taxation, or by being forced or "organize" in pseudo-cooperatives." These production cooperatives in the country or handicraft cooperatives in the towns, taking over the title to their property from the small owners, at the same time transfer their control to the state by the same simple organism of labor. The class structure has either disappeared or is well on the way to annihilation.

But the question arises: does this mean that social classes no longer exist? The official communist doctrine answers this question by pointing out that the disappearance of private property gives way to the organ of work, which was and is throughout the non-communist world the basis of contemporary class differentiation. But the division into classes, dependent upon property ownership, has been characterized, and still is, by the degree of participation of the larger groups of the population in social income. In the communist system the basis of property as the basis for the share a given class has in the social income has disappeared. But the inequality of the sharing in the profits of society has not disappeared and the feeling of injustice continues among the broad masses of people. Consequently the distinctions into privileged and unprivileged classes has not ceased to exist and they will become clearly evident only in the new system of forces with conflicting interests.

It is not the title to property, but the right to dispose of it by any means of the organs of labor that was proposed as a basis for a social class distinction. That right is decisive as to the wages or participation in social income. This right of disposal has only a single source: the possessive power of the state. Hence the relation of individuals and whole groups

---

\*The first part of this story appeared in the July issue of the JOURNAL.

to the state apparatus begins to describe the new structure of social classes the new system of forces with conflicting interests.

The state becomes the sole owner of the organs of labor. If this were to happen in a democratic state, under the real if widely diffused control of society working through a parliamentary system, and under conditions of centralized ownership and disposal of capital, the bureaucracy would be the virtual ruler. Even before World War II the increasingly rapid rate at which the state was assuming control of the economic life was a matter of deep concern to the labor movement. For a long time the ideal of socialization was in conflict with the practice of "statism". The ideal of socialization envisages as its aim economic democracy, that is to say the widest possible realization of immediate participation of society in the machinery of economic life. It counterposes to central state control the decentralization of social property by transferring it, along with government, to the villages and cooperatives of democratic planning organs, and central control of economic life with a participation at all stages of democratically elected and responsible representatives of interested groups of society—producers, workers, consumers and technicians.

In a communist régime democracy is a word without meaning. Social control does not exist. The system of censorship and of so-called "state secrets" makes impossible any semblance of organic social organization. Official statistics are prepared with the express purpose of concealing the facts. A "parliamentary" system is so controlled as to assure unanimous approval of everything the government proposes. These "parliamentary" organs are made up of the same people who draw up the government legislation. There is no question of any sort of control. The bureaucracy, the sole and omnipotent master of the state apparatus, is thus the exclusive executive of the organs of production. In this way it takes over absolutely the function of the former owner classes, extending its rule not only to the whole of collective life, but to spheres hitherto reserved for the private life of the individual. This centralization of all political and economic life in the hands of this bureaucracy has given it a power such as no other ruling class has ever had in western history. In the communist system there grow up two distinct social classes, dependent upon their relation to the state government: those who share in the apparatus of the governing bureaucracy, those dependent upon the favor or disfavor of the proletariat. In the Soviet Union that participation was carried to its ultimate and logical conclusions. In Poland, we are on the way towards a realization of this new social structure. The régime, with a heavy hand and strict consistency, is liquidating all elements of economic and personal independence so as to

bring about a condition of complete proletarization and subjugation of the masses to the state.

Yet again a question arises: can this new ruling group be properly called a social class? Or is it not more correct to speak of a party which controls the government, or perhaps of an élite, elevated to the administrative control of a state by the Communist Party which has taken over all executive and economic functions. Capitalist ownership was bound up with the right of the possessor to free disposal of his capital. In the communist system the connections between ownership and control of capital have been severed! Formal title to property was transferred to an impersonal state, and physical control of all organs of labor went into the hands of state functionaries. The differentiation between those who govern and those who are governed becomes more clear than ever before. Whether one has a function within the state apparatus or remains outside that apparatus determines the social position of a person and his share in the social income. The old concept of class remains in all its aspects, save that of ownership.

The party plays a special role. To replace the concept of class with the concept of a communist party would be equivalent to the transfer of the analysis from the plane of social relations to that of organizational problems, with which, in its proper place, we will be concerned. At the same time the term "governing élite" does not fully describe the phenomenon of the birth of the whole group of which that élite is the apex, yet concealed, in its totality, within the Communist Party.

The old concept of a social class, aside from the disappearance of private ownership of capital, quite adequately describes the new governing group. The economic function, together with the privileges stemming from the title of a political régime and economic control provide the complete equivalence between the contemporary bureaucracy of a totalitarian state and the ancient propertied and ruling classes.

#### *The Old and the New Bureaucracy*

The democracy in the communist system differs in many respects from the old type bureaucracy it had displaced, which may be called, with more or less accuracy, a democratic bureaucracy. Under democratic conditions the bureaucracy never constituted a distinct group, bound together by common interests or a common source of power. In its top echelons we may observe a connection and even a mingling with the privileged and propertied class. At the same time state employees, or those in private enterprise, as also the intelligentsia, are, in democratic systems, identified with various social groups. They constitute not so much a class as a social group, as their

groups of origin may have diverse constituencies and divergent, even contradictory interests. When a group of state employees or employees of private enterprise regard themselves as a supra-class element, serving the general good, another group, working in capitalistic enterprises, and dependent upon profits or dividends from these enterprises, experiences a sense of direct bond with the interests of the capitalistic world; still a third group, active in the labor organizations, is influenced by the ideology of labor. The bureaucracy is a group, fulfilling circumscribed functions, or performing a similar sort of work, yet without a separate consciousness and without a general undergirding of interests, and, *a fortiori*, without a separate organization and a general executive.

In the communist totalitarian system, the bureaucracy acquires a uniform basis of material interests arising from the monopoly of economic and political power; it remains completely uniformized according to the fixed model of the "Soviet worker" and is bound to one directive center, with the centralized apparatus of state power, and the worker becomes simply a cog in a vast machinery.

Let us take the example of the director of the present "Industrial Union." Formerly, as director of a private enterprise, he was connected with and dependent upon the owner or owners of this concern. In addition, he was necessarily involved in legislative matters and the requirements of the agencies of the state. In conjunction with his functions he received a salary several times greater than the average craftsman or worker in the business. At the present time a manager is exclusively dependent upon state officials like himself, only placed higher in the bureaucratic hierarchy. This same group makes laws and sets the framework of its activity, uninfluenced by any social group whatsoever. Whereas formerly this manager had to take account of the trades union of workers or craftsmen, now the "trades union" is an organization obedient to the will of an official like our manager, bearing the title of secretary or president of an official union or group of officials who constitute a party committee. From a material point of view nothing has been changed as to the privileges of the managerial group. The manager is still a manager. Their salaries are frequently several times higher than the average wages of the working man. In living accommodations, travel, vacations, there has been no change from the pre-communist days.

We might consider another example: the manager of a state owned farm or an estate. He does not possess any title to the ownership of the land, but aside from that he lives like the previous estate-owner, or if not in the same mansion, just as comfortably, and he has the same prerogatives as the former estate owner—with the important exception that he is re-

sponsible only to the officials of his own sort, save that they might be slightly higher on the hierarchical ladder. And he even has vis à vis the farm workers, more freedom than the former owner, since no union can cause him any trouble. State employees, less highly placed than himself, control all union activity among the workers who have to accept his orders.

In the case of a production cooperative or a *kolkhoz* the manager becomes automatically the director of the unit with the responsibility of an official bound to the state administration. In a crafts cooperative again the manager, enjoying many privileges compared to the rank and file of the membership, is dependent only upon officials like himself.

There is thus this social group, completely separated from other groups, internally cohesive and interdependent, bound together by a common interest in maintaining and increasing their position of privilege as contrasted with the working masses. Formerly the internal cohesiveness of the bureaucracy was extremely complicated and solidarity was essentially unattainable because of the dependence of individual bureaucrats upon so many and varied centers of distribution and control. Today, under a totalitarian communist régime, there is only one center of distribution and control, and the whole bureaucracy, industrial or social (i.e. trades unions or cooperatives), is dependent upon this center of control.

This change distinguishes the communist bureaucratic class of today from the bureaucracy of yesterday. But the problem goes deeper. The bureaucracy of capitalistic societies grew up spontaneously, in the process of a division of governmental function. The communist bureaucracy is (in the Soviet Union) or is becoming (in the captive states or in those under Soviet Control), a class consciously created and organized from the top by the Communist Party which controls the government. Just as, in the middle ages, the "sovereign" by granting lands and privileges created a nobility of lords and vassals, sworn to maintain his suzerainty and serve him by arms, so today the Communist Party and indeed its "suzerain" in Moscow is creating a bureaucratic class, enjoying the many privileges beyond those of the other classes of society, and destined to form the societal basis for the continued existence of the communist régime. The party itself becomes thus the backbone of this new class, insisting upon its own party hierarchical structure as necessary for the new class, and it binds by the duty of blind obedience and absolute fidelity those "protected" and watched by the various agencies of security.

In Poland the creation of this new class is just getting under way. The majority of officialdom is still made up of intellectuals or clerical workers of the previous generation who have no connection with the Communist Party. But there is a noticeable increase of office holders who are

bound by party discipline. It is this group which will eventually constitute the new bureaucracy, consciously united by common interests and the obvious need to protect their position of privilege.

The penetration of the bureaucracy by the apparatus of the Communist Party is being effected precisely in the measure that the whole official hierarchy is being taken over, from the top down. At the top, in the central administrative organ, all, or almost all, positions are in the hands of the party. The élite of the bureaucracy is identical with the party directorate. The Political Bureau of the Polish United Workers' Party (*PZPR*) constitutes the highest echelon of the régime and the head of the bureaucratic hierarchy. In that central organism the final decisions that affect every segment of the country's life are made and all modifications and personnel changes are also decided there.

We are thus faced, in its clearest form, with an oligarchy, which, having seized power, goes on to decide who or what will be taken in or thrown out of its select circle. Here there are brought together all the threads of government, impervious to any influence, even of the most highly placed members of that governing class, if they do not belong to the party élite.

As the Politburo of the Polish Communist Party was created and continues to exist and function under the direct influence of the Soviet Union, in the last analysis the broad and important decisions are those of the Politburo of the All-Russian Communist Party. Again the analogy with the middle ages suggest itself: the Soviet suzerain apportions the dukedoms and his barons act for him within the boundaries assigned them.

It is for that reason that, in contrast with the Soviet Union, the ruling communist oligarchy in Poland has no individual leadership. Bolesław Bierut is a colorless figure and no one would venture to regard him as a national leader. Jakób Berman harbored the idea of becoming an eminence grise, but no one placed upon his head the crown of the leader. An effort to make Wiesław Gomulka, former Secretary-General of the Communist Party, into such a leader, on the Soviet model, during the German occupation, turned out, for the candidate at any rate, very unfortunately. There is only one instance of an omniscient and omnicompetent leader, Joseph Stalin. His sublime omniscience is now determinative for the Polish Politburo. His will has decided, and now decides, in the final analysis, on all questions of personnel in the Polish Communist Party.

Not only do Communist Party members occupy all positions at the top of the bureaucracy, but on the lower levels the proportion of communists is continually on the increase, and at every point their positions are especially privileged. They have influence and access to higher officials which are

impossible for their non-party colleagues. Their prospects for advancement are of course infinitely greater, as they are a part of the network of the central power. The internal organization of the new bureaucracy is parallel to the structure of the Communist Party. The party apparatus is superior to the bureaucratic apparatus, and at every step of his career the official is judged according to his devotion to and enthusiasm for the régime.

The party apparatus, aside from the Politburo and the formal central organs of the party, is made up of a huge network of agents and masses of ordinary members. The agents of the party, whose number, as of the date of writing, reaches well beyond 200,000, are functionaries of a unique sort, engaged in the party machinery, and, along with regular members of the party, appointed to various outposts of political and social activity. Party functionaries constitute only one kind of state employees. They are paid from state funds since the party, in a totalitarian system, *ipso facto* identifies itself with the state and disposes of the state's resources. The agents, acting in various committees or party groups, even if they do not receive directly compensation for their political work, make up for this either by higher salaries at the place of their normal occupation or by the possession of a pure sinecure.

This agent becomes in effect a wedge into the established bureaucracy where he displaces, or dislodges non-party elements. Groups of party "activists" in the trades unions, cooperatives and other social organizations, or members of the councils and executive groups are only the individual agents writ large. The trades unions, and the factory councils contain about 250,000 of these "activists" who are, for the most part not yet members of the party. They are rather selected candidates for later inclusion into the more restricted apparatus. The agent of the second rank is a reserve for the Communist Party from which it can draw new crops of bureaucrats, for which the need is always on the increase. The "social advance" so loudly proclaimed for the proletariat from a position where it was deprived of all public and personal rights to one of membership in the ruling class looms large in the creation and consolidation of the new bureaucracy.

Beyond the party agent, whose task is to effect the will of the party even in the most remote corner of the national life, there remains the obedient and melancholy mass of party members, in actuality an unnecessary ballast in the organization of a new system of government and a new ruling class. The bureaucracy of the state and the party, along with the "activists," fulfill all necessary governmental functions. And yet the recruiting of party members and the filling of its ranks by the largest possible number of people from the various groups is a matter of constant urgency. This recruiting becomes, as it were, successful sallies into the very thickets of

society, a network in design, intended to bind the masses into the party. Individuals thus recruited, held by certain small yet tangible privileges in their daily life, yet without any decisive voice in party life, become hardly more than a chorus of yes-men for the rulers of the party. While the party organization is the determinative framework of the governing bureaucracy, the members of the party are the net means of which the masses are involved in the control of the state. The new bureaucracy has been developed, in comparison with the old, in considerable numbers. As institutions and agencies have increased, replacing private enterprise, the need for the creation of a different sort of central superstructure covering these institutions (not to mention the presence of an intricate party organization eager to exercise control and supervision) has justified the extension of the bureaucracy. In the internal structure this becomes a sort of maffia for the organization of a hierarchically graded secret society. A group of the élite in the Polish Politburo have their ear cocked for the orders of the Bolshevik Party in Moscow. A select stratum of "activists" carry out in absolute obedience the orders of the Polish Politburo, while the ordinary members of the party, like cogs in a machine, herd the rest of the people in the direction dictated by the "activists". Around this, the core of a new ruling class, the rest of the bureaucratic mass is centered.

This machinery, set in motion by the will of Moscow, could be constructed and can continue to exist only by means of a systematic and planned terror, whose organization, on the Soviet model, is entrusted to a special Office of Security (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa). Ostensibly the *UB* is intended only to be a protection against internal disturbances, caused by enemies of the régime. But a more significant task assigned to it is the maintenance of discipline within the ranks of the party, in order to forestall any lapse into heresy and to guarantee ruthless control of the Great Russian Communist Party.

#### *Internal Antagonisms of the Régime*

Class antagonisms are characteristic of the internal life of contemporary societies. And although the communist apologists discover that classes are disappearing under the impact of their doctrines, the basis for class antagonisms in the communist régime in actuality remains, only focussed on the farthest horizon, setting the mass of proletarized society against the exclusive bureaucratic class, strictly disciplined by the communist maffia. The conflict between these two diametrically opposed forces will certainly determine the history of the development of communist organisms.

In order to prevent open revolt, the communist system of government has built up in Russia, and is rapidly creating in the captive states an ap-

paratus of government with a power unheard of up to the present, even in the most powerful police states. It is directed against the whole citizenry. It increases the privileges of the ruling elements, and guarantees the possibility of further expansion of privileges. Along with this apparatus of physical force the communists have created an extensive apparatus of propaganda among the masses. Intensive internal propaganda in a totalitarian state is of no less importance than physical terror. The world has never known a similar offensive against the mind of man save perhaps in the middle ages when the sword and religion united to rule the masses.

But the very fact that the communist régimes are obliged to isolate, not only physically but also intellectually the areas they rule, shows how flimsy the foundations of their structure of slavery actually are. Its existence is possible only under conditions of this kind of isolation, condemning the masses of society to at least a temporary submission to force.

In an age of radio such an isolation cannot be total, nor can the roots of internal resistance against the existing conditions be eliminated. The cleavage between the social interests of the working people and those of the governing bureaucracy can only become deeper and the antagonism between these forces more bitter. The old saying that the working masses have nothing to lose in a war between thieves has lost none of its aptness.

For a certain time the communist régime in Poland has had a good propaganda basis in the vestige of the conflicts of interests as they existed before the communists came to power. It is possible, even, by forcing the propaganda line, and preying upon the lowest instincts of greed, to focus attention and arouse the anger of the masses who suffer want and misery, upon the storekeeper as the ostensible source of their hunger and misery, or upon the peasant who seems to be prosperous, or again even upon the independent craftsman. But in the end, after liquidating the groups of small owners and levelling all society downwards, where will the régime find a scapegoat who will obscure the reality of the new situation and protect the new ruling class from the hatred of the masses? There remains only the scarecrow of the old classes and the threat of a return to the conditions of former social inequality and the ancient bugbear of unemployment. The ghost of the past soon pales in comparison with the reality of today's persecution. It might even take on some glamor in the light of present realities.

The communist system manages however, to set one group of workers against another and to create artificial "fronts" of internal wars against "saboteurs" or "obstructionists," against social democrats or "gomulkites." It maneuvers these artificial antagonisms with remarkable skill. But even here it is met with the deeply rooted solidarity of the proletariat, or the

solidarity of the working people, which in great measure has frustrated this game of deception. The complaints of the communists that the campaigns of self-criticism do not produce results or that the working people, in spite of pressure, reject with contempt the Soviet invention of mutual accusation and refuse to defile their own class, are an eloquent illustration of this fact. Similarly the failure of the propaganda of judicial sentences on workers leaving their work without permission of the management shows that the communist plans which aim at the internal dissolution of the working masses have not found root in class relationships based on the old and fair traditions of the workers' movement and in a deep social morality.

The struggle of the working masses with the communist bureaucracy must be fought out right on the field of social inequality, which has already divided these forces. Along with this certainty the internal unity of the bureaucracy must be continually exposed to difficult tests. These trials will not be easily surmounted, because the skeleton put together by the Communist Party in the shape of communist "activists" is of a very recent date and style and produced on the path of violence and after blocking all other paths of possible action and social advance.

The ruling bureaucracy is in Poland still in process of becoming a class. It is directly influenced by the older traditions of individual freedom and the old manner of life general among the group of intellectual workers. Only the greatest vigilance of the *UB* and its network of spies, frequent purges and personnel changes in the corps of agents, whose task is to keep the great body of officials loyal to the régime, maintain the internal discipline of this class, always uncertain and in very delicate balance. Even this system of keeping the bureaucracy in leash creates an atmosphere which tends to disturb the internal cohesiveness of the ruling class. Even in the Soviet system, in effect for over thirty years, a system of terror and of continual purges, an atmosphere of uncertainty as to the morrow, and the denial of every freedom of thought and action, create tendencies which will wreck the unity of the ruling group. Spontaneously there grow up forthwith even amidst the bureaucracy inclinations to seek other forms of social organizations in which the office-holder would not be dependent upon the favor or disfavor of the ruling élite and obliged to be a menace to his colleagues.

One factor that tends to keep the ruling class together is the privilege of governing, apportioned among all its members in a degree commensurate with their place in the hierarchy. On its lowest levels, for the great mass of officialdom this privilege is often illusory. The material position of the bottom of the bureaucracy is and will remain for long, on the Polish scene,

close to that of the skilled laborer. The significant fact that the workers have refused to accept any further lowering of their standard of living, and the failure of the communist policy of pauperization of the masses seems to protect them from the effectuation of Soviet conditions, where, between the lowest official and the masses there is a great economic gap. This comparison of the bottoms of bureaucracy with at least the better situated earning groups of the working class must also give rise to a *rapprochement* in attitudes and tendencies, and a similar understanding both of one another's grievances and the desire for their redress.

It is not possible to escape a phenomenon that has been a long history of reappearance. Just as under the capitalist system injustice has mobilized against itself the better elements of the privileged classes, so even today it is not possible to immunize the new ruling class from the implications of overt injustice. After all, in addition of reasons of a social and economic nature there has been at work on the new ruling class, splitting it and creating an unsurmountable barrier between a Politburo and its agents devoted to Moscow and the mass of government officials with the rest of the population, a force deeply rooted in national feeling and now trampled on by the communists. The highest or most extensive privilege in the gift of the ruling class can not drown out this sentiment. What is more, it has been quickened in the hearts of the masses, bloodstained and smarting under the sense of social injustice. It is bound to spread from the masses to all strata of society.

The feeling of national unity is not only at the root of this sentimental reaction. It brings to bear the pressure of desires felt by millions even when they may not be openly voiced. In the face of the action of this force no member of the nation is in any position to resist its power, if he is at all bound to his own society. Having observed the disease of titoism spreading at the very top of the Communist Party, we can understand how strong the action of this collective pressure can be which arose from a feeling of national injustice and is able to seduce from a comfortable career as established communist leaders such men as Gomulka, Rajk or Kostov. When, in place of the Gomulkas, one can imagine even a Rokossowski misled the same way, we must recognize that the communist régime cannot count on putting down deeper roots in Poland.

The feeling of a national humiliation, the absorption of Poland by the Soviet Union, the violation of her most sacred national ideals, the feeling of shame at the subjection of Poland to Russian might is in no wise obliterated by the paltry show of diplomatic amenities doled out to the representatives of Polish communism by the Kremlin. The Politburo in Moscow is quite aware of these difficulties and takes great care to veil the

realities of Polish-Soviet relations by declarations of friendship and a guarantee of the Oder-Neisse frontier, which, after the post-war transfers of population, is now so vital for Poland. Yet this last contrivance minimizes in only the slightest degree the potential hatred of the Polish people for their oppressor. The national resentment deepens and hardens from day to day the chasm dividing the masses of society from the ruling communist bureaucracy which has embraced so enthusiastically the Russian bear. Nor can the bureaucracy, as a whole, consolidate its gains from the privileges of ruling and its disposal of all the machinery of production.

The new pattern of relations creates, so to speak, an alignment for inevitable internal antagonisms between the working masses and the ruling bureaucracy—the principal line of social cleavage. But along with that development there are growing antagonisms within this new ruling class which the communists have brought into being. The memory of the former free manner of life and the *rapprochement* of the ordinary government employee to the masses of private workers, and the feeling of an unbearable burden of terror hardly leads to the organic security of this ruling class, creating rather a formidable source of internal friction at its heart. And lastly, this feeling of national humiliation divides by an impassable chasm the communist élite from the rest of society, from its working masses and from the greater part of the bureaucratic class. The communist régime is in no position to eliminate the antagonisms. On this battleground future conflicts will inevitably break out.

### *The forces of the future*

The numerical modifications among the larger social groups have already altered decidedly the center of gravity onto the side of the working class. The rapidly advancing industrialization of the country, facilitated by the moving of the boundaries westward to include all of Silesia has effected not only the proletarization of the other classes, but a tremendous increase in the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers. If one may believe the official statistics this increase reached 75% at the beginning of 1950, and it is quite probable that in the very near future we will witness an absolute doubling of the number of workers. The figure of five million skilled and unskilled workers in jobs outside of agriculture, planned for 1955, seems very near to actuality.

The working class, which in the last half-century was certainly the most active element in Polish life, in spite of the fact that it was numerically a minor group, has at the present time come to occupy the primacy among all social groups. Furthermore the petty bourgeoisie is undergoing gradual liquidation, consciously engineered by the régime. The peasantry, obviously

weakened from the standpoint of group action by their wide diffusion throughout the country, are at present threatened with collectivization. Yet the peasants have opposed the communists so firmly as to force the régime to modify its plans and to declare openly and repeatedly that there will be no *forced* collectivization. That is something of a gain, but the peasants are still under great pressure and, under present conditions, have no economic margin of safety. Unable to count on peasant support, the principal resources of the party and the bureaucracy must be the urban proletariat. The future of the nation and its society will therefore depend upon the cast of that proletariat.

The old forms of social and political struggle are certainly not valid in a totalitarian system. The working classes no longer have at their disposal their former weapons: their freely organized unions. The puppet organizations, trades and party unions, put out in the show windows deceive no one and the masses of the proletariat today feel that they have been completely deprived of their group organizational defenses. Yet they have no intention of giving up the struggle for their rights. They will have only to discover other forms of resistance, less overt perhaps, but still by continued and unrelenting resistance to the new ruling class, accomplishing something of the same purpose. The régime is quite aware of this opposition and not a little worried by it.

Boycott of the communist organizations is a general manifestation of this spirit. When the Secretary of the Council of the Polish Workers' Party (*PZPR*) asserted recently in Katowice that skilled workers are, in a majority, avoiding party affiliation, it is an eloquent admission. According to his story, at the beginning of 1950 85% of government employees were in the party, whereas only 30% of mine workers working "on top" and but 10% to 12% of woodsmen and other skilled underground mine workers were party members. It would appear that the more skilled the worker, the greater the pressure necessary to get him into the ranks of the faithful.

Within this same party, according to current self-criticisms one reads in the communist press, there is formalism, bureaucratism, a lack of enthusiasm for Marxist-Stalinist aims. These would seem to be signs typical of an organization whose members are brought together under duress or pressure of fear. The story of every shop or factory offers thousands of examples of tacit and obstinate resistance to the basic principles of the communist organization of labor, a conspiracy to deceive their bosses and snarl up the competitions for increased production. Only a small portion of cases of this sort come to public notice. These tell rather of the glaring cases of the boycotts of communist activists, emphasizing the pressure on the majority of the workers to submit to the demands of the régime, which

call for an increase in the tempo at which capital goods are to be produced for the régime.

In one of the most important sectors—in the field of wages—the determined nature of the opposition to the policy of blocked wages and the statements of Hilary Minc that it was not possible to raise wages without upsetting the whole six-year plan was so strong that the régime had to retreat and not only promise quickly increases in wage scales, but carry them out in a whole group of trades, beginning with the miners. In spite of the organizational disarmament of the workers they have refused to give in.

The communists put great store by a new generation of workers. They count on recruiting women in great numbers for industry. From these elements they hope to mould a base for their movement. Uncertain of the older workers, they tend to eliminate them, so far as possible, from their jobs and replace them with younger and more malleable recruits. The fact that during the latest "purge" in the trades union movement 82% of the members of the Councils were replaced by workers who had never previously had anything to do with organized labor is eloquent testimony of the depressing nature of this struggle of the workers with the communist organization. And yet the cadres of trades union members in pre-war Poland numbered in the tens of thousands. But thorough analyses of the purges that have been carried out show that the reliance on these new workers has not been satisfactorily justified. Even after a third screening new elements have had to be brought in to replace, in the higher posts, the majority of those who were brought in after the previous "purge." The same situation holds for women officials who have been introduced into the new bureaucracy.

It is quite impossible to make any sharp distinction between the new group of workers swarming into industry and the old core of the Polish proletariat. The experience and group attitudes of the latter are quickly communicated to the new workers. The ideals that have motivated the workers' movement for decades are still alive and, in spite of the absence of freedom to manifest themselves, they constitute the real content of the spiritual life of all Polish workers. They may not be obvious or visible, but the new masses of the proletariat are soon deeply conscious of them. The ideal of a native Okrzeja cannot be dimmed by a Soviet hero of the cut of Stachanov. The spiritual master remains, not Lenin or Stalin, but Limanowski and Daszyński. The model and paragon of life and devotion to the highest ideals of which the Polish worker is capable will never be Dzurzyński, but Kazimierz Pużak.

LONDON, ENGLAND

## NOTES

Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Chief of the German War Documents Project and United States Editor-in-Chief of *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*, has retired from the Department of State. He has been succeeded by Paul R. Sweet, formerly of Colby College, who since 1949 has been the head of the United States team working in the original German archives now located at Whaddon Hall, near Bletchley, England. Mr. Sweet's place in England has been taken by Howard McGaw Smyth, formerly of the University of California and recently of the Historical Service of the Army.

\* \* \*

Preliminary selection of the documents for Series D of *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945* has been completed to the end of the war in May 1945; final selection has been made by the Editors-in-Chief to December 31, 1940. It is expected that all volumes of Series D containing documents up to the outbreak of the second World War in September 1939 will be released in 1953.

\* \* \*

Among recent deaths of Central European emigré scholars and men of action, the passing of Jan Kucharzewski should be noted. He died in New York after a long illness on July 5, 1952, at the age of 76. He was Premier of Poland in 1917-18 when the German government wished to attract Polish support. He resigned after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk made it abundantly clear that Germany had no intention of allowing an independent Poland to exist. After 1918, though he accepted the post as Polish delegate to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague (1923-30), he declined several offers of high cabinet posts under the Piłsudski régime, preferring to devote himself to a profound study of Russian life and thought which bore the title *Od białego caratu do czerwonego* (7 vols. Warsaw, 1923-31). He left Poland shortly after the battle of Warsaw in 1939. This work was naturally unpopular in post-1945 Poland, and book-sellers were forbidden to sell it. Mr. Kucharzewski abridged the work into a sizable single volume in English, and it was published under the title *The Origins of Modern Russia* by the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America (New York, 1948). In this form the work challenges comparison with Masaryk's classic work, *The Spirit of Russia*, but the focus lies on a slightly earlier period. Mr. Kucharzewski's health had never been robust since his arrival in America, but he gave what energy he could spare to the furthering of the work of the Polish Institute in New York. The end was not unexpected.

\* \* \*

The reorganization of the various Polish academies, projected for several years, has finally been effected. The most important of the several cultural and academic bodies taken into the new *Polska Akademia Nauk* (Polish Academy of Sciences) was of course the well established and highly respected *Polska Akademia Umiejętności* (Polish Academy of Science) at Kraków.

The President of the Republic announced the organization and membership of the new Academy on May 10, 1952. The President of the Academy is Professor Jan Dembowski, professor of Experimental Biology at Łódź; Vice Presidents, Professors Kazimierz Nitsch (Kraków), Waclaw Sierpiński (Warsaw), Witold Wierzbicki (Warsaw Polytechnic). Among the members of the Presidium of the Academy, some familiar names appear—Jan Dąbrowski (Kraków), Natalia Gąsiorowska (Łódź). Tadeusz Manteuffel (Warsaw), Zygmunt Modzelewski (Warsaw). The membership is divided into four sections: Social Sciences, Biological Sciences, Mathematics-Physical Sciences, and Technical Sciences. The membership of each section is divided into active and corresponding members. Among the active members of the section of the Social Sciences we note the names of Józef Chałasiński, Jan Dąbrowski, Natalia Gąsiorowska, Jerzy Kuryłowicz, Oskar Lange, Tadeusz Lehr-Spławiński, Zygmunt Modzelewski, Kazimierz Nitsch and Zygmunt Wojciechowski. Among the corresponding members of this section we may notice Stanisław Arnold, Julian Krzyżanowski, Kazimierz Majewski, Tadeusz Manteuffel, Stanisław Sliwiński, Stefan Zólkiewski.

A respectable number of eminent scholars' names may be found in these lists. Some others are relatively unknown for any positive scientific achievement, and the names of some of Poland's best minds are noticeable by their absence.

\* \* \*

#### WŁADYSŁAW KONOPCZYŃSKI 1880-1952

The death on July 13, 1952 of Professor Władysław Konopczyński of the Jagiellońian University of Kraków would almost seem to bring to an end an epoch in Polish historiography. A recent necrology in a Polish émigré weekly was entitled "A Titan of historical work". The sobriquet is completely just.

He began his studies in Warsaw in the nineties, and, as a member of secret anti-Czarist societies, experienced an early conversion to interest in his people's history. He graduated in law, but soon turned his attention to history. He was a pupil of Szymon Askenazy and was regarded as a protagonist of that school. From 1905 to 1911 he travelled widely in Russia, Scandinavia, the Hapsburg Empire, Turkey and in Western Europe. It was during these years of travel and archival research that he mastered the dozen languages he used in his work and came to know colleagues in his field in other countries. During the first world war (from 1914 to 1916) he lived in the Scandinavian countries in order to avoid draft into the Russian army. During this period he did the research which resulted in a number of studies of Baltic history which appeared in the early '20's. Appointed in 1917 to the chair of History at Kraków, he was a member of the Polish delegation to the Peace Conference in 1919 under Dmowski. On return to Poland he became a member of the Sejm from the Nationalist (Dmowski) party—(1922-1927).

An extensive project which he had suggested in 1921 became an actuality in 1931—The Polish Biographical Dictionary (*Polski Słownik Biograficzny*) under the auspices of the Polish Academy, and he was chosen Editor-in-Chief.

He participated actively in the International Congresses of History in the '30's, and in 1935 was one of the small group—Temperley, Halecki, Dembiński, Handelsman—that projected the *Cambridge History of Poland*, of which the two volumes of text have already appeared.

In 1939 he became dean of the philosophical faculty at Kraków and in November of that year was arrested by the Germans and imprisoned, first in Breslau, then at Sachsenhausen. The imprisonment lasted fortunately only three months. The war years he spent on his small country place, but participated in the work of the underground university and, regaining his personal library, kept at work on scholarly projects, some of which were published after the war.

His political views were not acceptable to the Communists, and when he was elected President of the Polish Historical Society, May 13, 1947, the minister of education, Skrzeszewski, threatened to deprive the Society of its funds. He resigned the presidency in order to save the Society, but suffered his first heart attack soon after this crisis. He was refused further publication of his books, and the next year, on November 1, 1948, was removed from his professorate at the University—two years before the statutable age for retirement. The following May he was removed from the post of the editor of the Biographical Dictionary, and soon resigned from the chairmanship of the historical section of the Academy. But he continued to work on his research projects in his own rich library and the archives and libraries of Kraków, and brought to conclusion several large monographs. Publication, however, was refused.

Several severe heart attacks in late December 1951 confined him to his bed for a matter of months. A few courageous friends maintained their loyalty to him and held a cheerful celebration at his bedside, May 17, 1952, of the 50th anniversary of his scholarly activity. In July he felt well enough to go for short walks, but a sudden attack on July 13 brought the end.

The majority of Konopczyński's work lay in the period of the Northern Wars and the Partitions. Out of his total production of over 40 books and hundreds of articles, he edited many of the diaries of the Sejms of the eighteenth century, wrote biographies of Konarski (1926), Pułaski (1931), a definitive study of the *Liberum Veto* (1918), (French edition, 1930), of the Confederacy of Bar (2 vols., 1936-38), and the best survey of modern Polish history *Dzieje Polski Nowożytnej* (2 vols., 1936) thus far written. Since the war, he was able to publish works on Frederick II and Poland (1947, see review in this *Journal*, vol. VIII, p. 424 f.) and the Baltic Question (1947, see review in this *Journal*, vol. IX, p. 428 f.) He had completed, before his death, another half-dozen monographs which may, it is hoped, some day see the light. He was a man of deep convictions, a courageous defender of what he felt to be right and just. His place in Polish historiography is secure, and the memory of his friendly earnestness, his great courtesy and his high ideals of true historical scholarship will not easily be forgotten by his pupils and colleagues. The writer of these lines is humbly proud to have been counted among his friends.

## BOOK REVIEWS

HALECKI, OSCAR, *Borderlands of Western Civilization, A History of East Central Europe*. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1952. Pp. 503. \$6.00.

The purpose of this volume is to provide a textbook of the history of East Central Europe, i.e. the region between Germany and Russia. The greater part of the book (275 out of 475 pages of text) is devoted to the ancient origins and medieval developments of the nations of this region up to their absorption into the three great multinational empires, Austrian, Ottoman, and Russian, a process completed with the Third Partition of Poland at the precise moment when they were undergoing a modern nationalist revival. The rest of the book deals in brief outline form with the modern period covering their cultural renaissance, struggle for freedom and unity, and attainment and new loss of independence. There is an exceptionally complete bibliography of works in English, French, and German, and a genealogical table of East Europe dynasties.

Professor Halecki undertakes to revise many conventional conceptions of East Central Europe, commonly held in the west, notably the view that it is an intermediary zone peopled by a chaotic collection of fragmentary "nationalities" with a vague past and with distinctive cultures, which it might have been wiser to keep under foreign rule. He states with emphasis that East Central Europe forms a part of western civilization and repeats here the view, advanced already in his Book *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (New York, 1950), that western civilization ends where the Russian border begins.

The history of East Central Europe has been relatively little explored, particularly its economic and social aspects. This is a pioneer work, and it is perhaps inevitable that it should lack in balance and proportion. It is exclusively a political history with only occasional glimpses of cultural developments. Social and economic history is completely ignored. Events are explained in terms of personalities only and never in terms of systems and movements. The reigns of kings are reviewed with dreary monotony, but feudalism, which was the dominant socio-economic system of East Central Europe no less than of Western Europe, is never mentioned. Yet, is the failure of the medieval states of East Central Europe to evolve into strong national monarchies like those in Western Europe not explainable by the long survival of feudalism resulting from the continued importance of trade and having as a consequence the continued importance of the nobility and the relative insignificance of the burgher class? There are some inconsistencies in the spelling of foreign names and terms. Thus, while the original orthography is used for Polish and Czech names, Yugoslav names are transliterated in part phonetically (e.g. Jellachich rather than Jelačić). The Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom, which the author regards as a more promising attempt at political organization of East Central Europe than the Habsburg empire, is treated at length disproportionate to the rest of the subject.

In spite of these objections this reviewer believes that Professor Halecki has

performed a very valuable service to all students of East European affairs in bringing for the first time all the complex strands of the political history of East Central Europe into one single volume.

*Florida State University*

VICTOR S. MAMATEY

NOLDE, BORIS, *La formation de l'empire russe. Etudes, notes et documents*. Tome premier. Paris: Institut d'Etudes Slaves. 1952. Pp. XII, 299.

The late Boris E. Nolde, sometime professor at the University of St. Petersburg and the author of many valuable studies in the fields of law and history, devoted his last work to the fascinating problem of the formation of the Russian empire through absorption and integration of a dazzling variety of peoples, states, and cultures. The author was extremely well qualified for the difficult task of tracing the growth of the Russian realm in the course of some four centuries, but his untimely death cut the project far short of completion. In this, the first of the two volumes to be published posthumously, Professor Nolde recounts the Russian acquisition first of Kazan and of the area of the middle Volga and, second, of the Ural region.

The author does not investigate the political, social and economic origins of Russian expansion southeastward and eastward. Instead he concentrates entirely on a meticulous tracing of the expansion itself and of its results. The ensuing picture is one of great precision and complexity defying any glib generalizations about the "nature" of Russian imperialism. Professor Nolde is at his best in marshaling specific data to prove a particular assertion and in establishing connections between the successive steps of the Russian advance.

Professor Nolde's book is so closely-knit and full of detailed argument that any selection from it for purpose of criticism or illustration is likely to be highly arbitrary. To cite one topic to the discussion of which the author has much to contribute, one may mention his analysis of the *iassak*. This tax was the basic state tax both in the principality of Kazan and in Siberia, but its origin and nature are far from clear. Professor Nolde argues convincingly on the basis of Moslem law that in the state of Kazan the *iassak* was a land tax (p. 72ff.). It remains to determine the connection between that tax and the Siberian *iassak* which often took the form of a direct levy on clans. One might add that in Siberia some people who were not Moslems and knew no landed property, for instance the Buriats, had the *iassak*.

Also of special interest is Professor Nolde's treatment of the Ermak episode in the conquest of Siberia (p. 160 ff.). The author takes an extreme view on that subject and denies to Ermak any significance in the Russian penetration eastward, ascribing his later fame entirely to the growth of a convenient legend.

In the valuable chapter on the industrialization of the Ural area Professor Nolde emphasizes the repeated attempts of Peter the Great and his successors to stimulate private industry as distinct from state enterprise.

The above instances offer only a few illustrations of the wealth of material to be found in Professor Nolde's book. Throughout that book one can

easily see the author's excellent knowledge and use of the sources. As a matter of fact, only two lines of adverse criticism seem applicable to Professor Nolde's study. It can be argued that it is too factual with insufficient generalization and, still more important, almost no integration of its particular topic with the totality of Russian history. It can also be argued that it contains too many details and is over elaborate. The first criticism is hardly fair, however, for Professor Nolde's study is after all only an unfinished part of a much larger project. The second criticism merely underlines the fact that the study is meant for the specialist; its meticulously detailed and precise narrative is its great strength as well as its weakness.

The first volume of Professor Nolde's *La formation de l'empire russe* is a valuable contribution to the history of the Russian empire. It is remarkable that such a thorough study could be produced without access to the materials in the Soviet Union. Students of Russian history will look forward to the publication of the second posthumous volume of the work.

*State University of Iowa*

NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

BARYCZ, HENRYK & HULEWICZ, JAN, edd., *Studia dziejów Kultury*. Warsaw: Gebethner i Wolff, 1949. Pp. 616.

This collection of studies has an amazing story. A group of younger scholars at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, interested in intellectual history, projected a collaborative work as early as 1938. It may be assumed the then distinguished professor of cultural history at Kraków was the inspirer of the work. Before war broke out, many of the articles had been set up in type, and proofs sent to the authors. Concentration camps and prison brought death to ten of the contributors. The enterprising publisher, who had accepted the project and invested much time and money in the venture, was also a victim of German "justice" and his press destroyed, the building turned into a button factory. Proof of 15 of the articles sent to Kraków contributors was all that remained. After the war the project was revived, but met financial difficulties until the established firm of Gebethner & Wolff accepted and published the work. Aside from the 15 articles which were salvaged, many of the remaining 26 had to be written *de novo*, in several cases being only fragments of larger works which were irretrievably lost e.g., in the Warsaw uprising of 1944. In its present form, as the editors remark, it is an "eloquent testimony to the persistence, continuity and vitality of Polish culture."

The studies cover the whole range of Polish cultural and intellectual history from the eleventh to the twentieth century. The first article, by Jan Dąbrowski, is, quite appropriately, a short essay "Three epochs of Polish History" on the periodization of Polish history. For Dąbrowski, the Jagiellonian epoch, 1386-1572, constitutes the beginning of modern Polish history, and at the same time must be regarded as transitional between the Polish middle ages and the age of the republic of the nobility. The second article, by Franciszek Bujak, is a study of the nature and extent of Polish national consciousness in the eleventh

century, based upon the early chronicles, particularly *Anonymous Gallus*. This subject has for several decades now challenged not only Polish scholars, but also German and Czech investigators. Bujak is convinced that the Polish people had a fully developed national consciousness by the early eleventh century, which had already withstood catastrophe, the stress of war and defeat, and the mistakes of wrongheaded dynastic leadership.

Among the other articles: Adam Vetulani, on the general acceptance of canon law in Poland in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; Roman Grodecki, The beginnings of manor (*folwark*—German *Vorwerk*) economy in Poland which he places in the mid-twelfth (1166) century, rather earlier than is usually accepted; Thaddaeus Sinko, On the preface to Długosz' *Historia Polonorum*, showing the wide classical learning Długosz commanded, contrary to G. Voigt's hasty and adverse judgment; Ignacy Zarębski, On the reception of humanism in Poland, as shown in the spread of fifteenth and sixteenth century treatises on educational theory in Poland; Władysław Pociecha, On the history of Polish-Italian cultural relations, from the time of Filippo Buonaccorsi—known as Callimachus—in 1470, to the last days of Queen Bona Sforza, to whose court Professor Pociecha has recently devoted a classic two-volume study; Henryk Barycz, Italian studies of Stanisław Orzechowski (1532-39), destined to have so profound an effect on the direction of humanistic learning in Poland; Bogusław Leśniodorski, The Polish Machiavelli, Christopher Warszewicki, author of a dialogue, *De Optimo Stato Libertatis* (1598), rather more humane and rationalistic than *The Prince*; Zygmunt Wolf, Italian travellers on the subject of Poland in the seventeenth century; Wacław Borowy, Englishmen, Scots and Irishmen in the Polish army under Sigismund III, a delightful treatment of a relatively untouched field; Władysław Konopczyński, An unknown author of a known work, by which is meant J. B. Steinhäuser, a royal counsellor to Leszczyński, who wrote the anonymous *Mémoires sur le gouvernement de la Pologne* (1759); Władysław Pniewski, Affection for Poland and polonism in Danzig German literature of the nineteenth century, which stresses the lingering memory of previous centuries of prosperity under the Polish régime, and a deep-rooted distrust of Prussia; Zygmunt Łempicki, Cultural history and literary history, a general exposé of the proper characteristics of the two disciplines, with cogent suggestions as to the mutuality of interest, technique and ultimate aim.

All in all this is a rich and appetizing collection of studies, more even in quality than most collaborative works, and a permanent monument to the early vitality of the Kraków school of intellectual history.

*University of Colorado*

S. HARRISON THOMSON

MENSHUTKIN, B. N., *Russia's Lomonosov*. Princeton University Press, 1952. Pp. 208. \$4.00.

Since the middle of the eighteenth century the name of Lomonosov was familiar to every Russian schoolboy. As a poet, as a scientist and as an educational reformer, he was a pioneer in Russia and made original contributions in many

fields. However, in the West, he was practically unknown until B. Menshutkin published an article in German in 1909. This volume on Lomonosov, translated into English by J. E. Thal and E. J. Webster from the main work of Menshutkin therefore is a most valuable contribution to the history of science. It fills a gap in Western literature on Russia and helps one to understand the essential unity of the two halves of Europe which unfortunately, at present, are separated by the so called "Iron Curtain". There was no such curtain in the eighteenth century; on the contrary, Russia and Poland participated in all European movements and made substantial contributions to them. In this connection three names stand out prominently: Peter the Great, Lomonosov and Catherine the Great. All three were profoundly influenced by Western ideas, all three were intimately and personally connected with Western leaders in science and education and all three contributed to the westernization of Russia.

In 1701 Peter the Great founded the famous School of Navigation in Moscow with two graduates of the Royal Mathematical School of Crist's Hospital in London and an astronomer from Aberdeen as the first professors. Since then hundreds of Russian naval officers, teachers and craftsmen of the eighteenth century were trained there and many of them completed their training in England and France. Advised by Leibnitz, Peter the Great also founded the Academy of Sciences, which was opened by his widow after his death. Many students of the Academic University were sent abroad and this time to Germany as well. Lomonosov was one of them and thus personally profited from the policy of Peter the Great.

During the period between the reigns of Peter and Catherine he was the chief agent of the same policy and it was thanks to his genius and versatility and his knowledge of Western science that Russia was able to realize rapidly so many of the schemes and projects of Peter the Great. In this volume Menshutkin, for the first time, gives a complete and well substantiated account of this rôle of Lomonosov as a mediator between Western and Eastern parts of Europe. Limited by the purpose of his work to the life and personal achievements of Lomonosov, Menshutkin could not devote much space to the general background of scientific intercourse between Russian and Western Europe, which would have demanded another volume. In this review, however, we can mention the Royal Society of England, the Académie des Sciences of Paris and particularly the naval and military schools of England and France which were in constant relations with their Russian opposite institutions. The famous French circle of physiocrats, headed by Quesnay, Turgot, Mirabeau and Dupont was especially influential. Their ideas of economic and educational reform were readily imbibed by Lomonosov and other Russian leaders and to a great extent guided the policy of Catherine II. In this connection one important fact seems to have escaped the attention of Menshutkin, who otherwise gives a learned and quite adequate biography of Lomonosov.

Most of the English, French and German scientists and reformers of the eighteenth century were closely connected with Freemasonry. Most of Lomon-

osov's Russian friends and protectors were known as masons and were initiated either in England or France (for instance Ivan Shuvalov, Grigory Orlov and Kisil Razumovsky). Whether Lomonosov himself belonged to the Society is unknown to the writer of this review, but all his activities and his religious opinions point that way.

For the American reader the comparison of Lomonosov with his contemporary, Benjamin Franklin, would be of special interest. Both of humble origin, sons of able fathers, who represented the rising class of merchant-craftsmen, the two men by their own efforts and abilities climbed the social ladder to the very top available to them at that time. Both were influenced by the same sources of contemporary knowledge and the same men, as for instance Hon. Robert Boyle. Lomonosov was well aware of Franklin's experiments with electricity and repeated them. Franklin also knew about Lomonosov's experiments and the accidental death from lightning of Lomonosov's collaborator, Professor Richmann in July, 1753, which was lamented by all scientists in Europe and America. They never met, but Franklin was elected the first American member of the Russian Academy of Sciences after Lomonosov's death.

The translation is excellent and the only mistake of any importance is the wrong spelling of the name of the German Academician *Epinus* (p. 147) printed as *Epirus*. In Latin script Epinus spelt his name AEPINUS.

We must congratulate the translators, the director W. Chapin Huntington and the American Council of Learned Societies for this most valuable volume.

*Cornell University*

NICHOLAS HANS

ANDERSON, EUGENE N., *Process Versus Power: Studies in Modern Culture*. University of Nebraska Studies, New Series, No. 9: Lincoln, Nebraska, January 1952.

Being a mere historian and political scientist, the present reviewer must own to a certain amount of prejudice when confronted with the jargon used at times in the social sciences in lieu (as it appears to him) of sharp and clear thought that would translate itself in clear and simple language. But perhaps one should let that pass.

The aim of this pamphlet is an analysis of the uncertain state of the cultures of our present period of rapid and profound change. Impressed by the shortcomings of both history and social science for such an analysis, the author adopts what he calls a "situational" approach, meaning starting with the existing state of things as a *Ding an sich*. But the fact of historical development soon intrudes. To stress the novelty of the industrial factor and its multitudinous consequences is a valid if not novel point. So is the fact of "localism," the degree to which society has been organized until recently on the basis of relatively small, largely self-sufficient, units. Yet, this too can be overstated. True, the great masses of mankind have only begun to share in world wide exchanges of goods and ideas; but the exchange of goods in the past, if puny by current

standards, has had far-reaching consequences, and ideas have traveled far and wide for many centuries.

The author is impressed by, and calls attention to, the modern factor of Bigness. Again, this is a good point, for the quantitative change is such as to have become qualitative in its effects, and this is interestingly tied in with the concept of a "society of process" contrasted with the "societies of power and rigidity". It would be doing the author somewhat less than full justice to say that he identifies the former with representative democratic systems and the latter with dictatorships. He is aware that the situation is not altogether unfair to charge his analysis (the brevity of it may be responsible for this) with oversimplification. Various specific instances might be cited; the description of the French situation, for example (pp. 110-11), while not incorrect, is nevertheless so telescoped as to convey a less than accurate picture. Greater stress should also have been placed on the discrepancy between rates of change in both time and place.

The tone of the whole and the final conclusion are permeated with optimism. The future may prove this to be warranted, but one cannot help but feel that the author's outlook is deeply conditioned by the American culture within which he operates. If this is a criticism of limitation, the fact remains that America does indeed constitute the outstanding example of hitherto successful Bigness combined with the flexibility of representative institutions. There may be justifiable grounds for concern about the future course of American power and culture; one may even grant that, at best, much that has been valued in western culture is doomed; the fact also remains that America's power has made her the present heir and defender of that culture. For that reason alone, studies such as the present, for all its shortcomings, are welcome contributions.

Paris, France

RENE ALBRECHT-CARRIE

BASDRABELLES, JOHN K., ed., *Historical Archives of Macedonia. I. Archives of Thessalonica, 1695-1912* (in Greek). Thessalonica: The Society of Macedonian Studies, 1952. Pp. xxiv, 576.

The material available for the study of the society of the Ottoman empire is still very scanty. This is particularly true for the large minority groups, Christians and Jews, especially in the European provinces. The accounts of European travelers have long been the principal sources, although some documents published here and there have yielded interesting information, usually, however, of a local character. The principal reason for this scantiness of information is the fact that the archives of the Ottoman empire, which, from every indication, contain a wealth of materials, have not yet been published. Indeed some archives have hardly been known at all. This is the case of three archives located in what is now Greek Macedonia. They are the archives of Veria, Castoria, and Thessalonica.

In 1942 John K. Basdrabelles published a study concerning the archives of Veria in which he included forty-two documents in Greek translation dealing

with the period before and during the Greek revolution of 1821. But the archives are much more copious, consisting in all of fifty-seven codices, containing numerous documents, and many fragments, all of which Mr. Basdrabelles has promised to publish, again in Greek translation. Meanwhile, following his examination of the archives of Veria, the same Basdrabelles searched in vain for the archives of Castoria whose existence no one had suspected. These archives apparently were very rich in documentary material, but unfortunately they were burned in 1943 during the war. There remained the archives of Thessalonica. It is with these archives that the present volume deals.

The archives of Thessalonica consist of 337 codices, all of them in good condition, covering the period from 1695 to 1912. Published in this volume in Greek translation are 424 documents and three memoranda drawn from the first 221 codices and covering the period from 1695 to approximately the end of the Greek Revolution. Of the documents contained in the remaining codices, there is only a brief summary but the promise is made that they will be translated and published as soon as conditions and time permit. Let us hope that we shall not have to wait too long.

The documents published should prove extremely valuable in the study of the society of the Ottoman empire in the eighteenth century. They throw light on a variety of subjects: problems of taxation; the fixity of the population; trade guilds; prices of commodities and rate of exchange of moneys in circulation; conversions to Islam; questions relating to the Greek church; official proclamations concerning war and peace and matters relating to mobilization; brigandage and piracy; summaries of treaties; attitude of the Ottoman government toward activities of the Roman church, especially its efforts to win converts among the Greek Christians; the antagonism between Jews and Christians; even some statistics concerning the relative size of the Greek population of Thessalonica with respect to Moslems and Jews. One is struck with the remorseless exactions of the provincial officials, but at the same time he is impressed with the benevolent attitude of the central government.

Those who know Turkish will no doubt be disappointed that these documents were not published in the original. It should be pointed out, however, that the object of the editor was to furnish to Greek scholars new sources for the study of the Ottoman domination of Greece, hence the Greek translation. Still, the student of the Ottoman empire in general would have been better served if these documents were also published in the original. The editor gives no inkling as to whether he intends to bring out these documents in the Turkish original; he does point out, however, that every effort should be made to preserve them. Meanwhile both Mr. Basdrabelles, the editor, and the Society of Macedonian Studies, which sponsored the publication of those documents, should be congratulated for having brought them to light.

*Rutgers University*

PETER CHARANIS

GALANTE-GARRONE, ALESSANDRO, *Buonarroti e Babeuf*. Turin: De Silva, 1948. Pp. 282.

GALANTE-GARRONE, ALESSANDRO, *Filippo Buonarroti e i rivoluzionari dell'Ottocento (1828-1837)*. Turin: Einaudi, 1951. Pp. 514. Lire 2400.

After decades of relative indifference to and underevaluation of an important Tuscan precursor of modern communism, several historians have begun to display interest in Filippo Buonarroti, the descendant of Michelangelo who collaborated with Gracchus Babeuf in the Conspiracy of the Equals in 1796 and who continued intermittently his revolutionary activities in various parts of Europe until his death in 1837. In line with Communist propaganda, some recent writers have tended to exaggerate the role of this long neglected conspirator and to create a kind of myth about him. Fortunately, the two books under review, whose author is a democratic socialist and President of the Tribunal in Turin, are not marred by any such design. Galante-Garrone's sifting of the documentary evidence, much of it hitherto little known and painstakingly gathered, regarding the tortuous career of Buonarroti reflects the author's scrupulous legal and historical training. These books, which are not designed to serve as a biography—for which there is still a need—undertake to examine Buonarroti's connection with Babeuf and Babuvism, and later, in the years between 1828 and 1837, to examine his relationship with numerous Belgian, French, Italian, and French revolutionaries, as well as with some of the cultural leaders of that period. They complement a somewhat broader study of the Tuscan radical by Armando Saitta: *Filippo Buonarroti: Contributi alla storia della sua vita e del suo pensiero* (Rome 1950).

Analyzing the development of the mental outlook of Buonarroti and Babeuf, Galante-Garrone notes that both were influenced in their youth by the egalitarian ideals of the illuminati and especially of Rousseau, Mably, and Morelly; that moreover both were influenced by the economic structure of their environment—Babeuf by the friction between small and large landholders in Picardy, Buonarroti by the backward agrarian system of Corsica, to which he was exiled by the Tuscan police in 1789; that both proceeded from an egalitarian to a communistic position primarily because of the events in revolutionary France; and that both of them arrived at their philosophical positions independently, although their meeting in prison in 1795 was of decisive importance for their later actions. Therefore, the egalitarian and communistic ideals that were expressed during the conspiracy in 1796 were not last-minute improvisations, but rather the "deep result of the revolutionary determination of the most radical Jacobins against the Directory."

After numerous arrests and internments, Buonarroti moved to Geneva, where he was active during the Napoleonic era in the *Carboneria* and other clandestine organizations. In 1824 the 63-year-old firebrand was forced to take refuge in Brussels, where he renewed acquaintances with many former members of the Convention who had moved to that city. Four years later he published his account of the *Conspiration pour l'Égalité dite de Babeuf*. Galante-

Garrone notes that its introduction, which seeks to explain the reasons for Thermidor, reveals that Buonarroti, notwithstanding his deficiencies as a historian, was one of the first to reappraise sympathetically Robespierre's dictatorial actions during the Terror and to give a new slant to the historiography of the French Revolution. In greater or lesser degree this slant has been pursued by Mathiez, Jaurès, and Lefebvre—although not entirely because of Buonarroti's essay, to be sure.

The ideas which were re-evoked and diffused by the *Conspiration* helped bring Buonarroti into closer touch with many leaders in the democratic, nationalistic, and liberal currents of Europe during the last years of the Restoration. These contacts, some of which were conspiratorial and others overt, increased notably after the July Revolution. Buonarroti's clandestine ties in Belgium with the "fellow-traveller" Louis De Potter and the "new Jacobins" were especially important, despite the failure of these radicals to establish a socialist republic.

Thereafter Buonarroti turned his attention to the Italian problem, the solution of which he believed lay in the creation of a firmly guided socialist republic to be linked with a French sister régime. Moving to Paris, the Tuscan Jacobin worked for a while with a group of *émigrés*, members for the most part of the *Amis du Peuple*, who sought to promote an invasion of Savoy by an "Italian Liberating Junta," with the hope of continuing thereafter into the Italian peninsula. Even before his expedition was forestalled early in 1831 by the French Government, Buonarroti broke with his associates and once more moved temporarily into the background. Soon the plotter was in league with Mazzini. Their relations at first were fairly amicable, but quickly they quarreled over the existence of the "class struggle," the relative virtues of federalism vs. centralism, the need for a temporary revolutionary dictatorship, the timing of insurrectionary actions, the desirability of French assistance, and other matters until the final rupture came in 1834. Much discussion is devoted by the author to the differences and jealousies among the numerous secret societies which largely gave their support to Mazzini or Buonarroti.

The relationship of Buonarroti to the Chartists is also examined, especially his intellectual ties with the radical James Bronerre O'Brien, who translated the *Conspiration* into English in 1836. Finally, the author discusses several aspects of Buonarroti's politico-economic formulae, including his concept of the "temporary" revolutionary dictatorship "in the interests of the masses," his program for abolition of indirect taxes in favor of progressive taxation, and his views on the functions of workers' associations. In a lengthy appendix are printed several little-known letters and fragments of essays by Buonarroti.

The two volumes, full of careful analyses and suggestive comments, are an important contribution to scholarship on the activities and thought of a fascinating revolutionary.

*Falls Church, Virginia*

CHARLES F. DELZELL

WEBSTER, SIR CHARLES, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841*, London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 2 vols., 1951. Pp. 914, £ 3 3s.

The publication of Sir Charles Webster's two volume survey of Palmerston's foreign policy is an event of importance. Not only as it comes from the pen of one of the great scholars of early nineteenth century diplomacy, but also because it relates to a most significant period in English and Russian foreign relations. In the latter aspect these volumes will be of special interest to the readers of the *Journal*.

It is well known that the period of the 1820's and 1830's was formulative in foreign policy. The events of that time and the decisions reached, particularly in regard to Turkey and the Near Eastern countries, had a profound effect on English and Russian affairs for well over a half century.

It appears proper to state briefly these aspects of policy, and to note Sir Charles Webster's special contribution, as it is quite impossible to cover, even fairly adequately, such volumes as these, even in a longish review.

Nineteenth century foreign policy of England and Russia was based to a degree hardly imagined possible upon the issues rising from the Greek Revolt and its outcome. There had been two earlier indications of approaching Anglo-Russian tension—Pitt's classic statement in 1791 and the rather pseudo-rivalry over Persia during the time of the Tsar Paul and of Napoleon. However, the Greek Revolt focused the issues more clearly, and Palmerston gave to them particular direction—as far as England was concerned. The two principal developments on which Palmerston's anti-Russian policy was founded came from the Greek Revolt—the treaty of Adrianople (1829), with its consequent effect on Russian policy, and especially on the treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi (1833).

Both drew, dramatically, attention to the main issue. This was the preservation or the partition of the Turkish Empire. And Palmerston's opinions were echoed by British foreign secretaries for most of the rest of the century. The effect was so great that the Near Eastern Question was rapidly transformed into a contest between England and Russia in which Turkey was the pawn. It could not have been otherwise, as Turkey was so situated that the Sultan's territories lay athwart the principle interests, or ambitions, of the two imperial contestants.

The famous Nesselrode Memorandum, the decision of the Special Committee on the Affairs of Turkey appointed in September 1829 by Nicholas I, laid down the principle that Russia would not benefit from an immediate destruction of Turkey. However, should the Turkish Empire break up, as the result of situations similar to those of the Greek Revolt, then Russia should act firmly and decisively, but within the European concert, to secure and extend her special interests and ambitions.

Russia's subsequent policy, so cautiously expressed and with such careful consideration of power politics, led to the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi, The Minchengratz Convention, both in 1833 and culminated in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1844. Before the latter agreement, Palmerston's anti-Russian

crusade, so vigorously upheld, had triumphed in the Convention of 1840 and the Straits Agreement of 1841. Both were outstanding accomplishments of Palmerston's diplomacy.

The diplomatic situation, resulting from this rather curious mixture of policies, or apparently identical policies, may be viewed in several ways. It is hardly correct to conclude that England and Russia had the same policy toward Turkey even though both powers desired Turkey to remain a weak nation, but for totally different objectives.

The great value of Webster's two volumes is to portray Palmerston's reasoning and to indicate how he was aware of and able to penetrate Russia's true purposes. The present significant study contains important material on Palmerston's attitudes towards matters other than the Near Eastern Question. Discussed at length, and of special value, are Palmerston's opinions on the Liberal Movement and the Revolutions of the 1830's. Significant also are the sections on Mehemet Ali and his connections with France, with its consequent threat to the Russian position in the Black Sea area. Especially important, for its insight into English internal affairs, is the brief section on "The Crown, the Cabinet, Parliament and Public Opinion." Throughout these volumes run the activities of Prince Lieven and his wife who has been described as the intriguer and arch busy-body of European diplomacy of that time.

These volumes, based primarily on Palmerston's private correspondence and other papers, which produced much new material, and related closely to pertinent diplomatic documents, do not contain a formal bibliography. In a certain sense, one can regard this in a spirit of relief, as extensive research has led to a rapidly expanding literature in this important phase of European diplomatic history. It is of course gratifying to note, as one could expect, that Sir Charles Webster pays full respect to, and recognizes, the outstanding scholars in this field, Professor H. W. Temporley and Professor Vernon Puryear of the University of California, who has three substantial volumes in this field.<sup>1</sup>

*University of Colorado*

JAMES G. ALLEN

ROBERTSON, PRISCILLA, *Revolutions of 1848: A Social History*. Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1952. Pp. 464. \$6.00.

By reason of breadth of investigation and freshness of approach this work takes its place in the front rank of synoptic treatments of the chaotic and tumultuous mid-nineteenth century revolutions. It may well be read in conjunction with *Opening of an Era, 1848* (London, 1949), edited by François Fejtö which displays the virtues and the characteristic shortcomings of a book by many hands.

In pursuing her studies, Mrs. Robertson has explored the most reliable printed sources, depending heavily and with disciplined discrimination upon the memoirs of participants and other contemporary materials. As the extensive and annotated bibliography bears witness, she is familiar with older syntheses on the upheavals of 1848, though one misses reference to the spate of monographs called forth by the centennial commemoration of the revolutions. Judgments on

the books that have been laid under tribute seem generally sound; it may, however, be questioned whether Lamennais exerted "a tremendous effect" on his age, or whether Herzen was endowed with the prescience ascribed to him, or whether de Tocqueville should be dismissed as "a cynical student of democracy." Throughout the more than four hundred tightly packed pages, the narrative proceeds smoothly, even engagingly, lighted now and again by an urbane epigram.

It is salutary to be reminded that 1848 witnessed more than fifty outbreaks, major and minor. Instead of recounting the history of all of them, Mrs. Robertson has concentrated on the developments which she considers most significant and instructive—the revolutionary course in France, in the Germanies, Austria, Hungary, and in the Italies, with brief attention to the disturbances fomented by Irish patriots. Much old straw has been threshed but a welcome and copious harvest has been garnered. Here is an exceptionally convincing account of the environment in which the explosions took place, their drama and their prose, the heights of enthusiastic vision which they evoked, and the despair of partisans when failure descended.

Although Mrs. Robertson discounts the importance of leading personalities, the whole gallery of revolutionary worthies, men and women alike, on both sides of the barricades is presented usually in vividly piquant word-portraits. Women who figured in the revolutionary storms—George Sand, Lola Montez, the matriarchal Archduchess Sophia of Austria, the Princess Belgiojosa, the tragic Anita Garibaldi, and nameless heroines—receive proper attention.

It is stretching matters, certainly, to assert, as Mrs. Robertson does, that no one appreciated the value of the Hapsburg Monarchy until it collapsed, to liken Austria to China, or to speak of Hungary as the Tibet of Europe—the analogue with our Southland, suggested elsewhere in the book, is much nearer the mark. Equally, it is less than accurate to refer to Venice as the key to the Mediterranean, to write that free and compulsory schooling prevailed in the Hapsburg dominions, to assign the Russian humiliation in the Crimean War to Austria's ungrateful neutrality, or to say that only Czech soldiers, among the captive peoples of Austria-Hungary, deserted in numbers during the First World War. Hungarian is sometimes confused or equated with Magyar.

The spirit of the book, the philosophy if you like, is reserved for mature and orderly exposition in the concluding chapter. It may be subsumed as liberalism, nineteenth century style, blended with the democratic ideology, twentieth western style. That mystical abstraction "the people" is invoked with misleading inexactness and we read "universal suffrage" where "manhood suffrage" is meant. Mrs. Robertson agrees that the class struggle, exhibited in the Parisian June days and the October days in Vienna, far from being the spur to revolution was plainly a by-product. The objectives of the revolutionists, whether political or social, failed of realization because the insurgent leadership, Daniel Manin alone excepted, never really trusted those who were governed. Inexperienced in the ways of democracy, the revolutionary chiefs were also short on tolerance "by which opposing sides may rub each other's corners off instead of

splitting them into pieces." Save for the liberation of the serfs in Central Europe, the cause of human freedom was advanced precious little by the *annus mirabilis*. "Today," runs the final sentence, "millions of classless, stateless people crowd the continent in hatred and despair—and in a way they are the end product of the futility and ruthlessness of the 1848 revolutions."

Sketch maps and a diagram of Paris, an index in exemplary detail and printed pages that are a delight to the eye deserve high marks. Mrs. Robertson, who dedicates the book to her father, the late Professor Preserved Smith, has impressively demonstrated what a mother with the responsibilities of a young family can nevertheless accomplish in the illumination of the past, if she is blessed with an instinct and a capacity for scholarship.

*University of Rochester*

ARTHUR J. MAY

SHIFFER, EUGENE, *Ein Leben für den Liberalismus*. Berlin-Grunewald: F. A. Herbig Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1951. Pp. 256.

Dr. Eugene Schiffer was born in 1860. He has thus witnessed the days of greatest strength and power of imperial Germany, the two world wars, the Weimar Republic, and the breakdown of the National-Socialist Reich. In 1904, he was elected a member of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies on behalf of the City of Magdeburg. With the description of the reception of the members of the Prussian Parliament by Emperor William II in the Berlin palace, the book begins. Characteristically, all the members of Parliament who are reserve officers had donned officer's uniform, and all these dignified elderly gentlemen, many of them slightly decrepit, made a strange impression in the uniforms of lieutenants or cavalry captains. "I could not imagine the German Reich without the German Emperor," Dr. Schiffer writes. "I always envisioned the Reich wearing the features of Barbarossa, and Prussia wearing the features of Frederick the Great. 'Reichist' and monarchist sentiments were inseparably fixed within me, so that the Emperor and King appeared in an almost mystic splendor."

Dr. Schiffer's memoirs will be of special interest for the student of World War I. During that time Dr. Schiffer was a member of the German Reichstag, where he belonged to the National-Liberty Party. He shows an intimate knowledge of William II and of the whole system. He sees clearly that Germany's moral and political catastrophe did not start with Hitler but started long before 1914. "The *via dolorosa* which Germany must now (1951) walk is part of the road, is the terminal part of the road, which we have been walking for half a century. It is really and truly only the continuation of the unfortunate one on which William II led us." And in that way World War I and World War II had their roots in the very same unfortunate German attitude which, in a feeling of moral and material superiority, challenged the whole world.

A convinced monarchist, Dr. Schiffer entered the service of the Weimar Republic only reluctantly and with a heavy heart. But after some hesitation, he decided to throw in his fate with the constitutional republic, though he knew very well that the republic came to the Germans without being desired by any-

body and without any intellectual or political preparation. Thus, the Weimar Republic offered from the beginning "a sad and melancholy aspect," never arousing any popular enthusiasm, nor finding any response in German hearts. Its end was in its beginning. Whether the defeat in World War II has laid better foundations for German democracy and for an integration of Germany into European civilization than did World War I, remains to be seen. Looking back upon a very long life in which he played a prominent political role, Dr. Schiffer, in a narrative full of interest and personal experience, provides us with some optimism for the immediate future, though the heritage of German dreams of greatness and power is still strongly entrenched. Dr. Schiffer's book should be read, above all, for the colorful light which it throws upon German life and history in the period from 1880 to 1920. Few readers will lay the book aside without the feeling of sympathy for the old man who has struggled so manfully with the problems which Prussian background and German history presented to him.

*City College of New York*

HANS KOHN

KIRIMAL, EDIGE, *Der nationale Kampf der Krimtürken*. Emsdetten, Westphalia: Verlag Lechte, 1952. Pp. 374. DM 19.

This is a very interesting and generally well-documented volume the purpose of which is to relate the story of the national struggle of the Krim Turks (or Tatars), especially during the revolutionary period of 1917-1918. The author and those who have introduced the volume, Dr. Gerhart von Mende and Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer, have not failed, however, to provide appropriate historical backgrounds of the problem, going back to the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 1783 and beyond. The author traces the national movement among the Krim Turks into the nineteenth century (the program of 1881, for example) and the revolution of 1905. As is pointed out in detail, during the period of 1917-1918, the national movement passed through three phases of developments, with demands for (1) cultural autonomy, then (2) territorial autonomy within a Russian federal structure, and finally (3) independence of the Krim Turks. For a variety of reasons, including the weakness of the Krim Turks themselves and the inability of the White-Russians clearly to see or adjust to the problem, the Krim Turks, like their brethren in the Caucasus region and elsewhere, failed and ultimately (1920-1921) succumbed to the Bolsheviks. While the essence of the story lies in the period of 1917-1921, the author carries it substantially down to date, with a treatment of the inter-war period in the Crimea and of the era of the second World War.

Because of its bearing on the whole subject of Pan-Turanism and that of the Turkish-speaking peoples of Soviet Central Asia, readers will, perhaps find the pages (pp. 253 ff.) dealing with the relations between the Krim Turks and the Ottoman Empire of peculiar interest during the period of 1917-1918. Of general interest is the detailed treatment of personalities and organizations in the leadership of the national movement among these people of the

old Russian Empire. One does not need to share entirely the author's point of view to appreciate the contribution which he has made to the subject. There is a good bibliography, if not exhaustive, and several black and white maps.

*Arlington, Virginia*

HARRY N. HOWARD

LENCZOWSKI, GEORGE, *The Middle East in World Affairs*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952. Pp. 459. \$6.00.

The growing Muslim solidarity accounts for the importance of this new account of contemporary politics and diplomacy in the Middle East. The significant political developments during the more recent period are systematically set forth in a well-documented textbook discussing the role of that area in the Second World War and of its political and economic development since the First World War.

Following the pattern set in 1920 by the British Foreign Office, here the traditional "Near East" has been redefined as the Middle East after excluding the Balkans and including additional Muslims of western Asia. Thus redefined, the Middle East comprises northeast Africa and those countries of southeast Asia south of the Soviet Union and west of Pakistan.

The author studies the Middle East by subdividing the ethnically non-Arab northern belt of Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, and the Arab core farther to the south. The latter comprise the peoples of the Fertile Crescent, of the Mediterranean coast of Asia, and of the Arab peninsula and Egypt. The mere mention of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan illustrates the complex problems stemming from the multiplicity of races and religions in the Arab region.

This work solidly and comprehensively discusses an area with many distinctive characteristics. The population of the Middle East is placed at more than ninety millions. The region is the center of the Islamic world; it has long been a prime strategic pivot in world politics; its oil reserves are an economic bone of contention.

The opening part of the work describes the Middle East as a geographic and strategic unit and sketches the modern diplomatic history of that area. The concluding chapter links the region with world politics, highlighting such topics as the impacts of the Second World War, the contest for dominance at the Turkish Straits, and the general conflict between east and west which places the Middle East in a pincer.

In the central (and the major) portion of the book, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Arab states of the Fertile Crescent and around the Red Sea are discussed in separate chapters. Stress is given their internal political problems. Thus short histories of some eleven independent countries between 1920 and 1951 comprise the bulk of the work. Attention is given their social and economic changes and their international significance.

A textbook does not permit too great elaboration of specific details. For example, it might have been stressed (pp. 147, 384) that it was the strong

and prompt joint diplomatic action of the United States and Great Britain which made effective Turkey's rejection in 1946 of the Soviet demand for a share in the military defense of the Dardanelles.

Mr. Lenczowski, now a university teacher, spent several years before 1945 as a career officer in the Polish foreign service. He is also the author of *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948*, an account of the imperialistic and ideological rivalry between the big powers for control of Iran.

*University of California*

VERNON J. PURYEAR

TALMON, J. L. *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 366. \$4.75.

This is the first of three volumes planned by its author, who is a Polish born professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The present volume deals with the French Revolution, the second and third will bring the story down to contemporary communism, and the three together will show how totalitarianism of the left (the right is excluded), far from being foreign to the European tradition, is descended from the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. The author distinguishes between two approaches to political problems, the absolutist and the empirical. The absolutist is totalitarian, perfectionist, Messianic. Believing in one certain objectively right form of society, one final solution and lasting harmony, it leads to compulsion. The empirical approach believes in balance, compromise and negotiation, a continuing imperfect adjustment of real forces in existing society. The two approaches, when aimed at humane ends, yield respectively "totalitarian democracy" and "liberal democracy." Naturally the author prefers the latter, as does the reviewer.

Mr. Talmon traces, acutely and brilliantly, the signs of totalitarianism in Rousseau, the *philosophes*, Abbé Sieyès, Robespierre, Babeuf and others. He quotes with approval from Burke and Tocqueville, who saw these same signs long ago. He uses Brinton's work on the Jarobins, and is wholly familiar with the best recent scholarship on the subject in England and France. The result is an informed, closely reasoned and readable book. Most readers will find the part on Babeuf most new to them.

With this much said, the reviewer confesses to a sense of disappointment, and to a feeling that others, such as Alfred Cobban, George Sabine or Frederick Watkins, have presented a more rounded view of totalitarian tendencies since the eighteenth century. Rousseau, Robespierre and the rest are discussed only as totalitarian democrats. What, if anything, they contributed to liberal democracy is not told. Perhaps the author thinks their contribution obvious. Perhaps he thinks they made none. Perhaps he simply feels that he should stick to his subject, totalitarianism. In any case, had he related his people more explicitly to the liberal as well as to the totalitarian movement, he would have probed more deeply into the paradox and tragedy of modern times. For example, the "republic one and indivisible," proclaimed in France in 1792, may have meant a monolithic state. It may also have meant a state without class and regional separatism. The

single will, or *volonté une*, demanded by Robespierre in 1794, may have meant dictation of all life by the ruling few. It may also have meant concentration on the war effort and on social reconstruction. The Rousseauist "general will" may have meant that everyone must wish the same thing. It may also have meant, as it more probably did for Rousseau, that no private will may have the force of law, that mere custom is not justice, that everyone in a political community must agree on a basis of legality and that the individual must often peaceably accept policies which he does not personally endorse. The trouble was that, in the state of war, civil war, anarchy and confusion of France in the 1790's, all these meanings became indistinguishable. "Freedom," says Mr. Talmon in conclusion, "has no meaning without the right to oppose and the possibility to differ." Who would wish to question so liberal a sentiment? Nevertheless, even in a "liberal democracy," it is only matters of opinion, policy or personnel that we have the right to oppose. We may oppose acts of legislation, but we have no right to disobey the law. If more than a harmless and hence tolerable handful oppose the presuppositions of lawfulness, if a whole community "differs" on the very nature of political right, then there can be no community and no civil freedom. In short, the idea of a general will and of a republic "one and indivisible" may be either liberal or totalitarian; but this is what the author does not show.

In addition, since this is a strong example of what we have come to call the history of ideas, it may be relevant to comment on some of the dangers to which this historical genre, when too specialized, may be vulnerable. The ideas of Rousseau, Robespierre and the others are set forth in a context of anticipation of Stalinism, more than in a context of eighteenth-century life and society, or of the actual choices and alternatives that men faced in an era of war and revolution. Ideas as such become the key to causal explanation. It is argued not only that the ideas of French revolutionary leaders were absolutist and intransigent, which is true, and brilliantly demonstrated by the author; but also that the revolutionaries turned to coercion and terror because they had such ideas, which is true only with more qualification than here appears. The record of the Braxfield trials in Scotland in 1793, or of the so-called Austro-Russian reaction in Italy in 1799, suggests that men then turned to coercion, and even terror, without benefit of a Messianic ideology. The implication is that left totalitarianism exists today because certain ideas were expressed in the eighteenth century. This is at best part of the truth; ideas become operative in conjunction with circumstances, and we have totalitarianism where we have acceptance of war and struggle. The "idea" of murder is as old as Genesis, but the act of murder occurs, with greater or lesser frequency, under social and psychological conditions which it is our problem to control. In the present book, the part on Babeuf is most fully woven into general events, with motivations and circumstances clearly sketched in; and this is one reason why this part seems the most satisfying.

MAGNANI, VALDO and CUCCHI, ALDO, *Crisi di una Generazione (Documenti della crisi contemporanea II)*. Firenze, La Nuova Italia. 1952. Pp. viii, 96. Lire 400.

This analysis of the "Crisis of a Generation" undertaken by the two well known authors—founders and leaders of Italy's "Titoist" movement—has little in common with customary anti-Fascist experiences of the older generation. Instead of the political struggles against rising Fascism, the vexations of a seemingly endless exile, or the sufferings in prisons and penal colonies the reader is confronted with an outwardly less dramatic but actually very penetrating account. Life in a small provincial town engulfed by the pressures and supervision of the local henchmen of the régime; professional studies and intellectual development in an academic atmosphere still partly resisting Fascist encroachment; contacts with the miserable daily existence and dignified opposition of workers and peasants; drifting from Croce to Marxism; the almost ten years in uniform from 1936 to 1945; partisan warfare in Italy and the Balkans, all this is brought to life in these pages in a surprisingly quiet and unusually convincing manner. This entire range of topics, however, is held together not only by opposition to the régime but also by growing awareness—especially in the 1930's—of the inevitable tragic rift between any political emigration and the continually developing political climate of the country it wants to liberate. While realizing the causes of this tragedy, the authors nevertheless castigate the costly mistakes of the anti-Fascist emigration, its lack of understanding of the country's changing problems, its inability to comprehend the experiences and mentality of hundreds of thousands of young men in the armed forces fighting the "Fascist war," its desperate desire to pass judgement on the basis of already outdated patterns. It is fundamentally this very criticism which finally brings the authors after long years of membership in the Italian Communist Party to the decision of leaving the Communist ranks (January, 1951). By that time both had emerged as key figures in the Communist-controlled Partisan organization and in Italian political life. There may be more brilliant accounts by contemporary writers justifying their final break with Communism. However, the effectiveness of these pages lies in their obviously complete objectivity, sincerity and moderation. Taking the reader from their earliest impressions of unrealistic and damaging Communist directives transmitted to party members in Italy during "under-ground" days to the political pomp of the Togliatti era, Magnani and Cucci attempt to trace the entire network of interference by the "Moscovised" party leadership with any policy that might solve the basic problems of the Italian people. What they have to say about the breaking of independent minds in the party schools, Communist neutralization of the partisan movement as a positive political force, Communist infiltration into the cooperatives, mutual distrust and supervision among the party high command or the miserable spectacle of opportunistic intellectuals yearning for an audience—represents an important addition to our knowledge of Republican Italy. The historian of contemporary

Italy can ill afford to overlook both the Fascist and post-Fascist evidence supplied by *Crisi di una Generazione*.

University of Kansas City

EDGAR R. ROSEN

MEISSNER, BORIS, *Russland im Umbruch*, Frankfort a/Main; Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1951. Pp. 91. DM 10.50.

*Russland im Umbruch*, despite its compression and its somewhat unprepossessing appearance, is a thorough, factual, and valuable study of the structure of the Soviet government. The information is based on documentary material (*Sbornik*), on existing monographs (Julian Towster's material, e.g., has been extensively used), on publications in leading Russian, German, and other periodicals (*Kultura i Zhizn*, *Molodoi Bolshevik*, *Ost-Probleme*, *Osteuropa*, *Economist*), and on news reports (*Pravda*, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, etc.).

The book deals with the hierarchy in the Russian state, the autocracy, the party, the police, the army, the council or soviets, and the youth organizations. It relates briefly their historical backgrounds and describes carefully their present structure, personnel, and role. It analyses their relative influence, their administrative and ideological functions, and their significance for the maintenance of the existing political order. It searches for the meaning behind the institutional forms and behind the changes which have occurred in them, and it bases its careful sociological considerations as well as its sober and convincing evaluations on a large amount of statistical and documentary data. While, because of the lack of reliable reports and figures, the information on the post-war era is necessarily not as exhaustive as that on earlier periods, the book clearly shows the transformation of the Soviet state structure during the crucial years from the great purges to the Fourth Five Year Plan. This period, which saw the rise of the "new intelligentsia," demonstrates to what extent "dialectical and historical materialism as a fundamental philosophy have been replaced [under Stalin] by a vulgar *Zweckrealismus*." (p. 17) The transition has necessitated a revision of the dogma itself and the "secularization" of Marxism, . . . serves to prove that, contrary to the Marxist view, not a change in the means of production has effected another revolution in Russia, but a change in the ideology imposed from above.

It is of special interest to note that the author does not speak, as superficial observers have done, of a new class society in the accepted sense. Instead, he refers to the Soviet Union as a corporate state, in which a new intelligentsia, instead of workers and peasants, exercised the leading influence. This intelligentsia, largely university trained, is recruited from all layers of society and forms the backbone of Russian officialdom in government, party, army, police, Komsomol, and other organizations. Training rather than birth or wealth accounts for a person's rise on the Russian scene of today. Meissner's conclusions differ here, e.g., from those of George Schueller, who wrote a little booklet on the *Politburo* which can be compared in approach and intent with a small section out of Meissner's *Russland im Umbruch*. But Schueller uses too narrow a sta-

stistical basis to permit generalizations. Contrary to what he seems to imply, it is this new intelligentsia which is increasingly the source of power in the nation; but it is also this same intelligentsia which accounts for many of the tensions within the Soviet organizations.

The Soviet Constitution provides the small ruling group, which is devoted to the building of a collectivist society, with the means of maintaining its position. With its help, certain balances, which are particularly well described in Meissner's book, have been erected between the various executive organs. But despite constitutional forms, it is impossible to speak of Russia as a "Rechtsstaat" in the western sense; for laws and edicts emanate from a variety of institutions—the Presidium of Supreme Soviets, the Council of Ministers, the Central Committee of the Party, or the Politburo—and their ultimate source is a narrow group of men who perpetuate their rule by cooperation rather than by democratic and legally or constitutionally provided methods.

It would be an injustice to the author to give the impression that the judgments and evaluations here mentioned, which are certainly subject to criticism and to possible revision, constitute the essence of his book. They rather emerge as a logical consequence of the factual data which comprise the major portion of the work and which make it a concise, useful guide for the student of the Soviet governmental system and its evolution.

University of Delaware

WALTHER KIRCHNER

MIKSCHE, F. O., *Unconditional Surrender; The Roots of a World War III*. London: Faber and Faber, 1952. Pp. 468. 25s.

Colonel Miksche does not tell his readers about his professional background prior to 1945 when he was appointed liaison officer to the Supreme Headquarters of the AEF at Versailles, though he does indicate that he subsequently became Czechoslovak military attaché in France and assistant military delegate at the Paris conference of 1946. Since the capture of his country by the Communists he has apparently resided in Great Britain where he has written three books entitled *Secret Forces*, *Blitzkrieg*, and *Paratroops* and collaborated in a fourth *War Between Continents*.

Although the author maintains in his preface that the title of this present book "clearly indicates the contents," adding that there were actually two unconditional surrenders—one at Versailles ending World War I and a second in 1945 when the Germans capitulated, this reviewer finds the claims hardly borne out by the facts. Indeed it is not easy to see the mountain—which Colonel Miksche tells us is the rearment of Western Germany and Japan as the means of saving the West in its struggle with the Soviet Union—because of the thick tangle of trees. The author organizes his material into three parts which he entitles "After World War II," "The Case of Germany," and "War or Peace." These are broken down into 11 chapters and capped by a conclusion and an appendix which includes various documents mainly aimed at showing the complicity of the Allies in bringing on World War II. But these parts and chapters

seem to serve primarily as a framework to which the author attaches his observations on a bewildering collection of topics drawn from several countries.

Perhaps the most effective discussion in the entire book is that which the earlier record of aggression on the part of France is set against the more recent aggression of Germany. Some of the author's statements on the other hand are naive—for example, his claim that "for years only one side of the story (of Hitler's rise to power) has been told." (p. 133). His own analysis here is reasonably adequate to be sure, but it contains little that is new to scholars. Some of his conclusions are more novel, though they sometimes suggest an emotional reaction rather than a careful historical investigation. Though his discussion of the unrecognized merit of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is interesting, this reviewer at least finishes it with the impression that Colonel Miksche is pining for the "good old days" of the past. Perhaps the most arresting pages of the book are those dealing with the weaknesses of Czechoslovakia and its leaders and the conclusion that such a political entity should never have been set up after World War I and should not appear as an element in any future European federation. The thesis that the German nationalism of the past should not only be permitted to reappear with its full trappings but indeed should be encouraged since a strong German army depends upon such an atmosphere will certainly not appeal to those who doubt the wisdom of reestablishing German military force and may be seriously questioned by those who regard the participation of Western Germany in the defense of the West as essential.

To the American reader a major, if not the chief aspect of the book, will probably be Colonel Miksche's repeated assertion that virtually every action and policy of the United States relating to Europe, Asia, or indeed the world has been the embodiment of error. In his eyes apparently the United States has been pushed into a position of leadership for which it is not only poorly but absolutely unprepared and unequipped. Much of the trouble which the world has suffered during the recent decades and is now suffering is attributed to the United States. While he gives the impression at times of seeing a possible constructive role for the United States—for example, forcing an end to the multiple party system in France which he sees as an ultimate direct weakness rather than a symptom—one rather feels that in the last analysis he quotes Friedrich Engels with more than a little hope: "The emancipation of Asia will be the beginning of America's decline." (p. 59).

Ohio State University

HAROLD ZINK

CONDODIE, MIKHAIL V., *The Soviet Financial System, Its development and relations with the Western World*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1951. Pp. 230.

The important intellectual task which today faces observers of the Soviet economy is to describe and to explain the inter-relationship between numerous economic controls of this economy. Only when the relationship between governmentally controlled costs, profits, output, savings, investments, money and other variables of the Soviet economy is fully explained, and not only for the planned

variables alone but also for the actual achieved variables, can the Soviet planned economy be really understood and its structural difference from the free system expressed in objective and uncontroversial terms. Until this task is solved, or even conceded, the arguments on the Soviet economic system, both of Western and of Soviet writers, are bound to be anything but convincing.

Mr. Mikhail V. Condoide's book on the Soviet financial system is a most recent testimony to the growing awareness in Western literature of this intellectual task. In Mr. Condoide's own words his aim is "to analyse the operations and significance of the Soviet financial system and its place and role on the collective economy of the Soviet Union" (p. ix). His book deals with Soviet financial controls set up in the fields of banking system and credits (pp. 24-47), money (pp. 48-75), the national budget (pp. 76-107), with financial controls extended into the international sphere (pp. 108-156). It also provides the reader in five appendices (pp. 167-206) with a number of documents, both of Soviet and Western origin which would throw light on some of these control measures.

The writer of the book has succeeded in showing how Soviet financial policy is interlinked with some features of the Soviet policy of enforced industrialization and its policy of planning in general. The author observes that in the Soviet Union investments "are completely independent of the willingness of the people to save" (p. 14), that the chief method of saving is that of compulsory savings, that this method is effected chiefly through indirect taxation (pp. 83 and 96 ff.) and that this capital accumulation is in the end, achieved at the expense of curtailed consumption (p. 97). The writer makes a number of interesting observations, among other things, on the structural similarity of the functions of Soviet money to such functions in other countries (p. 55).

The writer's final conclusion—"the Soviets have developed an effective centralized banking system well adapted to the needs of their collective economy" (p. 159)—comes, however, as something of a surprise, and appears to have been drawn or, perhaps, phrased, somewhat too hastily. Not only does this conclusion differ diametrically from that arrived at by A. Turetski, one the best Soviet economists, who claims that the Soviet financial system has been unable to stop waste and inefficiency in Soviet firms (see Turetski's *Sebestoimost i problema tsonaobrazovaniia*, Moscow, 1940, p. 300). Clearly, the Soviet financial system has failed to make sufficient use of economizing as a source of capital formation and hence of industrialization. The author's conclusion seems also to overlook his own previous observations on inflation (p. 74), insolvency of many Soviet firms (p. 38), unfulfilment of cost-targets, as well as a host of other features of an enormous chaos in Soviet industry which have not been dealt with by the author, all caused chiefly by the rigidities of the Soviet price and tax structure.

It seems, therefore, that while Mr. Condoide has been looking indeed in the right direction, some further analysis along these very lines is needed before intellectually convincing judgments may be passed on the Soviet financial system as a whole.

## SHORTER NOTICES

WAGNER, FRITZ, *Geschichtswissenschaft*. Munich: Karl Alber (Orbis Academicus), 1951. Pp. 468. DM 18.

The post-war period is richly provided—whether “blessed” or not—with treaties and manuals of historiography. Professor Wagner has composed a combined historiographical manual and anthology of the historical and philosophical thought of leading historians from Herodotus to Weber. The result of *Seminarübungen*, it is organized chronologically. Each section, broken down by individual historians, is introduced by a short descriptive or analytic resumé of the notable characteristics of the period or school, and summary biographical and bibliographical abrégés place the historian in his milieu. The extracts are usually very short, and, for any real entry into the spirit and substance of the work relatively useless. Disjointed quotation can be tendentious and vicious.

The best part of the work is the bibliographical section which brings together a considerable selective list of titles, monographs or articles, on the more prominent problems of historical writing. Obviously hastily assembled, and limited in scope, the list is none the less of some help. There is a handy *Personenverzeichnis* which gives thumbnail sketches of several hundred selected historians. An American or a British scholar would smile at the inclusions as well as the omissions, and a non-German Central European historian would have every reason to cringe at Wagner's apparent ignorance of great scholars who were active just beyond the boundaries of Germany. If this approach to history is characteristic of post-war Germany, there is no hope.

*University of Colorado*

S. H. THOMSON

LEIMBACH, WERNER, *Die Soviet Union, Natur, Volk und Wirtschaft*. Stuttgart-Franckh'sche Verlagshandlung, 1950. Pp. 526.

Dr. Leimbach has written an interesting book on economic geography of the present day Soviet Union. This book follows the writer's earliest studies on various parts of Russia (Tannu-Tuva, Soviet Uranium ore district, Soviet Central Asia, the region of the Forest Steppe, and others), and therefore it represents in some respect the summary of his search for facts on Soviet Russia during the past two decades. The book contains 40 photographs of various parts of the Soviet Union; 99 schematic maps of the chief areas discussed by the writer; post-war information on Soviet economy; frequent evaluation by the author of Soviet statistical material; numerous comparisons with developments prevailing in this country; and, above all, ample evidence of the sober and matter of fact attitude of the writer to his by no means easy task.

The field which Dr. Leimbach's book covers is, of course, the traditional field of any study of economic geography. The writer starts off with a description of general geographical features of the Soviet Union (pp. 13-162) and produces a wealth of well-selected material especially on Soviet climatic conditions, an element which is frequently underestimated by outside observers of Soviet economic life. He then proceeds to Soviet problems of population (pp. 162-232), agricultural development and resources (pp. 232-298) and mineral deposits and Soviet extracting industries such as coal, oil, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy (pp. 299-389), and provides the reader with a realistic appraisal of these elements of the strength of the Soviet Russia. The writer then turns to other

industries and produces detailed information on Soviet electric power stations, metal working industry, and so forth (pp. 389-420). The author concludes his survey of Soviet economic life with a description of Soviet systems of transportation (pp. 420-465), where he may surprise some readers by showing that Soviet Russia had less paved highroads than the three Baltic States taken together, and some remarks on Soviet foreign trade.

Experts and general readers alike will find Dr. Leimbach's little encyclopedia both helpful and interesting.

*University of British Columbia*

H. E. RONIMOIS

GEORGE, PIERRE, et al., *Les Fleuves et l'évolution des peuples. Europe Orientale Baltique-Mer Noire.* (Centre International de Synthèse) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950. Pp. 101. 300 Fr.

This book is a collection of five lectures delivered in 1948 before the Centre International de Synthèse, Institut International d'Archéocivilisation, Paris, at its fifth session of Historical Synthesis. The lectures investigate the problem of how the rivers influenced the history of the Polish nation. The lecturers were the most prominent Polish scholars on this subject.

The volume is introduced by Professor P. George of Paris with a brief summary of how geographical conditions, the development of transportation, and the contacts of civilization act on each other in Eastern Europe, between the meridians of Prague and Leningrad. Professor A. Zierhoffer of Poznań deals with the geographical frame of the area of Poland, analyzing the significance of the North-South and East-West obstacles in the way of transportation. Professor T. Lehr-Spławiński of Kraków treats the importance of the Oder and the Vistula basins in the origins of the Slav peoples. Professor M. Szaniecki of Poznań discusses the influence of the Frank monarchy on the medieval development of these two river basins. M. Wojciechowska of Poznań deals with the historical and geographical role of the Oder and the Vistula. An appendix by the same author, taken from his *Monographie de l'Oder*, Poznań 1948, treats the political role in the history of the Oder, the Polish river of destiny.

The book is well illustrated with a number of historical maps and diagrams. Unfortunately, part of the text has, by misprinting, dropped out between pp. 48 and 49.

The material collected in the book is warmly recommended to all those interested in Polish history. It is a good example of historical synthesis in the light of geography, a modern branch of study which is represented by Professor Jacques Pirenne and a number of other French scholars.

*Budapest, Hungary*

JOSEPH SOMOGYI

LERNER, DANIEL, *The Nazi Elite.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951. Pp. 112. \$1.00.

Once upon a time it was the privilege of this reviewer to be a colleague of Harold D. Lasswell at the University of Chicago. His approach to Political Science—while under fire by many critics, then as now—impressed me, as it still does, as offering the greatest possible promise of an operationally useful “science” of politics. This approach, at least in its essential concepts and directives is happily that of the scholars and writers associated with the Hoover Institute, which has embarked upon an ambitious program of “General Studies,” “Elite

Studies," and "Symbol Studies" (plus related "Interpretative Studies"), of which the present volume is No. 3 of Series B.

What is here attempted is an analysis of the rulers of the Nazi Reich in terms of their social backgrounds—i.e., primarily the *Kleimbürgertum* (here designated as "the Middle-Income Skill Group"), and classified, more specifically, as the "alienated intellectuals" who became propagandists, the "plebeians" who became administrators, and the "specialists on violence" who became policemen, terrorists, and militarists. The method is that of tabulating, by sampling, and interpreting in context, the data in the *Fuehrerlexikon* or Nazi who's who of 1934.

This procedure has its limitations, some of which are hinted at by Franz Neumann in his introduction. Its result lacks literary grace and has few qualities calculated to stir human interest and excitement. A text of 92 pages is embellished with 72 statistical tables. A passion for quantifying social facts is all-pervasive in this monograph. Devotion to measurement turns poetry—even the dramatic and tragic poetry of fanaticism, violence, and self-defeat—into dull prose. But the method has the merit of telling us more about the origins, careers, and even motives of the leadership of the N.S.D.A.P. than any other method currently available. This study is therefore an important contribution to our knowledge of the social dynamics of the Third Reich. It deserves the thoughtful attention of all students of modern Germany and of all who are concerned with the nature of human nature in politics.

Williams College

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

STURM, HERIBERT, *Eger*. Augsburg: Adam Kraft Verlag, 1951. Pp. 446. DM 16.80.

Dr. Heribert Sturm served from 1934 to 1946 as Director of the Municipal Archives in the city of Eger to which the Czechoslovak authorities gave back the name Cheb, derived from the name of a Slavic tribe Chbané. During the years of his service, Dr. Sturm most likely compiled the essential parts of his history of the city. The choice of the subtitle was determined by the author's desire to prove that by its origin and early history Eger - Cheb assumed the character and rank of a free Imperial city, and that its privileged position should be taken into account if and when the problem of the Czechoslovak western frontier is re-opened. The turning point in the city's history is 1322 for at that time it was given by Emperor Lewis of Bavaria to King John of Bohemia in pledge. The surrounding country was included in the transaction. The city and the district of Eger-Cheb had for many centuries rather loose ties with Bohemia and only after the Peace of Westphalia did the Hapsburg rulers endeavor to curtail its privileges. It is true that the Hapsburgs never formally incorporated the formerly autonomous unit into the Kingdom of Bohemia but for all practical purposes the city and regions were regarded as an integral part of Bohemia through the modern period, from the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 to the collapse of the Hapsburg Monarchy in 1918. That was the strongest reason for the decision of the peacemakers to leave it within the Czechoslovak boundary.

Dr. Sturm's book is not a political pamphlet but a solid piece of work. Some chapters are devoted to the course of events while others treat in detail the city administration, the legal system, social and economic conditions, giving special attention to the prominent places which Eger-Cheb held as the gate to Bohemia and later as an important railroad junction. But the lament for the lost position

among the cities of the Empire sounds as an undertone especially in those chapters which describe the city's vicissitudes under the Hapsburg régime and in Czechoslovakia. The author's story ends in the early 1920's. In an epilogue he sketches briefly and in subdued colors the ceremony by which the act of 1322 seemed to have been undone: the reception of the Führer in the City Hall on October 3, 1938, and his declaration that the former Imperial city had been redeemed from captivity and reunited with the Reich.

*Columbia University*

OTAKAR ODLOZILIK

SPENGLER, OSWALD, *Reden und Aufsätze*. München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1951. Pp. 342.

This edition has been enlarged by the inclusion of the address "Nietzsche und sein Jahrhundert" (1924), the "Entwurf zu einem juristischen Preisabschreiben" (1927)—both never printed before—and "Ist Weltfriede möglich?" Spengler's last publication, and heretofore available only in English (it was written in answer to an inquiry by Hearst's *International Cosmopolitan*). The editor (also a niece of Spengler's) informs us that this volume now contains "im wesentlichen" all of her uncle's addresses and articles which were completed at least as far as the "Formulierung" was concerned.

It may be briefly recalled that *Reden und Aufsätze* presents Spengler as a political observer as well as a historian. As the analyst and augur of his age he reveals a vision that was dimmed by rigidly conceived and strongly, often arrogantly, espoused notions. But the historian always is at least provocative. Of greatest interest is "Zur Weltgeschichte des zweiten vorchristlichen Jahrtausends," the imposing fragment of *Die Geschichte des Menschen von seinem Ursprung an* and the book on which he was writing when death overtook him in 1937. With sweeping strokes he covers a vast canvas. Evidence needs fails him on not too infrequent occasions; then, undaunted, he forces his brush with an apodictic "Es muss so gewesen sein." He has bitter words to say about his co-workers in the field. Modesty and weakness must have been synonyms in Spengler's vocabulary.

Among the additions, only "Nietzsche und sein Jahrhundert" arouses more than a fleeting interest of the reader unless, of course, he be a student and devotee of Spengler's. Here he is at his essayistic best and speaks of a kindred soul with eloquent conviction. His point that Nietzsche reveals his musical gift also in his approach to history, astounding at first, is, however, well taken.

*University of Colorado*

GERHARD LOOSE

MARTEL, LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GIFFORD, *East Versus West*. London: Museum Press, 1952. Pp. 220. 12s 6d.

Given the present paper shortage in Britain, some small saving could have been effected by not publishing this book. It has very little to do with the theme implied by the title, and generally represents the ramblings of an old soldier who is deeply embittered about socialism in Britain, the disintegration of the Empire, and the fact that his country can no longer call the tune in such areas as Iran and Egypt. He is certain that Churchill could have saved western Europe from the various humiliations in connection with the cold war had he been returned to power in 1945. British prestige would not have suffered as a consequence of having major decisions made in Washington rather than London.

Through many pages of tedious argument (sprinkled generously with in-

appropriate personal reminiscences) he bemoans the fact that a regular British Army is now being ruined by the introduction of conscription. As a cavalry officer he belabors the Laborite leaders for their failure to develop the kinds and quantities of tanks which he assures his readers would stop the Russians cold should war break out. He deplores the lack of courage among western statesmen. On the basis of his few month's observations in Russia during the war (he was, for a time, head of the British Military Mission) he asserts that a show of force in 1946 would have driven the Russians out of Europe, which in turn would have brought the downfall of the Communist régime.

How, then, might the West salvage the situation? By raising the military forces he prescribes in his book; namely, large and mobile armored forces operated by regulars who know what they are doing. By drawing up a charter of principles to rally the laggards. "Full use must be made of Christianity and of our ideologies." (p. 212). Establish a central headquarters. Vigorously stamp out Communism in all Western nations. Then begin to apply the necessary political and military pressure. Under such sustained pressure the leaders of the Kremlin would have to pull in their horns, and the "loss of prestige should eventually lead to their collapse." Having thus disposed of the current *enfant terrible*, the western powers should then divide the world into four "natural" Empires—the Americas (less Canada), Russia, the British Empire, and an Asiatic Empire. "World affairs would then be dealt with by these four or five great Empires. Who can possibly suggest that this would not be far preferable to the babel of sixty-nine Sovereign States?" (p. 214).

University of Nebraska

ALVIN T. ANDERSON

CARR, EDWARD HALLETT. *German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1951. Pp. 146. \$3.00.

Within the limitations imposed by the size of this small book, Professor Carr has summarized ably the evolution of German-Soviet relations between the two wars. Over half of the book covers the years from 1918 to 1922, when the Treaty of Rapallo was signed. These years are indeed important because they reveal the striking ambivalence of German policy, alternately attracted to, and repelled by, the prospect of closer cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Following Rapallo there is little evidence of purposeful and honest cooperation. Relations become cool and formal after the establishment of the Nazi régime. The non-aggression pact of 1939, along with the commercial treaty, do not present so much a return to Rapallo as they do a calculated balancing of forces in a very unbalanced power situation. Professor Carr seems to be saying that cooperative action between Germany and the Soviet Union was characterized throughout by cynical opportunism, which reduced the contract—even when the most "friendly"—to a marriage of convenience. It is not a pleasant thought to contemplate the consequences had the "national interest" of the two powers been more complementary.

In a sense his story of Russo-German relations between the two wars is a study in Soviet motivation. Professor Carr has said enough to identify himself among those who believe that Soviet policy serves first the more limited national interests of the U.S.S.R., and only secondly reflects larger calculations in consonance with the program of world communism. Both considerations are present, but the former takes priority over the latter.

The author would perhaps be the last to suggest that he has contributed

anything substantially new in this book. More specifically, it stands as an invitation to some scholar to give the same theme a thoroughgoing examination. The relevance of the problem was never more apparent.

*University of Nebraska*

ALBIN T. ANDERSON

ALLIATA, GIANFRANCO, ed. *L'unità mediterranea ed il Primo Convegno Internazionale di Studi Mediterranei*. Palermo: Accademia del Mediterraneo, 1952. Pp. 246.

Since the early '20's of this century the movement to regard the Mediterranean as a cultural focus for Western civilization has been taking progressively tangible form. In 1933 an Académie Méditerranée was founded at Nice, and interest grew markedly in the concept of Mediterranean cultural unity in the following years. A journal, *Rassegna Mediterranea*, was founded in 1948 by the Centro Studi e Scambi Internazionali, and the First International Congress of Mediterranean Studies, which met at Palermo, June 11-13, 1951, is the formal début of the interest thus aroused. Representative scholars from fifteen nations participated in the various sessions and section meetings. Their papers and the minutes of the session are printed in this volume. In four main sections, Law, History Letters and Art, Economics Transport Tourism, Political and Social Studies, and a short excursus, Eurafrika, the main ideas are elaborated. The coverage runs from protohistory to contemporary problems such as Arab unity. Anglo-Saxon contributors are noticeably absent. The papers are all short, but printed as delivered by specialists to specialists, yet not the less suggestive for that controlled brevity. From the point of view of cultural survival and transmission this is an extremely significant collection of papers, but not less it is a tangible evidence of Western realization of the place the Mediterranean has had and will continue to have in all aspects of European life.

S. H. THOMSON

## RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

## GENERAL

Barcia Trelles, Camilo, "Norteamérica, Europa y la estrategia de la defensa periférica," *Politica International*, Dec., 1951, 59-86.

Baron, Salo W., "Aspects of the Jewish Communal Crisis in 1848," *Jewish Soc. Studies*, April 1952, 99-144.

Cérych, L., "Mitteleuropa und der Föderalismus," *Democratia Militans*, Feb. 1952, 43-46.

Cérych, Ladislav, "Problémy Federalismu," *Skutečnost*, June 1952, 37-90.

Engel-Janosi, Friedrich, "French and Austrian Political Advice to Pius IX, 1846-1848," *Cath. Hist. Rev.*, April 1952, 1-20.

Falk, Marian, "Geograficzne przesłanki panowania nad światem," *Światło*, July 1952, 37-45.

Fleming, D. F., "What Follows the Arms Race?" *Jl. of Pol.*, May 1952, 203-223.

Friedmann, W., "Migration and World Politics," *Intern. Jl.* Summer 1952, 196-203.

Gottmann, Jean, "The Political Partitioning of Our World: An Attempt at Analysis," *World Pol.*, July 1952, 512-519.

Hájek H. J., "Nad Troskami Ilusi," *Skutečnost*, June 1952, 81-84.

Hohman, Elmo Paul, "Probleme und Arbeitsmethoden der internationen Sozialpolitik," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 1952, 70-86.

Krauss, Günther, "Wer beitet dem Terror Schach?" *Geopolitik*, July 1952, 385-391.

Kruls, General H. J., "Die Europäische Armee im Rahmen der Verteidigung Europas," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, June 1952, 137-143.

Mellado, Inocencia Rodríguez, "Diario de acontecimientos mundiales del cuarto trimestre de 1951," *Politica Internacional*, Dec., 1951, 181-199.

Posse, Hans, "Der schwere Weg zur europäischen Integration," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, April 1952, 84-88.

Pratt, Edwin J., "Voraussetzungen der osteuropäischen Erneuerung," *Democratia Militans*, Feb. 1952, 30-34.

Reisman, David, "The Limits of Totalitarian Power," *Antioch Rev.*, Summer 1952, 155-168.

Rohden, Herhadt von, "Luftkrieg und Wirtschaft," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, May 1952, 270-275.

Rubiera, Fernando Murillo, "La política internacional en el cuarto trimestre de 1951," *Politica Internacional*, Dec., 1951, 167-180.

Rubio García, Leandro, "En torno a la Unión Atlántica," *Politica Internacional*, Cuaderno 8, Dec. 1951, 121-130.

Schindler, Dietrich, "Wie kann die Subventionspolitik des Bundes erneuert werden?" *Schweizer Monatshefte*, April 1952, 73-83.

Schürmann, Leo, "Die Axt der Steuerpolitik," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, April 1952, 88-95.

"Studien über Materialismus," *Osteuropa*, April 1952, 102-107.

"The Cost of Living," *News from behind the Iron Curtain*, July 1952, 22-34.

Treue, Wilhelm, "Politische Kohle im ersten und zweiten Weltkrieg," *Die Welt als Geschichte*, Heft 3, 1951, 185-202.

Wiedenfeld, Kurt, "Kapitalismus und Weltmarktwirtschaft als Ergänzung und Gegensatz," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Heft 1, 1952, 20-53.

Wojciechowski, Zygmunt, "Badania zachodnio-słowiańskie," *Przeg. Zach.* VII, 1952 337-342.

Zeeden, Ernst Walter, "Der Historiker als Kritiker und Prophet," *Die Welt als Geschichte*, 1951, 154-173.

## AUSTRIA & CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Kamiński, Andrzej Józef, "Sprawy ideologiczne i organizacyjne nauki czechosłowackiej," *Przeg. Zach.* May 1952, VIII, 398-414.  
Koren, Hanns, "Gründung und Anfänge einer barocken Wallfahrt," *Blätter für Heimatkunde*, 1952, 46-56.

Lamprecht, Otto, "Die Siedlung Ratschendorf," *Blätter für Heimatkunde*, 26, 1952, 37-46.  
 Mieroszewski, Juliusz, "Problem 'Habsburskiego przedmurza'", *Kultura*, July-August, 1952, 48-53.  
 Popelka, Fritz, "Das älteste Grundbuch in der Steiermark," *Blätter für Heimatkunde*, 26, 1952, 6-11.  
 Studinger, Eduard, "Eine Schanze Maximilians I. auf dem Frauenberge bei Leibnitz," *Blätter für Heimatkunde*, 26, 1952, 57-59.  
 Tremel, Ferdinand, "Eine Bauernrevolte im Ennstale," *Blätter für Heimatkunde*, 26, 1952, 33-37.

## BALKANS &amp; NEAR EAST

Bismarck-Osten, Ferdinand von, "Strukturwandlungen und Nachkriegsprobleme der Wirtschaft Griechenlands," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 1952, 262-322.  
 Callmer, Christian, "Byzantina. Några drag i byzantinologiens historia," *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1952, 186-208.  
 Craig-Martin, Paul F., "Cotton and the Middle East," *Middle East Jl.*, Summer 1952, 299-314.  
 Dimitrov, George M., "The Social Reforms of A. Stamboliiski," *Bull. of Intern. Peasant Union*, June 1952, 5-7.  
 Genzsch, Edwin O., "Die südliche Verteidigungsfront," *Geopolitik*, June 1952, 345-348.  
 Halperin, Ernst, "Tito wider den Strom," *Wort u. Wahrheit*, May 1952, 366-371.  
 Horvath, Monseñor Közi, "Persecución de la Iglesia Católica en Hungria," *Oriente*, April-June 1952, 83-90.  
 Howard, Harry N., "Die amerikanische Nahost-Politik," *Aussenpolitik*, May 1952, 305-310.  
 Jäckh, Ernst, "Der Mittlere Osten—Mittelpunkt der Welt," *Aussenpolitik*, May 1952, 285-290.  
 Kiralfy, A., "The People's Court: A Comparative Review," *Soviet Studies*, April 1952, 387-407.  
 Petrović, J., "No Solution of the Trieste Problem without Yugoslavia," *Rev. of Intern. Aff.*, April 9, 1952, 7-8.  
 Popovici, C. L., "El Sureste europeo y el problema del Helenismo," *Oriente*, April-June 1952, 65-69.  
 Ramón Sobredo, José, "El Oriente Medio en la política internacional," *Politica Internacional*, Dec., 1951, 131-139.  
 "The Rise and Fall of Ana Pauker," *News from behind the Iron Curtain*, July 1952, 16-21.  
 Sarc, Ömer Celâl, "International Bank Report on Turkey," *Middle East Jl.*, Summer 1952, 336-304.  
 Stevens, Georgiana G., "Arab Refugees: 1948-1952," *Middle East Jl.*, Summer 1952, 281-298.  
 Vereté, M., "Note: Palmerston and the Levant Crisis, 1832," *Jl. of Mod. Hist.*, June 1952, 143-151.  
 Wichterich, W., "Problem Südalien," *Geopolitik*, June 1952, 349-355.

## BALTIC

Abrahamson, Erik, "Karl XI:s almanacksanteckniger för 1696—de sista Fullständiga," *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1951, 397-412.  
 Ahnlund, Nils, "Rättegangsbrevet den 7 augusti 1471. Till Brunkebergsslagets förhistoria," *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1952, 127-150.  
 Anderson, Albin T., "The Soviets and Northern Europe," *World Pol.*, July 1952, 468-487.  
 Berglund, Ake, "Schwedens Bevölkerungspolitik," *Geopolitik*, July 1952, 399-405.  
 Carlgren, W. M., "'Informationsstycken' från Abdul Hamids senare regeringsar." *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1952, 1-35.  
 Dickson, Harald v., "Grundzüge der schwedischen Wirtschaftstheorie, vor allem der

Stockholmer Schule, während der letzten 25 Jahre," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Heft 1, 1952, 54-69.

Gringauz, Samuel, "Jewish National Autonomy in Lithuania (1918-1925)," *Jewish Social Studies*, July 1952, 225-246.

Gudmundsson, Bardi, "Omkring Stiklestadslaget," *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1952, 151-161.

Hirschfeldt, Lennart, "Schwedische Aussenpolitik nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, June 1952, 143-151.

Lesiński, Henryk, "Początki i rozwój stosunków polskohanzeatyckich w XIII w," *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 130-145.

Schott, Erwin, "Das Schicksal eines kleinen Volkes - Die Esten seit 1939," *Zjt. f. Geopolitik*, April 1952, 202-213.

Schück, Adolf, "Studier i 'Skänninge-annalerna,'" *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1952, 36-48.

Slaski, Kazimierz, "Stosunki krajów skandynawskich z południowoi-wschodnim wybrzeżem Bałtyku od VI do XII wieku," *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 30-45.

Spencer, Arthur, "Soviet Pressure on Scandinavia," *For. Aff.*, July 1952, 651-659.

Tunberg, Sven, "Nagra omstridda problem ur Sveriges 1200-talshistoria," *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1951, 361-392.

Tunberg, Sven, "Nagra omstridda problem ur Sveriges 1200-talshistoria, II," *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1952, 105-126.

Tymielecki, Kazimierz, "Hanza niemiecka nad Bałtykiem (uwagi o genezie potęgi i znaczenia)," *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 101-129.

Undén, Östen, "Die Bündnisfreiheit Schwedens," *Aussenpolitik*, May 1952, 277-284.

#### GERMANY

Carr, E. H. (ed.), "Radek's 'Political Salon' in Berlin 1919," *Soviet Studies*, April 1952, 411-429.

Gooch, G. P., "Bismarck's Legacy," *For. Aff.*, July 1952, 517-530.

Grundinger, Marianne, "Zur östlichen Besiedlung des Rabenwaldes," *Blätter für Heimatkunde* 26, 1952, 23-28.

Hartl, Hans, "Die Tragödie der Konspiration," *Geopolitik*, July 1952, 392-398.

Hubatsch, Walther, "Zur Beurteilung von Tirpitz," *Die Welt als Geschichtslehrer*, 1951, 174-184.

Kellermann, Henry J., "Germany Today and Tomorrow," *Dept. of State Bull.*, July 1952, 807-857.

Kollman, Eric C., "Walther Rathenau and German Foreign Policy: Thoughts and Actions," *Jl. of Mod. Hist.*, June 1952, 127-142.

Lipgens, Walter, "Zwei unbekannte Bismarck-Briefe 1863 und 1869. Gedanken zum Problem der deutschen Innenpolitik," *Hist. Zjt.*, April 1952, 315-324.

McInnis, Edgar, "The German 'Peace Contract,'" *Intern. Jl.*, Summer 1952, 184-188.

Nettl, Peter, "Economic Checks on German Unity," *For. Aff.*, July 1952, 554-563.

Pradzyński, Jerzy, "Targi frankfurckie," *Kultura*, April 1952, 106-110.

Rassow, Peter, "Schlieffen und Holstein," *Hist. Zjt.*, April 1952, 297-313.

Schmid, Carlo, "Germany and Europe: The German Social Democratic Program," *For. Aff.*, July 1952, 531-544.

#### POLAND

Biskup, Marian, "Elbląg w czasach Rzeczypospolitej (z problematyki historiograficznej miasta)," *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 190-203.

Burmeister, Alfred, "Górniacy polscy w Donbasie," *Kultura*, April 1952, 115-122.

J. C., "The Peasant in Poland Today," *World Today*, Feb. 1952, 71-79.

Chłopocka, Helena, "Lokacja Szczecina na prawie niemieckim," *Przeg. Zach.*, VII, 1952, 612-626.

Chojnacka, Kazimiera, "Walka o wolny handel i żeglugę na Warcie i Ordze w pierwszej połowie XVI wieku," *Przeg. Zach.*, VII, 1952, 627-674.

Cieślak, Edmund, "Regulamentacja handlu rybami przez Związek Miast Hanzeatyckich w

XIV i XV wieku," *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 146-175.

Cieślak, Tadeusz, "Chłopi w wyprawie starogardzkiej Towarzystwa Demokratycznego (1846)," *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 240-246.

D., H., "The arrest of Communist Leaders in Poland," *World Today*, Jan. 1952, 38-44.

Gieysztor, Aleksander, "Badania nad polskim wczesnym średniowieczem w roku 1951." *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 299-312.

Grundziński, Tadeusz, "Stosunki polsko-wieleckie w drugiej połowie XI wieku," *Przeg. Zach.*, VII, 1952, 385-505.

Jasiński, Kazimierz, "Zapis Pomorza Gdańskiego przez Mszczuja w roku 1282," *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 176-189.

Kiersnowski, Ryszard, "Święttopołk - 'dux odrensis,'" *Przeg. Zach.*, VII, 1952, 506-529.

Klafkowski, Alfons, "Traktat pokoju z Niemcami," *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 1-29.

Kowalenko, Władysław, "Przewłoka na szlaku żeglugowym Warta Gopło - Wisła," *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 46-100.

Labuda, Gerard, "Problematyka badań wczesno-dziejowych Szczecina," *Przeg. Zach.*, 1952, VII, 536-578.

Ludat, Herbert, "Dae polnische Wissenschaft im Sog Moskaus," *Osteuropa*, April 1952, 86-93.

Matysik, Stanisław, "Gdańska ordynacja prawa morskiego z początków XVI wieku," *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 204-215.

Mieroszewski, Juliusz, "O reformie 'Zakonu Polskości,'" *Kultura*, April 1952, 5-13.

Mieroszewski, Juliusz, "Salto mortale 'narodowych interesów,'" *Kultura*, May 1952, 80-86.

Podlaszewska, Krystyna, "Ziemia śliwińska," *Przeg. Zach.*, VII, 1952, 689-699.

Prądzyński, Jerzy, "Na otwarcie polskiej stacji Free Europe," *Kultura*, May 1952, 80-89.

Prorok, Leszek, "Niedoszła rewolucja," *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 216-239.

Rozenkranz, Edwin, "Geneza Miasta Lubiąża (Müncheberg)," *Przeg. Zach.*, VII, 1952, 675-689.

S., M., "Listy z Polski," *Kultura*, April 1952, 98-102.

Strobel, Georg W., "Die polnische Widerstandsbewegung seit 1939," *Osteuropa*, June 1952, 188-196.

Sułowski, Zygmunt, "Najstarsza granica zachodnia Polski," *Przeg. Zach.*, VII, 1952, 343-483.

Szarek, Paweł, "Niemcy na starej drodze," *Światło*, July 1952, 14-21.

Tokarski, Jan, "Co nas dzieli?" *KKultura*, May 1952, 117-125.

Wachowiak, Bogdan, "Najdawniejszy port Szczecina (X-XIII w.)," *Przeg. Zach.*, VII 1952, 579-597.

Wojciechowski, Zygmunt, "Pogranicze plemienne śląskowielkopolskie i problem kształtowania się państwa Polan," *Przeg. Zach.*, May 1952, VIII, 279-298.

Wojciechowski, Zygmunt, "Szczecin, nie Gniezno," *Przeg. Zach.*, VII, 1952, 530-535.

Zajchowska, Stanisława, "Pierwotny krajobraz średniowiecznego Szczecina," *Przeg. Zach.*, VII, 1952, 598-611.

Zośka, "Na podziemnym szlaku - Wspomnienia z prac konspiracyjnych," *Światło*, July 1952, 45-54.

## RUSSIA

Aronson, Gregor, "The Tragedy of the Cosmopolite Tairov," *Russian Rev.*, July 1952, 445-52.

Bechtoldt, Heinrich, "Russlands Präsenz im Orient," *Aussenpolitik*, May 1952, 291-304.

Beloff, Max, "The Theory of Soviet Foreign Policy," *Soviet Studies*, April 1952, 345-350.

Buchholz, Arnold, "Grundzüge und Entwicklungstendenzen der sowjetischen Naturwissenschaft, (I)," *Osteuropa*, June 1952, 161-168.

Chubaty, Nicholas, "Present Soviet Historiography on America," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Spring 1952, 149-155.

Finegood, I. M., "A Critical Analysis of Some Concepts Concerning Soviet Agriculture," *Soviet Studies*, July 1952, 15-31.

Guins, George C., "Claims and Realities of Soviet Socialism," *Russian Rev.*, July 1952, 138-147.

Helmer, Karl, "Der Russland-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft," *Osteuropa*, June 1952, 177-180.

Idilli, Ajaz Ishaki, "The Turko-Tatars of Idel-Ural in their Struggle for Freedom," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Spring 1952, 136-142.

Kilpatrick, Carroll, "An American in Russia 1850," *Virginia Qy. Rev.*, Spring 1952, 183-190.

Klocke, Helmut, "Der Weg der Sowjetunion zur Industriemacht," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, April 1952, 214-221.

Li, S., "Iron & Steel in the Soviet Union," *World Today*, May 1952, 210-222.

Lamet, Stefan, "Soviet Fuel and Power," *Soviet Studies*, July 1952, 1-14.

Leober, Dietrich A., "Der Umbruch im Ehrerecht der Sowjetunion," *Osteuropa*, June 1952, 169-176.

Manning, Clarence A., "The American Universities and the Russian Problem," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Spring 1952, 108-115.

Meek, Dorothea L., "A Soviet Women's Magazine," *Soviet Studies*, July 1952, 32-47.

Meissner, Boris, "Die Deutschlandnote des Kreml - Wendepunkt in der sowjetischen Aussenpolitik?" *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, April 1952, 196-201.

Meissner, Boris, "Shdanow (II)," *Osteuropa*, April 1952, 94-101.

Nove, A., "The Kolkhoz System, a Rejoiner," *Soviet Studies*, July 1952, 48-52.

Miller, J., "The 1941 Economic Plan," *Soviet Studies*, April 1952, 365-386.

Pekiw, Petro, "Labor Day in USSR," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Spring 1952, 123-128.

Raeff, Marc, "A reactionary Liberal: M. N. Katkov," *Russian Rev.*, July 1952, 157-167.

Seton, F., "Pre-war Soviet Prices in the Light of the 1941 Plan," *Soviet Studies*, April 1952, 351-364.

Shub, David, "New Light on Lenin," *Russian Rev.*, July 1952, 131-137.

"Soviet 'Unity' and Social Antagonisms," *Bull. of Intern. Peasant Union*, June 1952, 8-12.

"The Planning of Industry and Investment," *Soviet Studies*, April 1952, 431-458.

"The Soviet Slavery System," *Bull. of Intern. Peasant Union*, June 1952, 21-24.

VER., "La Iglesia Ortodoxa en Rusia," *Oriente*, April-June 1952, 73-82.

Werner, George M., "Die Ostwanderung der Sowjetindustrie," *Osteuropa*, April 1952, 81-85.

Wittram, Reinhard, "Peters des Grossen Verhältnis zur Religion und den Kirchen," *Hist. Zft.* April 1952, 261-296.

Zinner, Paul E., "The Ideological Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy," *World Pol.*, July 1952, 488-511.

## UKRAINE

Bączkowski, Włodzimierz, "Sprawa ukraińska," *Kultura*, July-August, 1952, 64-84.

Bezpaliv, Ivan, "The Theories and Practice of the Academician Trofym Lysenko," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Spring, 1952, 156-164.

Łobodowski, Józef, "Ukraińska literatura emigracyjna," *Kultura*, April 1952, 446-60.

Smal-Stocki, Roman, "Ukraine as the Geopolitical Basis of Russian Imperialism," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Spring 1952, 116-122.